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ARTICLES
REANALYZING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF
FUNCTION(S) AND FORM(S)
ROBERT B. AHDIEH*
The analysis herein arises from the collision course between the sweeping reforms
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 and a single sentence of the U.S. Code, adopted nearly fifteen years earlier and
largely forgotten ever since. Few were likely thinking of Section 106 of the National
Securities Market Improvement Act when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on
July 21, 2010. As applied by the D.C. Circuit less than a year later in Business
Roundtable v. SEC, however, that provision's peculiar requirement of cost-benefit
analysis could prove the new legislation's undoing.
To help navigate this potential impasse, the Article that follows suggests the need to
more carefully analyze the function and form of the cost-benefit analysis mandate
in Section 106 and develops a generally applicable framework for doing so.
Discussions of cost-benefit analysis have traditionally approached it as a fairly sin-
gular phenomenon-with broad aspirations of "efficiency" as its purpose and with
its application in environmental and risk regulation understood to capture its form.
In reality, cost-benefit analysis is both more ad hoc-and more systematically
varied-than this account suggests.
The framework proposed herein thus makes an important contribution to our
understanding of the complexities and varieties of cost-benefit analysis generally. In
the particular case of Section 106, meanwhile, it counsels a distinct function and
particular characteristics of form that will better direct its application-both to the
myriad regulations mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act and beyond. Properly under-
stood, Section 106 is designed to encourage SEC attention to substantive considera-
tions that might otherwise be neglected, given the Commission's traditional focus
on investor protection. As to form, Section 106 constitutes a true mandate and one
properly subject to judicial review. Contrary to the analysis in Business
Roundtable, however, that mandate is procedural rather than substantive in nature.
By comparison with formal cost-benefit analysis, it is less rigidly quantitative. It
does, however, demand careful attention to the distributional impacts of relevant
rulemaking. To such particularized ends and in such tailored form, ultimately,
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cost-benefit analysis has the potential to generate significant insight-both under
Section 106 and for financial regulation as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal regulation of the financial markets has been contested
from its earliest days. In succession, the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 faced strong resistance. As one
newspaper reported at the time: "There is no greater murmuring
in the land than that which rises against the Securities Act."'
Representatives of industry did not just murmur, however, but warned
loudly that the legislation would dry up the capital markets and "seri-
ously retard economic recovery." 2 More graphically, they railed that
the Act sought to "burn down the house to exterminate [the]
vermin. "3
More than seventy-five years later, the story remains largely the
same. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 was fiercely fought and passed without a single vote to
spare.4 Ensuing efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and bank regu-
lators to undertake the nearly 400 rulemakings mandated by the legis-
lation have faced comparable resistance.5 Even the 1933 and 1934
Acts themselves continue to be challenged. 6
1 Larry Bumgardner et al., A Brief History of the 1930s Securities Laws in the United
States-And the Potential Lesson for Today 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
New York University Law Review) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 444 (1958).
2 Bumgardner et al., supra note 1, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 77 (1982); cf William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates,
The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) (arguing that effects of the
Securities Act would be limited).
4 See Meena Hartenstein, Wall Street Reform Passes Senate: 60-39 Vote Approves
Sweeping Bill to Overhaul Financial System, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 15, 2010), http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/politics/walI-street-reform-passes-senate-60-39-vote-approves-
sweeping-bill-overhaul-financial-system-article-1.464555 (reporting that the Dodd-Frank
Act passed by a vote of 60-39).
5 See Kevin McCoy, Dodd-Frank Act: After 3 Years, a Long To-Do List, USA TODAY
(June 3, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/03/dodd-frank-
financial-reform-progress/2377603/ (describing the finance industry's opposition to many of
Dodd-Frank's provisions).
6 Roberta Romano is perhaps the leading critic of the federal securities law regime,
variously questioning its utility and suggesting the benefits of state-level-and hence com-
petitive-regulation of the securities markets. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2365 (1998).
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The last decade-opening with the litany of accounting scandals
at Enron, MCI WorldCom, and other corporate behemoths and
closing with the devastation of the global financial crisis-has brought
an increasing sense of urgency to the design of effective regimes of
financial market regulation. Proving Newton's third law of motion,
however, this pressure has triggered an equal and opposite reaction
among the opponents of increased regulation. Such resistance has
taken many forms.7 Of late, however, a new weapon has emerged in
the battle to delay, defer, or prevent the adoption of new financial
rules: the claim of asserted inadequacies in the cost-benefit analysis of
relevant regulations.
Since the introduction of cost-benefit analysis in the New Deal
era,8 federal courts from the Supreme Court down have shown little
inclination to engage in a searching review of agencies' conduct of
such analysis.9 This has been true even of executive agencies-let
alone independent ones, such as the SEC.10 While the SEC has volun-
tarily engaged in cost-benefit analyses of its rulemaking for more than
thirty years, its assessments were, until recently, all but never the sub-
ject of critical review." Even after Section 106 of the National
7 Opponents have variously sought to delay rulemakings indefinitely, to deprive regu-
lators of necessary funding, to block the appointment of key regulators, and to overwhelm
regulators with public comments. See Louise Story, Resistance Bogs Down Financial
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 2011, at B1 (discussing the state of reforms mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act nearly one year after its passage).
8 See infra Part I.A.
9 See Jonathan D. Guynn, The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking After
Business Roundtable, 99 VA. L. REV. 641, 653-54 (2013) (noting that the D.C. Circuit's
searching review of the SEC's cost-benefit analysis in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412
F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005), upset agencies' expectations of deferential review); Christopher
Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222,
1288-89 (2009) ("In other contexts involving economic regulations, courts rarely interfere
to second-guess those cost-benefit determinations."); Peter Raven-Hansen, Making
Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291,
1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 340, 340 n.309 (1983) (noting deferential nature of courts' review of
agency cost-benefit analysis).
10 See id. at 646 (discussing several executive orders mandating cost-benefit analysis in
executive agencies).
11 See Leen Al-Alami, Comment, Business Roundtable v. SEC: Rising Judicial Mistrust
and the Onset of a New Era in Judicial Review of Securities Regulation, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L.
541, 553-54 (2013) (analyzing decision of the D.C. Circuit that the SEC had not performed
an adequate cost-benefit analysis). But see Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (remanding SEC rule that barred professional traders from using automated small-
order securities exchange system because of inadequate cost-benefit analysis). It bears
emphasizing that the lack of judicial critique of the SEC's analysis of costs and benefits
does not arise from any bar against judicial review. Any dimension of an administrative
agency's reasoning-whether voluntary or required-may be subject to review. See Fred
Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 89, 107 (2000) (noting that
any agency cost-benefit analysis is subject to judicial review).
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Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) directed the
SEC to "consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
[an] action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation," 12 courts showed little inclination to question the resulting
analysis.' 3 Perhaps even more telling, litigants challenging SEC
rulemaking did not think the question worth raising.14
In the face of a decade's growth in the scope of financial market
regulation, however, claims of error in the SEC's analysis of costs and
benefits have become an important battlefront. Faced with the flood
of SEC rulemaking demanded by Dodd-Frank, judicial review of the
cost-benefit balance struck by the Commission as to each proposed
rule may offer the best hope for opponents of increased regulation.
Where they have lost the fight in Congress, at the White House, and
before the SEC, cost-benefit analysis may now offer one more bite at
the apple-this time, in the courts.'5
Consider, by way of example, the striking history of SEC
rulemaking on shareholder proxy access: After a decade of debate,
multiple congressional hearings, and several aborted rulemakings on
this tool of shareholder participation and assertedly improved
12 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106,
110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012)).
13 See Al-Alami, supra note 11, at 548-53 (reviewing D.C. Circuit decisions that voided
SEC rules, but not on the basis of inadequate cost-benefit analysis).
14 Section 106 has been invoked in only three challenges to SEC rulemaking thus far.
See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis 1
n.3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York University Law Review) (noting rele-
vant instances). That litigants have not seen the SEC's analysis of costs and benefits as
good grounds for legal challenge is even more evident when we recall that in every one of
those cases, the petitioners' Section 106 claim was successful. Id. at 2. Beyond cost-benefit
analysis particularly, the SEC might be said to have been insulated from judicial review
more generally, for much of its existence. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The
Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking
Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2012) (noting that "SEC-adopted rules enjoyed a
blissful existence before the D.C. Circuit" before Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d
133 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
15 See David S. Hilzenrath, Wall Street Finds Relief in Court from SEC Rules, WASH.
POST, Aug. 11, 2011, at A10 (noting that the court in Business Roundtable had set what
could be an impossible standard to meet). That this is the dynamic at work is suggested by
industry groups' willingness to invoke this newly discovered weapon in seeking to constrain
SEC initiatives. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1846 (discussing the "rattling of
appellate-review sabers by industry groups" after Business Roundtable). Jason Johnston's
game-theoretic account of resistance to agency undertakings-first, by way of political lob-
bying, and then, through cost-benefit analysis and judicial review-suggests a conceptual
framework for this dynamic. See Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1343
(2002).
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corporate governance, 16 the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly empowered
the SEC to give shareholders access to the corporate proxy to nomi-
nate directors to the board.'7 On June 18, 2009, the SEC proposed just
such a rule, receiving over 600 comments and making various changes
by way of response.' 8 More than a year later, it enacted (in a closely
divided vote) Rule 14a-11,19 the first of hundreds of new rules
addressed in Dodd-Frank and to be enacted in short order.20
Considering SEC rulemaking unsafe at any speed, however, the
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce challenged the
new rule on behalf of their corporate memberships, invoking the cur-
sory, and otherwise obscure and mostly ignored, language of Section
106 of the NSMIA, which directed the SEC to consider the impact of
its rules on "efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 21
Building on a pair of recent D.C. Circuit decisions-the first also
arising out of a claim by the Chamber of Commerce-they argued
that the SEC's assessment of the costs and benefits of mandatory
proxy access had not met the requirements of Section 106.22 To the
surprise of both administrative law and securities regulation experts,
16 See Anthony W. Mongone, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny
and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 746, 759-63
(2012) (reviewing history of SEC consideration of proxy access rule for shareholders). In
just the final two years of the proxy access fight, drafting the rule reportedly cost the SEC
21,000 staff hours and $2.2 million. Id. at 794; Rachel A. Benedict, Judicial Review of SEC
Rules: Managing the Costs of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 97 MINN. L. REV. 278, 278 (2012); see
also Ben Protess, Court Ruling Offers Path to Challenge Dodd-Frank, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18,
2011, at B1.
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)).
18 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 106 (2012) (discussing changes made to
the rule after the comment period); Case Note, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1088, 1089 (2012).
19 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV.
1347, 1351 (2011).
20 See Elaine Buckberg, Jonathan Macey & James Overdahl, Will Court Short-Circuit
Dodd-Frank?, POLITICO.COM, (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:23 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0811/61363.html (noting that the rule that the court struck down was "the first of
approximately 250 new regulations required under Dodd-Frank"). The pace of agency
action on the rulemakings dictated by Dodd-Frank has been halting at best. See McCoy,
supra note 5 (noting that about two-thirds of Dodd-Frank's rulemaking deadlines had not
been met just a month before the third anniversary of its passage).
21 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
22 Id.; see also Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Notably, the
SEC's release included seventy-three pages of economic analysis of the final rule. J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Shareholder Access and Uneconomic Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable
v. SEC, DENv. U.L. REV. ONLINE, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.denverlawreview.org/
online-articles/2011/9/30/shareholder-access-and-uneconomic-economic-analysis-business.
html; Case Note, supra note 18, at 1089.
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the D.C. Circuit agreed in Business Roundtable v. SEC, vacating the
rule and sending it back to the SEC, which promptly announced its
intention to forgo any appeal and abandon further efforts to enact the
rule.23
On multiple levels, the Business Roundtable decision came as a
surprise to scholars and practitioners of administrative law.2 4 Most
simply, the D.C. Circuit's analysis seemed all but impossible to recon-
cile with the high standard of deference the Supreme Court had estab-
lished for judicial review of agency action.25 In rejecting the SEC's
reliance on certain academic sources over others in support of its
rulemaking, the D.C. Circuit seemed to be engaged in just the type of
substitution of its judgment for that of the agency that the Court had
explicitly forbidden.26 That this lack of deference came in the realm of
securities regulation-which had received especially broad deference
from the courts in the past-added to the surprise.
Perhaps most surprising, however, was Business Roundtable's
dramatic departure from the deference the courts had previously
shown agency evaluations of costs and benefits.27 The D.C. Circuit's
demands would have been out of the ordinary, thus, as to any cost-
benefit analysis provision. That they arose out of the obscure language
of Section 106-and its mere instruction to the SEC to "consider" the
23 SEC News Release 2011-179, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on
Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-179.htm; see also Ben Protess, S.E.C. Won't Fight Ruling Striking Down Proxy
Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/
s-e-c-wont-fight-ruling-striking-down-proxy-access/.
24 See, e.g., Cox & Baucom, supra note 14 (suggesting inconsistency of Business
Roundtable with Supreme Court precedent and Congressional standards); Hayden &
Bodie, supra note 18 (addressing the "bizarre" nature of the court's reasoning); Mongone,
supra note 16 (discussing the unprecedented level of judicial scrutiny applied in Business
Roundtable).
25 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (holding that the scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is
narrow, and a court is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency).
26 See id.
27 See Case Note, supra note 18, at 1094 (noting that Business Roundtable set an even
higher standard of review than normally used in the D.C. Circuit); see also Hayden &
Bodie, supra note 18, at 102 (suggesting that the court's reasoning in Business Roundtable
"contravenes the traditional deference to administrative authority"); Steven M. Davidoff,
Proxy Access in Limbo After Court Rules Against It, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2011, http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/201 1/07/27/proxy-access-in-limbo-after-court-rules-against-it/
(arguing that the opinion creates "an almost insurmountable barrier" for agency action).
Such deference has been especially high when it comes to agencies' assessment of technical
or scientific questions. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983) (noting that "a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential" when
examining scientific determinations).
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impact of proposed rules on "efficiency, competition, and capital for-
mation"-was even less explicable.
The language of Section 106, to begin, is not that of conventional
cost-benefit analysis. Where Congress has sought such an analysis, it
knows how to make itself clear. The Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) thus required findings as to the "[q]uantifiable and non-
quantifiable health risk reduction benefits" and the "[q]uantifiable
and nonquantifiable costs for which there is a factual basis in the
rulemaking record." 28 In the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA), analogously, Congress mandated a "qualitative and quanti-
tative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits." 29 Each of
those provisions was adopted within a year of the NSMIA, moreover,
suggesting Congress knew what it was doing when it drafted Section
106. Beyond its language, the legislative context of Section 106, its
relative obscurity, and the distinctive inquiry it demands all add to the
mystery of its forceful application in Business Roundtable.30
Given the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that Section 106 has
been the subject of close scholarly and practitioner attention ever
since the Business Roundtable decision. With its peculiar syntax, regu-
latory context, and legislative history, however, it has not lent itself to
ready understanding. Scholarly analysis to date has thus explored it as
an odd mutation of the Supreme Court's "hard look" standard for
judicial review of agency action-as a reinterpretation of sorts of the
Administrative Procedure Act's provision for "arbitrary and capri-
cious" review. 31 But this approach obscures more than it reveals.
Instead, this Article analyzes Section 106-consistent with its leg-
islative history, with the SEC's approach to it, and with the D.C.
Circuit's implicit treatment of it-as a cost-benefit mandate, but of a
distinct sort. Business Roundtable was correct to analyze Section 106
as a cost-benefit provision-and even as an enumeration of factors for
SEC consideration-but wrong in its assessment of what such a con-
ception of the provision entailed. In addressing that misunder-
standing, we may better engage the high stakes of the decision for
SEC rulemaking in the years ahead. If the promise of the Dodd-Frank
28 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613
(1996).
29 2 U.S.C. §H 1532-1538 (2012); cf Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 510-11 (1981) (noting Congress' clear articulation of demand for cost-benefit analysis,
in relevant statutes).
30 See infra Part I.B.1 (describing the adoption of Section 106).
31 See, e.g., Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1826; Michael E. Murphy, The SEC and
the District of Columbia Circuit: The Emergence of a Distinct Standard of Judicial Review, 7
VA. L. & Bus. REV. 125 (2012).
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Act is to be realized-an open question after Business Roundtable32 -
it is essential to properly understand the decision and both the
demands and the limits of cost-benefit analysis under Section 106.33
As suggested above, though, Business Roundtable is no less
important for students of administrative law generally than it is for
experts in financial regulation. Beyond its immediate implications for
the SEC, the extension of cost-benefit analysis to financial regulation
demands an evaluation of cost-benefit analysis more generally. In
extending cost-benefit analysis into new territory, Section 106 requires
us to codify a more diverse range of functions for cost-benefit analysis,
beyond the traditional assertion of increased efficiency. Equally
important, it requires us to tease out diverse modalities of cost-benefit
analysis in actual practice, revealing far greater variance in its actual
application as a decision tool than commonly acknowledged.
To explore these issues, I proceed as follows: Part I offers a brief
introduction to cost-benefit analysis as it has been conventionally
understood and outlines the origins and content of Section 106. As the
immediate impetus for, though not the full context of, the analysis
offered herein, Part I also briefly reviews the decision in Business
Roundtable.
With that background, the Article explores cost-benefit analysis
generally-in Parts II and 111-before turning back to Section 106 in
32 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1065-66 (2012) (arguing that Business Roundtable "cast a substantial cloud over the SEC's
continuing ability to adopt other rules in implementing the Dodd-Frank Act"); see also
Case Note, supra note 18, at 1088 (noting that Business Roundtable's approach "all but
bars contested reforms"); Protess, supra note 16 (commenting that the D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion "does not bode well for several other Dodd-Frank rules"). The implications of
Business Roundtable thus run to agencies beyond the SEC as well. See Kraus & Raso,
supra note 14, at 1 ("Other financial regulators are alarmed, and with good reason, since
their economic analyses of their own rules are generally less sophisticated than the
SEC's."); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY AGENCIES 57-58 (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/reportleconomic-
analysis-report-draft (pointing to cases brought by business groups against other agencies
that cite Business Roundtable); Hal Weitzman, CME Group Chief Donohue Hits at
Washington Regulators, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at 18 (addressing effects of the
decision on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
33 In particular, as David Arkush argues, it is critical that the SEC stake out a clear
position on the proper application of cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation. See
David J. Arkush, Status-Quo Bias in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation 1
(Mar. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law
Review); cf RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:
How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR
HEALTH (2008) (arguing for use of cost-benefit analysis in support of regulatory initia-
tives); Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 42 (noting faults in the current conception of cost-
benefit analysis and arguing for a new approach that is more favorable to regulation). The
analysis herein might be understood to offer a framework for it to do so.
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particular and financial regulation more broadly, in the final two
parts. Stepping beyond the conventional debate among administrative
law scholars over the normative wisdom of cost-benefit analysis, Part
II offers a typology of the multiple (and sometimes conflicting) pur-
poses that cost-benefit analysis might be understood to serve in any
given case. While "efficiency" is usually asserted as the goal, there
turn out to be various forms of efficiency that cost-benefit analysis
might help to promote. Equally important, there are crucial non-
efficiency functions that cost-benefit analysis may serve as well.
Going beyond the function of cost-benefit analysis, I turn to con-
sider questions of its form and application. As with questions of func-
tion, the study of cost-benefit analysis has tended to approach it as a
standard-form procedure, to be applied or not applied in different set-
tings, but with limited differences in form. 3 4 Suggesting a greater
diversity of forms under the common umbrella of cost-benefit
analysis, Part III explores four sets of questions to be weighed in
determining the appropriate form of any given cost-benefit analysis:
the source of law for the relevant requirement, the nature of the
agency responsible for conducting the analysis, the nature of the
problem at issue, and the nature of the variables to be evaluated.
Across the study of cost-benefit analysis generally, the foregoing
offers a distinct approach to the application and evaluation of any
given cost-benefit analysis provision. Especially as such applications
are extended across more diverse subject-matter areas of administra-
tive regulation, a systematic framework for evaluating the appropriate
function and form of the particular cost-benefit analysis requirement
at issue will be essential to its effective application. But what of
Section 106 particularly, and financial regulation more generally?
Of particular relevance to securities law scholars, Part IV brings
the framework articulated in Parts II and III to bear on Section 106's
charge to the SEC to consider the impact of its rulemaking on "effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation." 35 First, it identifies a
34 To be sure, the contrast between cost-benefit analysis and the casual consideration of
arguments for and against relevant policy choices-occasionally with citation to Benjamin
Franklin-is sometimes acknowledged. Cf Int'l Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1321
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (drawing connection between Franklin and cost-benefit analysis); PAUL
ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION 11 (2013) (describing Franklin's admonition); John 0. McGinnis,
Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 940 n.177 (2001) (sug-
gesting that cost-benefit analysis flows from Benjamin Franklin's suggestion that policy
decisions be made after weighing relevant advantages and disadvantages). As often as not,
however, the point of that contrast is not to identify varied forms of cost-benefit analysis,
but to distinguish it from what it is not.
35 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
§ 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012)).
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largely nonefficiency explanation of Section 106's functions. Properly
understood, Section 106 is a mandate of cost-benefit analysis, but it is
not-in primary part-about increasing efficiency, reducing cognitive
biases, increasing transparency, facilitating agency monitoring, or any
of a number of other potential functions outlined in Part II. Rather,
echoing the Business Roundtable decision-at least as interpreted in
the most generous light-Section 106 is best understood as an unusual
means for Congress to force SEC consideration of substantive factors
not prioritized by its organic statutes, nor capable of ready incorpora-
tion into those statutes.
Drawing on that function, together with the findings as to form
suggested by application of Part III's framework questions to Section
106, Part IV concludes by offering a distinct account of the proper
conduct and review of the analysis prescribed by Section 106.
Successively, it describes a narrow duty to consider, but not necessa-
rily regulate in accord with, Section 106's factors; a distinct form of
cost-benefit analysis, characterized by careful attention to the distribu-
tional dynamics at work, a lesser emphasis on rigid quantification, and
no demand to "balance" the operative factors in some mechanistic
fashion; and a high degree of judicial deference to the agency's
analysis, cabined by a limited framework of judicial review.
Part V concludes, suggesting the value of finding a place for cost-
benefit analysis in financial regulation generally, for at least three rea-
sons: its contribution to the complex balancing exercise at the heart of
financial market regulation, its potential to address both the reality
and the perception of interest group influence in the design of finan-
cial rules, and its capacity to reduce the cognitive biases that underlie
systemic risk on the financial markets. As elsewhere, cost-benefit
analysis in financial regulation is bound to generate disagreements-
and even controversy. Key design features may help to limit the latter,
or at least maximize the prospect that the benefits of cost-benefit
analysis in financial regulation outweigh its costs. Among other char-
acteristics, I suggest in Part V that integration of a broader range of
factors, a clear enumeration of relevant considerations (including
especially systemic risk and distributional concerns), and judicial
review targeted to procedural rather than substantive duties should
define the parameters of cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation.
In the regulation of financial markets, as elsewhere, cost-benefit anal-
ysis may foster efficient ends or be paralyzing. By embracing a dis-
course of cost-benefit analysis focused on the diversity of functions it
may serve and the varied forms it may take, we are far more likely to
encourage the former-and to avoid the latter.
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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:
FROM RISK REGULATION TO SECURITIES REGULATION
Although requirements of cost-benefit analysis have been in the
U.S. Code since the 1930s, recent decades have seen a dramatic
expansion in its use among both executive and independent agencies.
Its subject-matter reach has also grown, as it has found application
beyond its original core of agencies operating in the realm of risk reg-
ulation, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and
others. Most recently, it has secured an important foothold in the hith-
erto insulated realm of financial regulation. After outlining the origins
and traditional application of cost-benefit analysis, I explore that
extension more closely-including its unexpected intersection with
the SEC's efforts to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.
A. The Origins and Embrace of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis mandates in U.S. law can be traced to the
1936 Flood Control Act, which required agencies to evaluate the eco-
nomics of proposed flood control projects. 36 Over the ensuing
decades, scholars and policymakers sought to apply cost-benefit
analysis to a variety of regulatory sectors, from workplace safety to
military spending.37 With the rapid growth in federal environmental
law in the 1970s, however, the future of cost-benefit analysis grew
murky. Given the challenges of valuing environmental goods and
human life, cost-benefit analysis seemed increasingly out-of-place.38
The election of President Ronald Reagan, however, gave cost-
benefit analysis a new lease on life. Within weeks of taking office,
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, directing that "regulatory
action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society."39 The order
was greeted with substantial protest,40 on varied grounds. Some
36 Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 169 (1999).
37 See David Pearce, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy, 14 OXFoRD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 84, 85 (1998) (reviewing history of the use of cost-benefit analysis).
38 Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 170-71. Important Nixon-era executive orders
nonetheless included cost-benefit analysis requirements. Johnston, supra note 15, at 1344.
39 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-29 (1981); see also Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3 (1995)
(describing Reagan's executive order).
4 Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHi. L. REv. 1137, 1139 (2001).
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decried it as a nontransparent means of deregulation; others objected
to its aspiration to quantify the immeasurable; and some questioned
the rigidity of the cost-benefit analysis it prescribed and its potential
to foster abuse of the rulemaking process.41
Notwithstanding these and other objections, the practice of cost-
benefit analysis took hold and persisted, even after the White House
changed hands.42 Rather than abandoning the requirement, President
Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, charging agencies to
"assess both the costs and the benefits of [any] intended regulation." 43
Clinton's order thus preserved the basic requirement of cost-benefit
analysis, giving agencies greater leeway to rely on nonquantifiable
grounds of decision, but otherwise modifying only details of its
application.44
In the years since Reagan's executive order, the practice of cost-
benefit analysis has thus permeated the federal regulatory system-
though with greatest force at those agencies responsible for human
health and safety. Various legislative attempts to mandate cost-benefit
analysis universally have failed to clear Congress, as have a number of
bills applying it to one or another particular agency.45 Many important
pieces of cost-benefit analysis legislation have been successfully
enacted, on the other hand, including the UMRA and the NSMIA
provision of interest herein.46
With its now long history and embrace across the political spec-
trum,4 7 the place of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory analysis would
today seem secure. Across a wide range of government agencies-
41 See Philip Shabecoff, Reagan Order on Cost-Benefit Analysis Stirs Economic and
Political Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1981, at 2:28 (noting various critiques of cost-benefit
analysis).
42 Posner, supra note 40, at 1139.
43 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993).
44 See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161,176-78 (1994) (reviewing
terms of Clinton's executive order); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1994) (describing the Vice
President's role in overseeing the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
under Clinton's executive order). In particular, Clinton's order altered the framework of
political oversight over agencies' cost-benefit analyses and the associated level of trans-
parency. See Shapiro, supra, at 39 (noting that Clinton's order ended "much of the secrecy
that marred White House oversight in the two prior administrations").
45 Johnston, supra note 15, at 1345 & n.7.
46 The practice of cost-benefit analysis has increasingly spread to the state level as well.
Posner, supra note 40, at 1139-40.
47 President Obama made only limited changes to the Clinton-era executive order,
including several designed to expand its reach. See Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R.
215, 216 (2011) (directing agencies to consider even values that are difficult or impossible
to quantify).
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including some for whom it is not even required-cost-benefit analysis
is now conducted as a matter of course.48 These agencies routinely
engage in a "systematic enumeration of all benefits and all costs,
tangible and intangible," 49 associated with their regulatory undertak-
ings.50 As prescribed by Executive Order 12,866, they variously weigh
the "functioning of the economy and private markets, the enhance-
ment of health and safety, the protection of the natural environment,
and the elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias" 51-even as
they pursue the dictates of their particular regulatory missions.
Yet controversy about the use of cost-benefit analysis persists.
Consider the contentious establishment of a new "maximum contami-
nant level" (MCL) for arsenic in drinking water rushed through in the
waning days of the Clinton Administration, and undone immediately
thereafter (at least for a time) by the Bush Administration.
In 1942, federal regulators established an MCL for arsenic of 50
parts per billion (ppb). Fifty-four years later, after being directed by
Congress to set a new arsenic standard by 2000, the EPA asked the
National Resource Council (NRC) of the National Academy of
Sciences to conduct an independent review of the arsenic toxicity data
and recommend any appropriate changes to the standard. Relying
upon one of several published studies-each pointing to different con-
clusions-the NRC ultimately recommended a reduced arsenic level,
of 10 ppb. Recommendation in hand, the EPA issued a new MCL at
48 See Posner, supra note 40, at 1139 n.15 (noting a dramatic increase in Federal
Register references to cost-benefit analysis between 1980 and 1999).
49 See March Sadowitz, Note, Tailoring Cost-Benefit Analysis to Environmental Policy
Goals: Technology- and Health-Based Environmental Standards in the Age of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 2 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 11, 1 22 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5o See Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons
from the SEC's Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 1 (2006)
(suggesting Reagan and Clinton executive orders resulted in more systematic use of cost-
benefit analysis).
51 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(i), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Beyond these, additional
costs include "the direct cost both to the government in administering the regulation and to
businesses and others in complying with the regulation, and any adverse effects on the
efficient functioning of the economy, private markets (including productivity, employment,
and competitiveness), health, safety, and the natural environment." Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(ii).
Guidelines from the Office of Management and Budget prescribe the process that
agencies should follow in conducting cost-benefit analyses. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1 (2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory-matters-pdf/a-4.pdf. First, the
agency should present the monetized costs and benefits of the action. Second, it should
present costs and benefits that are quantified but cannot be monetized. Third, it should
present a description of qualitative data used in the analysis. Finally, the agency should
present surveys and other data it relied upon for estimates in the analysis. Id. at 18.
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that level, alongside an evaluation of the costs and benefits of various
potential MCL levels. 52
In a January 20, 2001 memorandum from Andrew Card, chief of
staff to newly inaugurated President Bush, however, the EPA was
directed to delay the effective date of the new rule for 60 days, from
March 23, 2001 to May 22, 2001.53 On the latter date, in turn, a further
delay was imposed, to February 22, 2002.54 The EPA then initiated an
additional cycle of review, including a request to the National
Academy of Sciences to review the findings of the NRC. 55 It also
requested the National Drinking Water Advisory Council to review
the costing methodologies, assumptions, and data used in the original
rulemaking.56 As for benefits, finally, it charged the newly convened
Arsenic Rule Benefits Review Panel to conduct further review.5 7 On
March 25, 2003, two years after the original effective date, the EPA
finally affirmed the 10 ppb standard and put it into effect.58
The tortuous path to a new standard for arsenic contamination-
and the central role that cost-benefit analysis played in that process-
has been widely cited by critics of the practice. As Lisa Heinzerling
put it shortly afterwards, the entire process seemed "inexplicable." 59
More generally, the case of arsenic regulation can be seen to highlight
the ambiguities of cost-benefit analysis as a decision procedure. If, as
even advocate of cost-benefit analysis Cass Sunstein argued, it could
only suggest a range of 0 to 112 lives saved (and monetary savings of
between $0 and $560 million) with a lowered MCL, 60 how much work
can cost-benefit analysis really be understood to do in regulatory
decisionmaking?
Much of this debate has played out in the academic literature-
including among scholars who have straddled the line between the
theory and practice of cost-benefit analysis.61 Yet for all the vigor of
52 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEo. L.J. 2255, 2268-71 (2002)
(describing EPA's establishment of MCL standard).
53 Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants
Monitoring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134, 16,134 (Mar. 23, 2001).
54 Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants
Monitoring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,342, 28,342 (May 22, 2001).
55 Id. at 28,345.
56 Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants
Monitoring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,617, 37,621 (July 19, 2001).
57 Id. at 37,622.
58 Minor Clarification of National Primary Drinking Water Regulation for Arsenic, 68
Fed. Reg. 14,502, 14,502 (Mar. 25, 2003) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141).
59 Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311, 2312 (2002).
60 Sunstein, supra note 52, at 2283.
61 Among the leading critics of cost-benefit analysis are Professors Lisa Heinzerling,
Doug Kysar, Thomas McGarity, Christopher Schroeder, and others. See, e.g., FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELEss: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
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the scholarly debate, it has inadequately attended to certain crucial
questions. For the most part, legal scholars have focused their atten-
tion on whether cost-benefit analysis is appropriate-especially in the
regulation of human health and safety-rather than exploring ques-
tions of its potential form, or even its precise function in one setting
versus another.62 Even where the literature does engage with the form
cost-benefit analysis might take, it most often does so only in the ser-
vice of proving or disproving its normative wisdom. 6 3
Perhaps because of this emphasis on the normative question of
cost-benefit analysis as good or bad, the academic study of cost-
benefit analysis has also tended to approach the practice as a fairly
singular phenomenon. This begins with the casual assumption-by
most, but not all-of broadly-defined "efficiency" as the primary func-
tion of cost-benefit analysis.64 Equally important, scholars have com-
monly engaged cost-benefit analysis as a singular method of
decisionmaking, rather than an umbrella encompassing an array of
related, but distinctly operationalized, approaches to considering the
costs and benefits of alternative regulatory choices. 65 As I will argue
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010); SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 335 (2011); Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous
Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1876 (2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(1999)).
62 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 61 (engaging normative questions
of cost-benefit analysis rather than its form and function); Thomas 0. McGarity, The
Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463 (1996)
(same).
63 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341
(2002) (arguing that ambiguities of quantitative risk assessment undermine the case for
cost-benefit analysis).
64 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, Can Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Policy
Go Global?, 19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 146, 176 (2011) (pointing to the argument that cost-
benefit analysis "should be focused exclusively on efficiency criteria"). Important excep-
tions include some of Cass Sunstein's work, and articles by Matthew Adler and Eric
Posner. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A Comment on Judge
Williams' Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271 (2001) (exploring utility
of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for promoting overall well-being); Eric. A. Posner, Cost-
Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 289 (2001)
(advocating cost-benefit analysis as a means of maximizing social welfare); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000) (arguing
that cost-benefit analysis is justified as a way to correct cognitive difficulties).
65 See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 63, at 2342-45 (offering an account of the nature of
cost-benefit analysis generally); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 2256-60 (same). Richard
Revesz and Michael Livermore might be seen as something of an exception to this rule. See
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herein, it is essential that we be more ecumenical in our evaluation
and application of cost-benefit analysis, both with regard to its func-
tions and its forms.66 In certain settings, in the service of certain goals,
and in certain forms, cost-benefit analysis may be an invaluable tool.
In other settings, with different goals, and in a distinct form, it may be
a grave threat.67 Without greater attention to the heterogeneity of
cost-benefit analysis's functions and forms, the discourse around it can
only get us so far.
B. Costs, Benefits, and the Efficiency of Financial Regulation
Notwithstanding the seeming attractions of an analysis of regula-
tory costs and benefits in-of all places-the financial markets, such
analysis has not traditionally been a focus of U.S. securities regulation,
even as it has grown in importance in other areas.68 Beginning in the
1970s, the SEC started to conduct cost-benefit analyses, though only
voluntarily, and with no particular consistency in the nature, form, or
quality of its analysis. 69 Perhaps for that reason, the SEC's efforts
received little or no attention-from scholars, the courts, or even
critics of the Commission's regulatory choices.
REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33. In encouraging advocates of enhanced regulation to
engage (rather than resist) the use of cost-benefit analysis, they suggest the potential for it
to take distinct forms. Id. at 9-19. Their analysis, however, would appear to construe this
variation as involving a deviation from the proper form of cost-benefit analysis. Separately,
one might understand the Supreme Court's decision in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556
U.S. 208 (2009), to acknowledge (at least implicitly) the potential for a multiplicity of valid
forms of cost-benefit analysis. The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 153, 346-47 (2009).
66 In a sense, the acknowledgement of multiple functions and forms of cost-benefit
analysis that I recommend herein can be understood as an embrace of the "agency-specific
precedents" in administrative law that Levy and Glicksman identify-and cautiously
endorse-in recent work. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific
Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (describing the manifestation of agency-specific
precedents and their normative implications).
67 See REVESz & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 44 (noting potential wisdom or disu-
tility of cost-benefit analysis, depending on context); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at
341-51 (suggesting limitations of cost-benefit analysis as to certain types of policy issues).
68 See Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103
AM. EcoN. REV. 393, 393 (2013) (noting this gap in the literature).
69 See SEC Div. OF RISK, STRATEGY, AND FIN. INNOVATION & OFFICE OF GEN.
COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM: CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC
RULEMAKINGs 3 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi-guidance
econ-analy-secrulemaking.pdf [hereinafter CURRENT GUIDANCE] (noting that no statute
expressly requires the SEC to consider cost-benefit analysis; nor is the SEC, an indepen-
dent agency, obliged to follow Executive Order 12,866); Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at
5-7 (discussing the reasons the SEC might voluntarily report benefits and costs); Mongone,
supra note 16, at 755 (noting that the SEC acknowledges the importance of assessing costs
and benefits).
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Against this backdrop, Section 106 of the NSMIA-an act prima-
rily directed at preempting state securities law-tacked a single sen-
tence onto the end of the "definitions" sections of the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment
Company Act of 1940:
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation.70
For nearly a decade thereafter, that sentence was forgotten-some-
times even within the SEC, but invariably outside it. In recent years,
however, it has emerged as a new front in the application of cost-
benefit analysis, and in fights over the SEC's attempts to respond to
the recent financial crisis and the scope of financial regulation more
generally.71
1. The Adoption of Section 106
After securing majorities in both houses of Congress in 1994, the
newly installed Republican leadership established an aggressive
agenda of legislative reform. Among its priorities-if not a first-order
one-was a desire to transform both the substantive content and the
procedures of regulatory rulemaking. 72 This goal inspired an array of
legislative proposals-relatively few of which were ultimately enacted
70 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106,
110 Stat. 3416, 3424-25; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012)
(including the provision added by the NSMIA); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012) (same); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(c) (2012) (same).
71 Besides Section 106, another largely overlooked provision is Section 23(a)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which requires the SEC to consider the impact of its rulemaking
on competition and to articulate its basis for concluding that any negative impact thereon is
warranted. See CURRENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 3 (noting additional dictates on
SEC decisionmaking); see also id. at 3 n.7, 11 n.32 (same); COPELAND, supra note 32, at 38
(same). In critical respects, the analysis herein bears upon the application of Section
23(a)(2) as well.
72 See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 36, 42 (noting the place of cost-benefit
analysis on the 104th Congress's agenda); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate
over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1528-32 (1996) (predicting
emergence of a less-protective regulatory state following Republicans' electoral success);
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 247, 269-86 (1996) (outlining the 104th Congress's various attempts at deregu-
latory reform).
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into law.73 Among the success stories, however, was an obscure provi-
sion of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.
Primarily directed at preempting state securities law,7 4 the
NSMIA also required the SEC to "consider, in addition to the protec-
tion of investors, whether [its proposed] action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation."75 Specifically, the Act
amended the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940-three of the four
key statutes administered by the SEC-to append this language at the
end of their definitions sections.76
Looking to the language of Section 106 alone, it is not obvious it
demands all that much of the SEC. Consider, to begin, the contrast
between the SEC's obligation merely to "consider" the implications of
a proposed rule for efficiency, competition, and capital formation,
with the directive to do so in any case in which it is required to "con-
sider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest."77 Section 106 makes no explicit reference to "costs"
or "benefits," meanwhile, in contrast with Congress's explicit invoca-
tion of cost-benefit analysis only the year before, in the UMRA-and
73 See John Shanahan, Regulating the Regulators: Regulatory Process Reform in the
104th Congress, REG.: CATO REV. Bus. & Gov'T, Winter 1997, at 27 (noting limited
number of successful regulatory process reforms).
74 See Mongone, supra note 16, at 789-91 (noting preemption of state securities law
and regulation of mutual fund industry as primary motivations of the NSMIA).
75 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106.
76 Three years later, by way of another piece of legislation primarily directed to other
ends-the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which famously (or infamously) undid the separation
of investment and commercial banking codified by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933-
Congress addressed the NSMIA's failure to integrate the analysis of "efficiency, competi-
tion, and capital formation" into the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as well. See Cox &
Baucom, supra note 14, at 1822 (noting that the conference report accompanying the bill
rebuked the SEC for failing the properly implement the NSMIA's review standards).
Again, however, it did so by simply adding the requirement at the tail end of the defini-
tions section. See id. (noting the nature of statutory amendment).
Further evidence of the less than careful drafting of Section 106 might be seen in its
puzzling limitation of the scope of its application. Read literally, Section 106 would be
applicable only in situations where the SEC "is required to consider or determine whether
an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest." National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 § 106. Yet many of the most important rulemaking provisions in
securities law require the SEC to determine whether a rule is justified by the public
interest or is in the interest of investors. Notably, in this regard, Congress's authorization
of SEC rulemaking on proxy access in the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to
proceed "under such terms and conditions as [it] determines are in the interests of share-
holders and for the protection of investors." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 971(b), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012)) (emphasis added).
77 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106 (emphasis added); see
also Coffee, supra note 32, at 1066 (explaining that the language of Section 106, on its face,
only instructs the SEC to consider these impacts); Mongone, supra note 16, at 769 (same).
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the very same year, in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996.78 In adopting Section 106, moreover, Congress rejected the
Senate's version of the bill, which would have imposed a higher stan-
dard of economic analysis on the SEC, mandating that its chief econo-
mist produce a report (a) analyzing "the likely effects of the proposed
regulation on the economy of the United States, and particularly upon
the securities markets and the participants in those markets"79 and (b)
detailing "the estimated impact of the proposed regulation upon eco-
nomic and market behavior, including any impact on market liquidity,
the costs of investment, and the financial risks of investment."80
Other strands of the legislative history, by comparison, suggest
Congress expected some kind of cost-benefit analysis under Section
106.81 In particular, the House Report accompanying the NSMIA
noted the Committee's "expect[ation] that the Commission will
engage in rigorous analysis pursuant to this section."82 Further, it indi-
cated that, in considering efficiency, competition, and capital forma-
tion, "the Commission shall analyze the potential costs and benefits of
any rulemaking initiative, including, whenever practicable, specific
analysis of such costs and benefits."83 House Commerce Committee
Chairman Tom Bliley, meanwhile, described Section 106 as mandating
a "meaningful cost-benefit analysis" of any proposed rule. 8 4 Three
years later, further suggestion of Congress's expectations came in the
Conference Report to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, with its rebuke
of the SEC for inadequate analysis under Section 106 to date.85
Confirming the complex character of Section 106, however, the report
criticized the SEC even as Congress appended-without adjustment-
the precise language of Section 106 into the Investment Advisers
Act.86
78 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also Edward R. Morrison, Judicial
Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. Ci. L. REV.
1333, 1352 (1998) (commenting on said legislation's explicit requirement of cost-benefit
analysis).
79 Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1819-20 (quoting Securities Investment Promotion
Act of 1996, S. 1815, 104th Cong. § 310(b)(2) (1996)).
80 Id.
81 See Mongone, supra note 16, at 755 & n.41 (reviewing legislative history).
82 Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1820 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 39 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3901).
83 Id. Consistent with the statute itself, the House Report also makes clear that the
SEC's analysis of efficiency, competition, and capital formation should be conducted
"without compromising investor protection." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878).
84 Id. at 1822-23 (quoting 142 CONG. REc. 25,810 (1996)).
85 Id. at 1822 (citing H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 165 (1999) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 259).
86 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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2. The Application of Section 106
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this ambiguous terrain, the SEC
has applied Section 106 (and its extension to the Investment Advisers
Act)8 7 with some uncertainty. SEC analysis of efficiency, competition,
and capital formation, to begin, has to date been conducted separate
and apart from its consideration of the costs and benefits of proposed
regulatory initiatives.88 Its cost-benefit analysis has tended to be far
more detailed than its analysis under Section 106, meanwhile, notwith-
standing the entirely voluntary nature of the former.89
At least in part, this approach may be explained by the SEC's
treatment of the analysis of efficiency, competition, and capital forma-
tion as a species of cost-benefit analysis-particularly in its assessment
of efficiency.90 Not uncommonly, the SEC has simply referred back to
the same sources-and analysis-in discussing a proposed rule's
potential implications for efficiency, as it earlier offered in analyzing
costs and benefits. Perhaps similarly seeking to echo its more struc-
tured analysis of costs and benefits, SEC assessments under Section
106 have also tended to go beyond mere "consideration," instead
87 For purposes of simplicity, I reference the provision for the SEC's consideration of
efficiency, competition, and capital formation in Section 106 of the NSMIA. That provision
was codified in separate sections of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940. See supra notes 70, 76 and
accompanying text. Thereafter, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act codified the identical lan-
guage in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See id.
88 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that the SEC began including a sepa-
rate section regarding efficiency, competition, and capital formation concerns after passage
of the NSMIA). The adopting release for the proxy access rule, for example, included
separate sections for cost-benefit analysis and for the impact of the rule on efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations; Final Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,753-76 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 240.14a-11) (Sept. 16, 2010). It
bears noting, though, that this has begun to change. See Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 31
(noting that the SEC began integrating cost-benefit analysis and its evaluation of effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation concerns after Business Roundtable).
89 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 6, 10 (noting relatively cursory and largely
duplicative nature of SEC analysis of efficiency, competition, and capital formation in the
past, which sometimes consisted of no more than an invitation for public comment on
Section 106's enumerated factors). But see id. at 14 (noting improvements in quality of
SEC's analysis over time).
90 In recent internal guidance, notably, the Office of General Counsel-together with
the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation-has directed the Commission's
rulemaking staff to combine these two categories of cost-benefit analysis. CURRENT
GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 1, 14-15; cf ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATION 2013-2, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AT INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Recommendation%202013-2%20%28Benefit-Cost%20Analysis%29.pdf (offering addi-
tional recommendations on cost-benefit analysis by independent agencies); Henry G.
Manne, Will the SEC's New Embrace of Cost-Benefit Analysis Be a Watershed Moment?,
REGULATION, Summer 2012, at 20, 23 (commending new guidance document).
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offering an affirmative conclusion as to the proposed regulation's pro-
motion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation-a poten-
tially problematic expansion of its obligations under Section 106, as
we shall see.91
3. Judicial Review of SEC Analysis Under Section 106
Historically, the SEC has been fairly insulated from judicial
review and constraint. With only a handful of exceptions-most
directed to the SEC's jurisdiction to enact certain rules, rather than to
the content of those rules or its decisionmaking procedures-the
Commission has enjoyed relatively free rein from the courts.92 Of par-
ticular relevance herein, decades of cost-benefit analysis by the agency
have not given rise to any direct reversal. 93 For nearly a decade, the
same was true of the SEC's analysis of efficiency, competition, and
capital formation under Section 106. In recent years, however, the
D.C. Circuit has invoked that requirement to vacate and remand sig-
nificant SEC rulemaking initiatives on multiple occasions. 94
Most notable was the court's decision in Business Roundtable v.
SEC. 9 5 The rule at issue therein-giving select shareholders access to
the proxy to nominate directors-had been the subject of substantial
analysis and debate. 96 It had been taken up in a series of proposed
rulemakings. 97 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress explicitly authorized
91 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1839-40 (critiquing the SEC for offering con-
clusions under Section 106, rather than simply outlining its analysis).
92 See James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An
Essay, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2000, at 11, 37-39 (noting that "[flew decisions
have seriously questioned the validity of an SEC rule").
93 The SEC's conduct of cost-benefit analysis, in fact, has rarely even been subject to
review-regardless of the ultimate outcome. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
This should perhaps come as little surprise, however, given the limited judicial attention to
agencies' cost-benefit analyses more generally.
94 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life
Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d
133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In each of the three cases heard by the D.C. Circuit, it is perhaps
interesting to note that the appellant was represented by the same attorney, Eugene Scalia.
See Jamila Trindle, Another Scalia Vexes Regulators, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at Cl
(noting common representation of petitioners across all three cases). Judge Douglas
Ginsburg, meanwhile, authored two of the three opinions and sat on the panel that decided
the third. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146; Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 167; Chamber of
Commerce, 412 F.3d at 136.
95 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
96 See Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J.
435, 440-47 (2012) (reviewing the history of federal proxy access).
97 See id. (discussing those proposed rulemakings); see also Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 and 274 (2010)) (proposing changes to federal proxy rules).
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the SEC to adopt the rule. 9 8 And after more than 600 comments and
various revisions to the proposed rule based thereon,99 the SEC
promulgated a final rule in August 2010.100
Immediately upon its enactment, however, Rule 14a-11 was chal-
lenged by the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce
on the grounds that its adoption violated the Administrative
Procedure Act, as well as the Constitution's protections of federalism
and free speech. And on July 22, 2011, in a fairly cursory, thirteen-
page opinion, the D.C. Circuit agreed-not merely remanding the
case, but taking the unusual step of vacating the rule as well. 101 For
scholars of administrative law, however, the substance of Business
Roundtable v. SEC was even more surprising than its procedural
disposition.
Given the broad deference owed to agencies under the Supreme
Court's "hard look" standard of review, as articulated in the State
Farm decision,102 the D.C. Circuit's characterization of the SEC's
98 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012))
("The Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a shareholder of proxy solicita-
tion materials supplied by an issuer of securities for the purpose of nominating individuals
to membership on the board of directors of the issuer, under such terms and conditions as
the Commission determines are in the interests of shareholders and for the protection of
investors.").
99 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 18, at 106 (noting revision of proposed rule in
response to comments).
100 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (describing the enactment of Rule 14a-
11); see also Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder's Vote and Its Political Economy, in
Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (outlining provisions of
the SEC's final rule); cf Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy
Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2011) (observing that the vote to grant shareholders
proxy access was close and divided along partisan lines). For varied critiques of the merits
of the SEC's proposed proxy access rule, see Fisch, supra note 96; Joseph A. Grundfest,
The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 Bus. LAW.
361 (2010); Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage
Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REv. 1431 (2012). It bears
noting that the possibility of shareholder access to the proxy had been debated by the SEC
as far back as 1942. Fisch, supra note 96, at 437.
101 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). On September 6,
2011, the SEC announced that notwithstanding the importance of proxy access-and even
its place as the first SEC rule enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act-the Commission would
not appeal the D.C. Circuit's difficult-to-challenge decision and would abandon the rule.
See SEC News Release, supra note 23 (stating that the SEC would not seek a rehearing or
Supreme Court review of the D.C. Circuit's decision). However, the SEC has clarified the
status of the proxy access amendments to Rule 14a-8, which were finalized at the same
time as Rule 14a-11, maintaining that 14a-8 was unaffected by the court's ruling. See SEC
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legall
cfslbl4g.htm (noting continued validity of Exchange Act Rule 14a-8).
102 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44
(1983).
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analysis as "arbitrary and capricious" appeared to constitute a signifi-
cant departure from past precedent. Especially as imposed on the
SEC-an independent agency that had historically enjoyed wide lati-
tude in its rulemaking-Business Roundtable prompted many to ques-
tion whether the court was asserting a newly heightened standard of
review for agency action. 03
What may have been most surprising about Business Roundtable,
however, was its reliance on Section 106 as the basis of decision.
Attenuated as many of the appellants' other claims may have been,
the court's reliance on Section 106 was in some ways even more prob-
lematic. As wide as the discretion granted to administrative agencies
in general, judicial deference to agencies' cost-benefit analysis has
always been even greater.'0 The rejection of agency rulemaking on
the basis of inadequate cost-benefit analysis is thus exceedingly rare.
As to many statutes and the executive order prescribing cost-benefit
analysis, judicial review is not even permitted.105 One might have
expected even greater judicial deference under Section 106, then,
given its mere demand for "consideration," its cursory nature, and its
failure to even invoke the rhetoric of "costs" and "benefits."
Few, to be sure, took the view that the SEC's analysis of the
impact of Rule 14a-11 on efficiency, competition, and capital
103 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 22 ("The decision far exceeded the standards set out by
Congress and the courts with respect to cost/benefit analysis."); Cox & Baucom, supra note
14, at 1813 (reporting "that the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit in Business
Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the standard enacted
by Congress"); Davidoff, supra note 27 (noting that the Business Roundtable "opinion
appears to create an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it pro-
vide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective"); Murphy,
supra note 31, at 163 (noting that the standard of review adopted by the court "veers
widely from the traditional arbitrary and capricious review"); David Zaring, More on the
DC Circuit's Proxy Access Decision, THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.the
conglomerate.org/2011/08/the-dc-circuits-proxy-access-decision-keeps-getting-attention-
see-here-for-a-roundup-and-here-from-elliott-spitzer-seem.html ("The [c]ourt's analysis of
the SEC's failure to consider the economic consequences of its actions is probably best
characterized as fly-specking, and the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive.");
see also Stanley Keller, What Now for Proxy Access?, HARv. L. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 9:29
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/08/18/what-now-for-proxy-access (expres-
sing concern about the "impossible ... bar the [clourt set" for future agency action, not-
withstanding lack of sympathy for expanded proxy access). For a sustained critique of the
court's treatment of the SEC's analysis of the empirical data, see Kraus & Raso, supra note
14, at 21-24.
104 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting the deference that courts have
traditionally shown cost-benefit analyses conducted by agencies).
105 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1571(b)(2) (2012) ("[N]o provision of this chapter shall be con-
strued to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any person
in any administrative or judicial action."); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2011)
(stating that the order does not create any substantive or procedural rights, "enforceable at
law or in equity by any party against the United States").
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formation was beyond reproach. At a minimum, the Commission
erred in failing to articulate grounds for applying the rule unvary-
ingly-including even to mutual funds, as to which its provisions
would seem wholly inapposite.106 One might also have expected the
SEC to engage at least somewhat more closely with the costs that cor-
porations would incur in resisting whatever subset of board nominees
they chose to fight. 07 Finally, and most broadly, the SEC might have
better situated its proposed rule by more forcefully articulating the
market failures and broader problems associated with maintaining the
status quo.108
The SEC's analysis, on the other hand, was hardly superficial. On
top of sixty pages of the final release dedicated to cost-benefit analysis
narrowly defined, the SEC devoted another seventeen pages to its
analysis of efficiency, competition, and capital formation under
Section 106.109 That analysis relied on peer-reviewed publications,
which-by most accounts-captured the prevailing view on the ques-
tions presented." 0 Nevertheless, the SEC took care to acknowledge,
and even engage, the literature to the contrary. As for costs, the SEC
devoted no less than $2.2 million to the preparation of its analysis."'
Whatever the limitations of the SEC's work, then, it is difficult to see
the adoption of Rule 14a-11 as constituting so egregious a failure of
cost-benefit analysis as to outweigh the significant expectation of def-
erence owed to the Commission under the Supreme Court's prevailing
standard of review. How, then, did the court arrive at that holding?
Properly understood, the court's conclusion rested on a certain
disconnect between its formal rationale and the substance of its
analysis. On its face, the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Business
106 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1154-56 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (criticizing
SEC's application of Rule 14a-11 to investment companies); see also Kraus & Raso, supra
note 14, at 23-24 (discussing shortcomings of the SEC's release); Zaring, supra note 103
(noting confusion as to why Rule 14a-11 was extended to mutual funds).
107 See Davidoff, supra note 27 ("The D.C. Circuit has a point about the [SEC's] failure
to consider fully the costs to corporations.").
108 This particular failure has been emphasized by David Arkush in an unpublished
work. See Arkush, supra note 33, at 4-5 (observing that the SEC might have fared better
had it "done more to frame the problem"). Other shortcomings of the SEC's analysis,
however, might also be noted. See Mongone, supra note 16, at 774 (observing that "[slome
of the SEC's conclusions . . . are naked assertions supported by no evidence").
109 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 99 SEC
Docket 439 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf;
see also Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 17-18 (describing detailed analysis of costs and
benefits, and relevant literature, in the SEC's proposing release for Rule 14a-11).
110 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 17 n.90 (reviewing academic literature cited in
the proposing release).
111 Benedict, supra note 16, at 278.
2007
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Roundtable-like the court's earlier decisions under Section 106-
cast the shortcomings of the SEC's analysis of efficiency, competition,
and capital formation as having rendered its actions "arbitrary and
capricious" under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.112
In doing so, the decisions implied a failure to properly weigh substan-
tive statutory criteria that Congress had enumerated in the agency's
governing statutes. In the words of both the Chamber of Commerce
and Business Roundtable decisions, the SEC had failed in its "statu-
tory obligation" to consider the impact of its rules on efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation."13
Perhaps recognizing the strain of reading Section 106's factors as
substantive statutory criteria, however, the court's actual analysis
more closely-and correctly, I would suggest-approximates a review
of the quality of the SEC's cost-benefit analysis. Most clearly, in
Business Roundtable, the court speaks of the need to "weigh[ ] the
rule's costs and benefits."11 4 Elsewhere, it refers to the need to
demonstrate a "net benefit.""x5 In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the
first case decided under Section 106, the court similarly spoke of the
SEC's failure to consider the costs its rule imposed on the mutual fund
industry:
Although the Commission may not have been able to estimate the
aggregate cost to the mutual fund industry of additional staff
because it did not know what percentage of funds with independent
chairm[e]n would incur that cost, it readily could have estimated the
cost to an individual fund, which estimate would be pertinent to its
assessment of the effect the condition would have upon efficiency
and competition, if not upon capital formation.116
With this dichotomous approach, the D.C. Circuit has generated
substantial ambiguity as to the nature of Section 106-and as to what
is to be expected of the SEC under it. Consistent with the substance of
its language, with its legislative history, and with the SEC's own
approach to it, the D.C. Circuit saw some kind of cost-benefit analysis
requirement in Section 106. Given the disconnect between its explicit
requirements and a standard-form cost-benefit analysis, as well as the
112 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
113 Id. at 1150; Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
114 647 F.3d at 1153.
115 Id. at 1153, 1155.
116 Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144; see also David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor
Protection with Capital Formation Needs After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26
PACE L. REv. 39, 40 (2005) (noting the D.C. Circuit's holding "that the Commission vio-
lated the Investment Company Act by failing adequately to consider the costs mutual
funds would incur" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sherwin, supra note 50 (discussing
mutual fund reforms and the role of cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation).
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lack of precedent for such invasive review of agency cost-benefit
analysis, however, the court's formal analysis cast Section 106 as an
enumeration of substantive statutory factors for the SEC to weigh in
its rulemaking. Given the language of the provision, its place in each
statute to which it was added, and the history and context of its adop-
tion, neither account of Section 106 can be sustained on its own. There
is surely something of a cost-benefit flavor to Section 106, but it is of a
distinct species than that found in other contexts-and one that the
D.C. Circuit, with its analytical gymnastics, may have actually come
close to capturing. To appreciate as much, it is necessary to step back
and acknowledge a broader universe of functions and forms of cost-
benefit analysis than has commonly been appreciated.
II
THE FuNcIoN(s) OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An understanding of the ambiguous demands of Section 106-
and of the increasingly varied universe of cost-benefit analysis provi-
sions one can find across the length and breadth of federal statutory
law, executive orders, and agency regulations-must begin with a
more robust outline of the multiple functions that cost-benefit analysis
can be understood to advance. To what ends do we engage in such
analysis? What purposes do its advocates assert it to serve?
The default, usually underanalyzed response has been that cost-
benefit analysis advances some broadly defined goal of "efficiency." 117
Pressed, some might refine the scope of the promised efficiency to
mean the achievement of optimal policy outcomes or results. Beyond
such vague assertions, however, the precise utility of cost-benefit
analysis is taken by many of its proponents as simply a given.118 We do
well, then, to more carefully dissect cost-benefit analysis's asserted
promotion of efficiency-highlighting related, but distinct, strands
that might come within it-and to explore the potential nonefficiency
functions that cost-benefit analysis might serve as well. 119
117 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
118 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1346 (suggesting generalized notions of the utility of
cost-benefit analysis).
119 A few scholars have explored potential nonefficiency rationales for cost-benefit
analysis-most primarily, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner. See Adler, supra note 64, at
271, 279 (presenting a welfarist defense of cost-benefit analysis); Adler & Posner, supra
note 36 (analyzing cost-benefit analysis from legal, economic, and philosophical
perspectives).
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A. Efficiency Functions of Cost-Benefit Analysis
There can be little question about the potential of cost-benefit
analysis to generate a certain efficiency-or at least about that aspira-
tion's central place in the legislative and regulatory expectations of
such analysis. Whether by clarifying the net benefits of a proposed
rule, encouraging the better choice among competing proposals, or
perhaps even highlighting rulemaking needs that might otherwise be
overlooked, cost-benefit analysis may serve to enhance efficiency. To
evaluate the prospect of such gains in any given case, however, it is
useful to disaggregate three distinct forms of efficiency that cost-
benefit analysis might be seen to promote: (1) the achievement of
better outcomes, (2) the reduction of cognitive biases, and (3) more
effective priority setting.
1. Efficiency as Better Ends
Most forcefully, cost-benefit analysis might be asserted to gen-
erate better outcomes under a true efficiency criterion-in which costs
equal benefits. 120 As Tom McGarity suggests, cost-benefit analysis
"can lead agencies to impose only those regulatory restrictions on the
private sector that increase overall allocative efficiency." 1 21 In
designing regulatory policy, thus, a systematic weighing of the costs
and benefits might be hoped to lead an agency to the optimal one. In
120 See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335,
390-92 (2006) (describing the "Optimality Criterion" of efficiency, which requires that
costs equal benefits).
121 Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 38 (1998); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone?, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 299, 302
(2001) (observing "that it is exceedingly difficult to choose the appropriate level of regula-
tion without looking at both the benefit and cost sides"); Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1060
(noting that "cost-benefit analysis is a way of ensuring better priority setting and of over-
coming predictable obstacles to desirable regulation"). It bears noting that some have
affirmatively challenged the understanding of cost-benefit analysis as advancing either
Pareto or even Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcomes. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1105, 1106 (2000) (noting that "the link between CBA and Pareto efficiency is tenuous and
that the link between CBA and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, although tighter, does not justify
CBA, because Kaldor-Hicks itself lacks normative significance"); see also KYSAR, supra
note 61, at 102-04 (discussing Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks optimality). A distinct limitation
on the capacity of cost-benefit analysis to generate efficiency outcomes is highlighted by
Claire Hill. See Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioural Law and
Economics, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 563, 582-83 (2004) (noting that "[w]here the law requires a
cost-benefit analysis, there is an implicit assumption that the options whose costs and bene-
fits are to be compared are known, or at least determinable through some mechanical and
uncontroversial procedure").
2010 [Vol. 88:1983
December 2013] REANALYZING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
this account, cost-benefit analysis "produces the most desirable results
from the least resources." 122
In light of the necessarily speculative elements of cost-benefit
analysis in actual practice, as well as its susceptibility to
manipulation, 123 however, more modest accounts of how cost-benefit
analysis might promote optimal outcomes should also be considered.
Cost-benefit analysis might, for example, be argued to increase the
prospect that agencies will make relatively better choices among alter-
native regulatory policies-even if not necessarily leading them to the
optimally efficient ones.1 24 Even more modestly, cost-benefit analysis
might primarily function in the negative, to eliminate affirmatively
bad options.125 Applying an exceedance test of efficiency, we might
expect cost-benefit analysis to reveal that subset of regulatory initia-
tives as to which costs outweigh benefits.126 Such inefficient regula-
tion, in turn, might be less likely to become law.127
Finally, cost-benefit analysis might be argued to promote optimal
outcomes by encouraging the pursuit of efficiency versus distributive
122 Julie G. Yap, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship Out of the
Riptide of National Security, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1289, 1322 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 174-75 (describing the
function of cost-benefit analysis in "calibrat[ing] the stringency of agency regulation");
Johnston, supra note 15, at 1347-48 (advocates of cost-benefit analysis "assume that ...
regulations would be 'better,' because agencies would have taken a better and more
detailed account of the real economic costs of regulatory compliance"). A related, but
different, contribution of cost-benefit analysis might be its ability to suggest lower-cost
means to achieve identical ends. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1661 (2001) (providing examples where cost-benefit analysis has "led
to regulations that accomplish statutory goals at lower cost").
123 See William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The "Legislative
Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 298, 301 (1996)
(observing that "the nature of cost-benefit analysis itself ... provide[s] agencies and regu-
lated entities heightened opportunity to manipulate the rulemaking process").
124 See Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk
Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 1032
(2001) (noting that cost-benefit analysis is a "useful tool[] in identifying policies that maxi-
mize societal well-being more often or better than alternative procedures").
125 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1074 (stating that "[a]t the very least, cost-
benefit analysis" can show "people that the consequences of various approaches might be
different from what they seem").
126 See Driesen, supra note 120, at 387-90 (describing the "No Excess Cost" conception
of efficiency).
127 See Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative
Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 Hous. L. REv. 79, 93 (2011) (describing "cost-benefit
analysis as a mechanism that ... puts a thumb on the scale in the direction of restoring the
efficient amount of regulation"); see also Johnston, supra note 15, at 1347 (suggesting that
requiring agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis of proposed rules would result in
fewer regulations being promulgated); Yap, supra note 122, at 1323 (cost-benefit analysis
encourages the adoption of regulations only in those cases "when benefits exceed costs"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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goals in administrative regulation. Cost-benefit analysis, in this
account, may help to isolate the efficiency versus distributive effects of
different regulatory choices. 128 In turn, agencies can be pressed to
extract asserted distributional benefits, limiting regulatory initiative to
the promotion of true efficiency ends. 129
2. Reducing Cognitive Biases
Beyond better outcomes, cost-benefit analysis might also be
understood to promote "efficiency" by reducing cognitive biases. As
Cass Sunstein has described, such biases can readily be identified in
public assessments of regulatory choices, and in those of regulators as
well.130 The paradigmatic case is cancer-as to which public percep-
tions of risk are grossly exaggerated by comparison with other, far
more substantial risks.131 The perceived costs of preventing cancer are
similarly skewed, but in the opposite direction. 132 In certain settings,
128 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1347 (highlighting distributional versus efficiency
ends of regulation). One might plausibly see such a preference for efficiency versus distrib-
utive ends as inherent to the methodology of cost-benefit analysis. See Douglas A. Kysar,
Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on "Retaking Rationality Two Years Later," 48
Hous. L. REV. 43, 75-76 (2011) (discussing the importance of choosing a value metric in
cost-benefit analysis).
129 See Livermore, supra note 64, at 176 (noting distributional elements of regulatory
analysis). One might see the requirement of Office of Management and Budget review of
agencies' cost-benefit analyses as a means to effectuate such a commitment to true effi-
ciency ends.
130 See Sunstein, supra note 64 (discussing cognitive biases and arguing that cost-benefit
analysis is justified by its ability to counteract those biases); see also Darryl K. Brown,
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 341 (2004) ("CBA can help
counter several well-established cognitive biases."); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein,
A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1502 (2002) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis can over-
come cognitive limitations and correct misperceptions people have about the magnitude of
risks); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 492 (2002) (noting that "decisionmakers
make cognitive errors that lead to systematic . . . biases"). In a sense, this account of the
efficiencies of cost-benefit analysis can be understood as one means by which it fosters
optimal outcomes. If we define such outcomes by the accurate reflection of relevant
rational actors' preferences, then the reduction of cognitive biases can be understood to
move us closer to that goal.
131 See McGarity, supra note 63, at 2369 (discussing "the 'intuitive toxicology' through
which the American public addresses health risks"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 2266 (dis-
cussing how heuristics can lead people to miscalculate the probabilities of certain risks).
The other classic example is the perception of flying as more risky than driving. See Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 799, 831 (stating that this perception can be explained by the availability
heuristic); Betty Joan Thurber, A Behavioral Science Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley's
Certification Requirements-The Right Kind of Deterrence?, 7 TRANSACIONS: TENN. J.
Bus. L. 123, 134-35 (2005) (suggesting that it can be explained by the vividness bias).
132 See Michael P. Stone, Anti-Prognostication, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 435, 440 n.30
(2005) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 116 (2004))
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then, cost-benefit analysis may "help [the] government resist demands
for regulation that are rooted in misperceptions of facts." 133 Cost-
benefit analysis can thus respond to "intense emotional reactions"
with information relevant to the perceived risk.134
Although a number of cognitive biases may be impacted by cost-
benefit analysis, certain biases stand out. Attitudes about cancer and
the risk of a plane crash, for example, may arise from alarmist bias
and resulting concentration on the severity of the potential harm,
without regard to its (limited) probability. 35 Availability heuristics
may also be relevant in those settings, with increased risk estimates
associated with prominent incidents of the negative result.136 This is
precisely the dynamic, of course, in risk assessments of flying versus
driving. 3 7
A related dynamic is the tendency to give greater weight to
clearly visible benefits or costs (i.e., those "on-screen") versus those
that are less apparent (i.e., "off-screen").138 Connected to the latter
are systemic effect biases, which cause individuals to discount the
effects that a decision will have within a complex system.139 Finally,
informational and reputational cascades may cause individuals to
accept certain beliefs simply because they think others hold them.140
In relevant cases, this may generate panic about risks that are, in
reality, quite small.
The impact of these cognitive biases reaches beyond the general
public, affecting the conduct of agencies as well.141 Availability bias
(noting Posner's argument that "people generally have a tendency to overestimate the ben-
efits and underestimate the costs associated with science and technology").
133 Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1662.
134 Id.
135 See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1070-71 (discussing contemporaneous research on the
subject and its implications for cost-benefit analysis).
136 See id. at 1065 (explaining the availability heuristic in the context of cost-benefit
analysis).
137 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
138 Brown, supra note 130, at 342.
139 See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1069 (highlighting difficulty of identifying and
accounting for systemic costs when planning regulations); see also Brown, supra note 130,
at 342 ("[P]eople often cannot foresee complex, systemic effects of particular interventions.
It is hard to anticipate unintended consequences, though they are common in complex
systems regulated by social policy.").
140 Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1066-67.
141 See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 933, 962-71 (2004) (noting cognitive
biases in agency decisionmaking); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral
Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (1998) (noting that "judges, legis-
lators, [and] bureaucrats . . . are also subject to various biases"); Stephen J. Choi & A. C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1, 21 (2003) (discussing
cognitive biases among regulators and the possibility that those biases are of greater mag-
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may arise, for example, out of an agency's primary experience in a
particular industry or field. On-screen/off-screen heuristics may also
be strong, perhaps especially in those agencies with the very narrowest
mandates. More generally, agencies may fail to realize their actions
are based on distorted public perceptions.
Where an agency must grapple with cognitive biases, then, cost-
benefit analysis may help to "raise the consciousness of upper level
decisionmakers to all of the impacts of their decisions, thereby
reducing the tendency of mission-oriented agencies to reach irrational
results." 142
3. Priority Setting
The role of cost-benefit analysis in agency priority setting repre-
sents a final way in which it may enhance efficiency.143 Cost-benefit
nitude than those influencing investors); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 45 (2000) (noting that biases
can afflict legal decisionmakers, not just private individuals); Carol A. Needham, Listening
to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking Action, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2329, 2350 (2010) ("[P]olicy makers, as well as other individuals, can also be influ-
enced by cognitive and behavioral biases."); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1575 (1998) (emphasizing that
officials are as vulnerable to biases as individuals, and thus may not be better positioned to
make "rational" decisions on behalf of the populace); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R.
Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549,
558 (2002) (noting that cognitive biases color expert reasoning as well, and that greater
education or training given to experts can in fact worsen some biases); Seidenfeld, supra
note 130 (examining generally how cognitive biases and psychology affect official
decisionmaking); Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1072-73 (concluding that biases are prevalent
enough in the public that they can lead to demands for regulation not "based on the
facts").
142 McGarity, supra note 121, at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). While Sunstein
casts the reduction of cognitive bias as an argument for cost-benefit analysis distinct from
the standard claim that cost-benefit analysis is efficiency enhancing, see Sunstein, supra
note 64, at 1060 (contrasting cognitive bias rationale for cost-benefit analysis from conven-
tional efficiency claims), the former is better understood as a species of the latter.
Efficiency relies on the,rational behavior of relevant actors, see Howard Gensler, The
Competitive Market Model of Contracts, 99 COM. L.J. 384, 385-86 (1994), including an
accurate appraisal of available information. Systematic biases in risk perception and the
valuation of relative costs and benefits undermine efficiency. Conversely, mechanisms that
undo such biases thereby promote efficiency.
143 See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 175 (providing a comparison of lead and
radionucleuotide contamination regulation, to explain how cost-benefit analysis affects pri-
ority setting); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TowARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 19 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of comparing costs
and benefits of various programs to ensure effective spending on priority issues); REvEsz
& LIVERMoRE, supra note 33, at 173-74 (exploring how cost-benefit analysis can help
foster regulation); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 86-89 (discussing proposals to
create a technocratic cadre with sufficient breadth and experience to prioritize among gov-
ermnent programs); cf McGarity, supra note 121, at 39-40 nn.155-58 (noting priority set-
ting arguments of others). As David Driesen has systematically demonstrated, much of the
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analysis may help inform agency choices as to where (and when) to
regulate. In particular, it may suggest useful areas for regulatory
engagement that might otherwise be overlooked.
Most robustly, agency use of cost-benefit analysis within the
framework of an annual regulatory inventory would help shape
priorities across distinct regulatory domains. Even absent any such
inventory, however, a consistent practice of analyzing the promised
benefits of alternative regulatory choices might be expected to foster a
certain comparative evaluation across regulatory spheres and thereby
impact agency priorities.144
The use of cost-benefit analysis in priority setting is closely tied to
the pursuit of optimal outcomes and the minimization of cognitive
biases. Priority setting is worth teasing out as a distinct function, how-
ever, given the possibility of a role for cost-benefit analysis in priority
setting, even absent any cognitive bias. Such a function might likewise
be useful, even if more optimal ends are not ultimately advanced.
But a further point also bears noting: Both conventional wisdom
and actual practice-though not formal theory-most commonly treat
cost-benefit analysis as constraining of regulatory initiative,145 with a
"cost-benefit state" assumed to produce less regulation. This seems
like the most natural consequence of the optimal-outcomes and
cognitive-bias function accounts of efficiency gains described above.
By contrast, any function of cost-benefit analysis in setting priori-
ties involves some greater degree of balance. Thus, in facilitating pri-
ority setting, cost-benefit analysis could well increase the volume of
advocacy of priority setting as an important function of cost-benefit analysis appears to be
motivated by something other than true priority setting. See David M. Driesen, Getting
Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ENvrL. L. REP.
10,003 (2001). Rather than being about "ordering" or even "selection," Driesen argues,
priority setting arguments for cost-benefit analysis by Breyer, Sunstein, and others are pri-
marily directed to distinct questions of "allocation." Id. at 10,010-14. As Driesen himself
acknowledges, however, cost-benefit analysis could be imagined to serve a true priority
setting function, even if it is not commonly promoted-let alone used-in that fashion. Id.
at 10,018.
144 It bears acknowledging that priority setting might alternatively be cast as a non-
efficiency (rather than efficiency) function of cost-benefit analysis. Thus, cost-benefit
analysis could facilitate setting priorities in accordance with something other than effi-
ciency criteria. As commonly understood (most particularly by advocates of cost-benefit
analysis), however, the priority setting impact of cost-benefit analysis is an efficiency func-
tion. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1063 (commenting on administrative misallocations
and the role of cost-benefit analysis in potentially curing them).
145 See Driesen, supra note 120, at 354-64 (noting only one case in which cost-benefit
analysis might be argued to have increased regulatory stringency, after analyzing a set of
cases asserted to demonstrate the potential for cost-benefit analysis to increase regulation).
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rulemaking in certain settings-once it has focused regulators' atten-
tion on priority needs. 146
Broadly, this potential impact arises where cost-benefit analysis
drives regulators to focus on those areas where "intervention will
yield the greatest net benefits." 147 At a minimum, cost-benefit analysis
may reduce attention to areas in which intervention would accomplish
little, freeing up resources in other spheres.148 More dramatically, it
might help to overcome apathy or indifference about an issue-area or
topic-whether on the part of the relevant regulatory agency or
among the public generally-thereby encouraging regulatory
activity.149
B. Nonefficiency Functions of Cost-Benefit Analysis
An understanding of the role of cost-benefit analysis in distinct
settings-be it financial regulation, environmental regulation, or else-
where-requires not only parsing generalized efficiency claims into
distinct efficiency functions, but also recognizing various arguments
for cost-benefit analysis that are not grounded in any promise of effi-
ciency. Less commonly acknowledged, let alone explored, these may
be important aspects of the goal of cost-benefit analysis in any given
case-including, I will argue below, in the present one.
1. Limited Regulation
Any comprehensive account of the functions of cost-benefit
analysis must include the generalized constraint of regulatory initia-
tive. At least in some cases, "[c]ost-benefit analysis serves a political
function not just of clarifying agency action but restraining agency
146 As Sunstein notes, cost-benefit analysis may "promote attention to problems that,
while serious, are not producing much public attention." Sunstein, supra note 121, at 303.
But see Kysar, supra note 128, at 69-70 (noting the usual role of cost-benefit analysis in
limiting regulatory initiative). In absorbing agency resources, of course, even the use of
cost-benefit analysis for priority setting must place some greater burden on regulatory initi-
ative. Driesen, supra note 143, at 10,019.
147 Yap, supra note 122, at 1323.
148 Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1661.
149 Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 130, at 1502. A related possibility is that cost-benefit
analysis might be used to help justify proposed regulatory undertakings. See Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 48 Hous. L. REV.
1, 28 (2011) (noting the Obama administration's use of this approach). Cost-benefit
analysis might fruitfully be integrated, for example, into an agency's concise statement of
basis and purpose. Cf Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355,
397 (2012) (mentioning cost-benefit analysis as part of a larger discussion of a purposivist
approach to interpreting regulations and the role of rationality in that method).
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action, pulling it rightward."150 Hence the pithy critique of it as gener-
ating "paralysis by analysis."s15
The expansion of cost-benefit analysis through one of President
Ronald Reagan's very first executive orders hints at this deregulatory
purpose. 152 Likewise, efforts of the Republican-controlled Congress
elected in 1994 to expand its use. 1 5 3 As Pablo Spiller and Emerson
Tiller describe, the Republican majority saw cost-benefit analysis as a
way of increasing agencies' decision costs (reducing the volume of
new rules), while also decreasing the decision costs of courts reviewing
(and presumptively limiting) agency rulemaking. 154 Whatever the par-
ticular mechanism, though, some element of regulatory constraint
must be included among the possible functions of cost-benefit
analysis.'55
2. The Enhancement of Overall Well-Being
The use of cost-benefit analysis to advance efficiency is problem-
atic in important respects. At least in some circumstances, pursuit of
the collective utility preferences of relevant individuals-of effi-
ciency-may not be an attractive regulatory objective. "If social wel-
fare has an objective or idealized component, so that people may be
misinformed about their own preferences or that their preferences
often should not count (sadistic preferences, for example), then cost-
benefit analysis will produce wrong results when these distorted pref-
erences have substantial influence."15 6 Consequently, where
preferences are disinterested, uninformed, adaptive, or simply bad,
cost-benefit analysis directed to efficiency may be ill-advised.157 The
150 Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 289, 296 (2001); cf Volokh, supra note 127, at 79, 80 ("Free-market advo-
cates have mostly gone along with cost-benefit analysis because of a belief that it would
serve as a brake on regulation.").
151 McGarity, supra note 121, at 50.
152 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
154 See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of
Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 361-62 (1997) (noting
goals of mid-1990s statutory reforms of administrative procedures).
155 In actual practice, the antiregulatory valence of cost-benefit analysis is even clearer.
See REVEsz & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 24-42 (tracing the political history of cost-
benefit analysis, starting with the Reagan administration); Driesen, supra note 120, at
354-84 (reviewing history of cost-benefit analysis, both generally and under the adminis-
tration of President George W. Bush).
156 Posner, supra note 150, at 292.
157 See Adler & Posner, supra note 121 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is best under-
stood as a welfarist tool).
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same may be true where significant wealth differentials are associated
with the gains (or losses) from a given regulatory initiative.' 58
If the operative measure of costs and benefits is not the satisfac-
tion of any and all preferences, however, but only the positively well-
founded and normatively attractive subset of them, cost-benefit
analysis might still serve to enhance overall well-being-even if it does
not promote efficiency.' 59 Cost-benefit analysis-at least as effectively
designed and selectively applied-may thus serve as a sufficiently
close proxy for well-being to warrant its use as a decision tool. 16 0
More generally, cost-benefit analysis may advance a broader set
of welfarist goals, including nonutilitarian conceptions of moral and
political good.' 6' For present purposes, however, it is enough to say
that cost-benefit analysis may-at least sometimes-help to enhance
overall well-being, regardless of its implications for efficiency.162
158 See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 238 (suggesting that wealth differences among
those that gain from a project and those who lose may be a determinative factor in whether
an agency should employ cost-benefit analysis). Stating the point differently, it is not clear
that cost-benefit analysis can be expected to consistently promote Pareto efficiency. Adler
& Posner, supra note 36, at 189. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, meanwhile, cannot offer a norma-
tive basis for cost-benefit analysis, given its flawed assumptions of redistribution. See id. at
190-91 (outlining limitations of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a defense of cost-benefit
analysis).
159 See Adler & Posner, supra note 121, at 1106 (rebutting critics of cost-benefit analysis
by arguing that normative concerns, not efficiency, justify the approach). In this account,
willingness to pay and willingness to accept cease to be the operative metrics of cost-
benefit analysis. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health,
and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory
Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 61 (2005) (parsing and critiquing Adler and
Posner's approach).
160 See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 245 (proclaiming the value of cost-benefit
analysis in fostering overall well-being); Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 130, at 1499 (identi-
fying cost-benefit analysis as "an imperfect but useful and administrable proxy" for wel-
fare); see also MATTHEw D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006) (positing a welfarist justification for cost-benefit analysis). But
see Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar & David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: New
Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48 (2009) (reviewing and critiquing
Adler and Posner's argument).
161 See Adler & Posner, supra note 121. Adler and Posner's argument to this effect is
largely one of comparative institutional analysis. For them, cost-benefit analysis represents
the best decision procedure to advance overall welfare compared to any available alterna-
tive. See id. at 1105 (emphasizing that cost-benefit analysis outperforms other available
decision guides). In a related vein, Darryl Brown suggests a view of cost-benefit analysis as
merely an informational tool, capable of serving an array of policy and welfare goals, well
beyond efficiency. See Brown, supra note 130, at 336 (listing different questions as to which
cost-benefit analysis can provide information).
162 Note that this account of the function of cost-benefit analysis relies on the possibility
of interpersonal comparisons of utility among other deviations from the prevailing wisdom
of neoclassical economics. Cf Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 204-09 (exploring ways to
surmount objections to interpersonal welfare comparisons); Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond
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3. Increased Transparency
Cost-benefit analysis may also increase the transparency of regu-
latory decisionmaking in at least three respects. First, at the most basic
level, cost-benefit analysis can serve a purely informational function.
Going a step further, it can be understood as a mechanism of public
accountability-and even political redress. Finally, to related effect,
cost-benefit analysis may also impact the role of interest groups in the
regulatory process.
By way of information access, to begin, cost-benefit analysis gen-
erates data regarding the basis of agencies' decisionmaking-informa-
tion that might otherwise be inaccessible to the public. As a result, it
may better position those impacted by relevant regulatory initiatives
to track agency decisionmaking.163 Even where cost-benefit analysis is
not a mandatory constraint on agency action, then, but involves mere
"consideration" of a set of enumerated factors-as in Section 106-it
may be useful. 164
Greater access to information may minimally help to call atten-
tion to the issues at stake in a given regulatory sphere.165 Beyond that,
it may foster a more informed public dialogue around relevant regula-
tory choices. 166 "[C]ost-benefit analysis should increase the likelihood
that citizens generally, and officials in particular, will be informed of
what is actually at stake." 167 Of course, the quality of information gen-
erated by cost-benefit analysis-and hence any gain in transparency-
has its limits. Given both the speculative quality of much quantifica-
tion in cost-benefit analysis, as well as its resulting susceptibility to
manipulation, 168 cost-benefit analysis can hardly be said to generate
perfect information.
Whatever its precise quality, access to the information that cost-
benefit analysis generates may also facilitate public accountability.
Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43, 51 n.40 (2011) (discussing chal-
lenges of preference comparisons in the context of "methodological individualism").
163 See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 175 (noting that cost-benefit analysis fosters
regulatory transparency).
164 See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1704 (defining and examining "consideration"); see
also Johnston, supra note 15, at 1352-53 (comparing procedural cost-benefit statutes to
substantive cost-benefit mandates).
165 See Sunstein, supra note 121, at 303 (including this among benefits of cost-benefit
analysis); see also ROSE & WALKER, supra note 34, at 14 (expanding on the transparency
justification for cost-benefit analysis and describing how it fosters more open, less distorted
understanding of regulatory issues).
166 McGarity, supra note 121, at 40.
167 Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 130, at 1503; see also Sunstein, supra note 72, at 293-94
(describing ways in which properly conceived cost-benefit analysis allows officials to better
oversee regulatory agencies).
168 See supra note 123.
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Cost-benefit analysis may thus "make[ ] it easier for voters to, if nec-
essary, throw[ ] the bums out."16 9 In the extreme case, this could reach
even bums at the agency level. More naturally, though, it increases
accountability of the elected officials whom the public expects to
police agency action. 70
Of course, the claim that cost-benefit analysis increases accounta-
bility also has its limits. At least as currently overseen by the Office of
Management and Budget-and the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in particular-cost-benefit analysis also
reduces transparency in important respects.171 The review process
may generate substantive regulatory changes, without significant pro-
cess, and with political rather than technocratic motivations as their
source.172 At least in some forms, however, cost-benefit analysis may
enhance public accountability.
Finally, cost-benefit analysis and resulting transparency may
reduce the influence of interest groups on administrative
rulemaking.173 The objective, transparent, and (perhaps misleadingly)
simple nature of cost-benefit analysis may reduce interest group influ-
ence by limiting the ability to distort public perceptions. More
broadly, the capacity of interest groups to achieve desired results "by
exaggerating risks [or] by minimizing them" necessarily diminishes
169 Volokh, supra note 127, at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ROSE &
WALKER, supra note 34, at 13 (citing multiple benefits to public debate and accountability
that flow from cost-benefit analysis).
170 In this account, cost-benefit analysis offers a readily understood basis to assess the
political actors responsible for the appointment of agency heads. Posner, supra note 150, at
295.
171 See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision
Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010) (suggesting a lack of transparency in presidential
oversight of regulatory agencies via the Office of Management and Budget); see also
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1576-78 (2002) (citing the EPA's
arsenic decisions to highlight the limited transparency of cost-benefit analysis); Driesen,
supra note 159, at 78-80 (cataloging ways in which cost-benefit analysis might inhibit, or
only indirectly aid, transparency, compared to other models); Kysar, supra note 128, at 68
(stating that the complex, technical nature of cost-benefit analysis reduces transparency,
allowing agencies to disguise value choices).
172 See Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfield, Rulemaking in the Shadows: The Rise of
OMB and Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 143, 154 (1991) (describing the role of politics in the Office of Management and Budget
review process).
173 See ROSE & WALKER, supra note 34, at 14-15 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis
"provides a significant check" on interest group influence, by "requiring the agency to
reveal the factors that underlie its analysis"); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz,
Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1370-73 (2013)
(suggesting capacity of cost-benefit analysis to expand the universe of interests represented
in rulemaking).
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where the risks are more neutrally evaluated and reported. 174 This
suggests, finally, the possibility that cost-benefit analysis might be
understood to constrain interest-group influence by addressing the
public's cognitive biases-on which interest groups might otherwise
play.1 75
Modeling the impact of cost-benefit analysis on interest-group
influence, Eric Posner begins with a dynamic in which interest groups
utilize informational advantages about the status quo to bias the deci-
sionmaking of the President or Congress. Once cost-benefit analysis is
introduced, however, interest groups' private information about the
implications of a proposed regulatory initiative is largely revealed,
undermining their influence over the President and Congress, and
hence the agency.176 This is not to say, of course, that such influence is
nullified by cost-benefit analysis. But the particular element of it
arising from interest groups' superior information may be
diminished.177
4. Agency Monitoring
Following directly from the foregoing, cost-benefit analysis may
be an important tool not only in facilitating public awareness and
action, but also in facilitating more effective monitoring of agencies by
the political branches. At some level, this might be linked back to the
role of cost-benefit analysis in priority setting. Cost-benefit analysis
may thus help to ensure that agencies are pursuing the priorities of the
political authorities to whom they are accountable, rather than their
own.
Posner's aforementioned model thus frames the interaction
between the political branches and the agencies they oversee as a
principal-agent relationship.178 Within this framework, the political
principal's capacity to effectively evaluate any given regulatory
initiative turns on its ability to overcome significant information
174 Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 130, at 1502-03.
175 Sunstein, supra note 122, at 1662.
176 Posner, supra note 40, at 1170-74.
177 Id. at 1174-75. To be sure, the aforementioned risk that cost-benefit analysis may
increase the opportunities for manipulation of regulatory decisionmaking by special inter-
ests is a substantial one. See Driesen, supra note 159, at 83-85 (rejecting arguments that
cost-benefit analysis limits the scope for interest-group manipulation). If the history of
cost-benefit analysis is any indication, the latter may be the primary valence of the impact
of cost-benefit analysis on interest-group influence-and especially industry influence. See
supra note 155 and accompanying text. For present purposes, however, it is enough to say
that cost-benefit analysis may sometimes function to limit the impact of special interests.
178 Posner, supra note 40, at 1142-43; see also Posner, supra note 64, at 289-92 (dis-
cussing the moral hazard problem created by the principal-agent relationship between the
President and agencies).
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asymmetries between it and the agency. The agency is thus more
aware of the status quo-information that may be valuable to the
President or Congress in determining whether a given initiative effec-
tively advances its political preferences. By making such information
available, cost-benefit analysis allows the political principal to better
determine whether to intervene and prevent the proposed under-
taking from going forward. 179
Importantly, in this account, one need not assume any form of
efficiency as the normative end sought by the President or
Congress.180 Further, there is no need for cost-benefit analysis to take
the form of a substantive constraint on agency action. Rather, it
suffices that agencies are required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis,
even if they need not comply with it.181
Cost-benefit analysis may also produce a degree of agency self-
alignment with political expectations, independent of any increase in
monitoring or discipline. 182 As agencies engage in cost-benefit
analysis, they may become more attuned to relevant political con-
straints, and proceed accordingly. Cost-benefit analysis may thus
foster a certain balancing of political factors by agencies as well.
5. Factors for Decision
Finally, cost-benefit analysis might be understood as a device to
force agencies to consider factors that Congress has deemed relevant.
This, of course, is required for any statutory delegation, whether in the
organic statute of an agency or in other statues it is charged to admin-
ister.183 The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, for example,
179 Adler and Posner also offer a slightly modified version of this claim. In addition to
fostering agency accountability to their political principals, cost-benefit analysis may also
provide an affirmative tool by which administrative agencies can better justify their deci-
sions to other agencies. Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 175.
180 See Posner, supra note 40, at 1162 (pointing out that the constraining effects of cost-
benefit analysis on agency action can help even those principals whose regulatory goals are
not defined by efficiency). More effective monitoring of agency action by the President or
Congress may advance democratic accountability, however, even if the agency's prefer-
ences are relatively more aligned with efficiency than those of its political principals.
181 See id. at 1191 (suggesting that agencies might be permitted to issue inefficient regu-
lations, so long as they conduct cost-benefit analyses).
182 See Sunstein, supra note 72, at 288-89 (suggesting that cost-benefit analysis in con-
junction with the threat of congressional review of agency action can deter agencies from
proposing poor regulations in the first place).
183 See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 727, 740-41 (2009) (noting that agencies may consider only those factors enumer-
ated by Congress in rulemaking); Marianne Koral Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule
Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1928, 1939 (1984) (emphasizing that when delegating
authority to an agency, Congress specifies which factors are to be considered and the
weight to be afforded each); cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
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charges NHTSA to consider four factors in setting average fuel
economy standards: technological feasibility, economic practicability,
the effect of other motor vehicle standards on fuel economy, and the
national need to conserve energy.184 The EPA, meanwhile, must con-
sider nine factors in granting a permit for the dumping of waste into
ocean waters, including the need for the proposed dumping; its effect
on human health and welfare, including economic, aesthetic, and rec-
reational values; and potential alternatives.18 5
One might imagine cases, however, in which the enumerated fac-
tors for consideration are not substantive ones that speak to the mis-
sion of the relevant agency, let alone the particulars of a given
statutory charge. Rather, they are variables of cost, efficiency, or the
like, which Congress otherwise fears might be neglected. In such cir-
cumstances, cost-benefit analysis may serve as a tool by which
Congress can press the agency to consider a new variable-or set of
variables-in its decisionmaking.
Lawmakers might find particular merit in this approach, where it
would be difficult for Congress to reach a consensus to alter existing-
perhaps even longstanding-criteria for decisionmaking. This might
be true in any number of circumstances. A particularly striking one,
however, would be where the new factors to be added to the analysis
could be seen to tilt against the initiation of new regulatory undertak-
ings. In that setting, cost-benefit analysis may serve to indirectly inte-
grate the desired considerations.
Contrary to the loosely theorized invocation of efficiency as the
singular purpose of cost-benefit analysis, then, it may serve a wide
range of potential functions. Depending on the particular statutory
provision at issue-and perhaps the particular application of it-cost-
benefit analysis may serve a variety of efficiency or nonefficiency pur-
poses of varying scope. In assessing any given cost-benefit mandate, as
a result, an essential first step must be to identify its essential function
or functions.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that a court may invalidate a rule if the promulgating
agency relied on factors other than those Congress intended that it consider). This expecta-
tion of agencies might also be tied to the requirement that "an intelligible principle" sup-
port any legislative delegation. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 502(e), 89 Stat. 871, 905
(1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2006)).
185 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006). The National Energy Conservation Policy Act even
includes cost-effectiveness among its enumerated factors for agency consideration, along
with the amount of energy savings, other funding support, and the like. 42 U.S.C. § 8256
(2006).
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III
THE FORM(S) OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Having outlined a broader range of functions for cost-benefit
analysis than has commonly been evaluated, the next step in under-
standing cost-benefit analysis under Section 106 (or any other statu-
tory mandate) is to identify the key determinants of the form that
such analysis should take in a given case. 186 As with the focus on effi-
ciency as its singular function, cost-benefit analysis is commonly seen
as fairly singular in form. In reality, though, cost-benefit analysis is
both more ad hoc and more systematically varied than conventional
accounts of its application would suggest.
Much of the conception of cost-benefit analysis as a singular phe-
nomenon can be traced to its most common application in the arenas
of human health and safety, environmental regulation, and risk regu-
lation generally. The first requirement of cost-benefit analysis in U.S.
law came in the Flood Control Act of 1936.187 The expansion of cost-
benefit analysis mandates-in the National Environmental Policy Act,
the Water Pollution Control Act, and the Toxic Substance Control
Act, among others-likewise occurred largely in these areas.*8 Given
its commonplace application to this particular set of questions, it is
hardly surprising that cost-benefit analysis would be viewed as a fairly
standardized tool of decisionmaking. 189 As it is applied more broadly,
however-whether in financial regulation or elsewhere-our concep-
tion of the practice must necessarily change. Distinct forms of cost-
benefit analysis will need to be recognized, along with the possibility
that the practice may be inapplicable to certain settings.
To be sure, some have acknowledged the need for distinct appli-
cations of cost-benefit analysis in distinct settings. Jason Johnston, for
example, has noted the relevance of whether cost-benefit analysis is
186 Such a framework is especially appropriate if we conceptualize cost-benefit analysis
as a decision procedure to be measured against alternative decisionmaking approaches. See
Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 167 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should be evalu-
ated not by considering the moral justifiability of outcomes but by assessing its total costs,
compared to other decision procedures).
187 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (outlining this early history of cost-benefit
analysis).
188 See Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some
Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1146 (2008) (identifying early
examples of congressional cost-benefit mandates).
189 To related effect, Adler suggests that cost-benefit analysis in risk regulation is dif-
ferent-though in the distinct sense that it may be less appropriate there. See Adler, supra
note 64, at 273 (suggesting that for risk regulation, the assessment of costs and benefits and
of overall well-being may be so divergent that cost-benefit analysis is inappropriate).
Death (or the risk thereof) is different, he posits, given the difficulty of its monetization.
Id. at 272.
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mandated by statute in determining how it should be applied.190 Eric
Posner, meanwhile, has encouraged variation in the form of cost-
benefit analysis, depending on the extent of congruence between the
preferences of the political principal and the relevant administrative
agency. 191 More modestly, the unsuitability of cost-benefit analysis in
certain settings has also been acknowledged.192 Adler and Posner thus
recognize that "under certain conditions agencies may need to modify
the traditional understanding of CBA, or even depart from CBA
entirely."193
An ecumenical notion of the form of cost-benefit analysis in
diverse settings is less common, however, than one might expect.
More importantly, there has been little attempt to sort out the factors
to consider in determining how (or even whether) to apply cost-
benefit analysis in a given setting.194 In this section, I suggest four
factors to weigh in conducting that calculus: the legal basis for any
cost-benefit analysis, the character of the responsible agency, the
nature of the problem presented, and the variables to be weighed. 95
A. Source of Law
The form of cost-benefit analysis in a given setting will depend on
the legal basis for that analysis. This begins with the question of
whether the analysis is required, is merely authorized, or is entirely
voluntary. As to the first two possibilities, consider the distinct provi-
sions of the Consumer Product Safety Act and the Toxic Substances
Control Act. While the former bars the Consumer Product Safety
Commission from promulgating a new rule "unless it has prepared. . .
190 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1350-55 (applying a game theory model to identify
differences in agency incentives depending on whether the relevant statute requires cost-
benefit analysis).
191 See Posner, supra note 64, at 293-94, 296 (proposing that the President grant greater
discretion to depart from strict adherence to cost-benefit analysis conclusions to agencies
whose heads have the same priorities as the President).
192 I leave to one side those who would never use cost-benefit analysis.
193 Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 168.
194 In a work in progress, Amy Sinden similarly takes up the question of alternative
forms of cost-benefit analysis, offering a typology of three axes along which to plot the
extent of formality of cost-benefit analysis in a given case: the degree of quantification/
monetization, the degree of precision, and the number of alternatives. Amy Sinden,
Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis 8 (Mar. 15, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
195 Careful thought about the form of cost-benefit analysis may be especially important
for agencies such as the SEC, for which the emphasis on cost-benefit analysis is in its early
stages. For such agencies, David Arkush has argued, asserting control of the particular
choice of method/approach may be essential in shaping their interactions with the courts-
and even Congress-around the demands of cost-benefit analysis. Arkush, supra note 33,
at 3.
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a final regulatory analysis of the rule containing ... [a] description of
the potential benefits and potential costs of the rule," 1 9 6 the latter
simply includes costs and benefits among multiple factors for the EPA
to consider in its rulemaking.197 As to the purely voluntary practice of
cost-benefit analysis, meanwhile, the SEC's use of cost-benefit
analysis-as distinct from its consideration of efficiency, competition,
and capital formation-is a case in point.198 Notwithstanding the
absence of any formal requirement or even authorization, the SEC
has engaged in cost-benefit analysis of its proposed rules since the
1970s.199 Even such voluntary conduct of cost-benefit analysis may be
grounds for critique, and even review, to the same degree as would
any other grounds of agency decisionmaking. Yet expectations of form
presumably ought to be less demanding where the agency's use of
cost-benefit analysis is entirely voluntary. 200
A second question as to the source of law is whether any appli-
cable call for cost-benefit analysis comes by way of statute or by exec-
utive order. Much of the administrative conduct of cost-benefit
analysis arises from the series of executive orders that mandate it,
dating back to President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291.201 But
many statutes-from the UMRA to the SDWA, Consumer Product
Safety Act, and Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act-
also charge individual agencies, or agencies generally, to engage in
196 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(2) (2012). Other mandatory cost-benefit analysis provisions can
be found in the legislation governing federal banking agencies, 12 U.S.C. § 4801(a) (2012),
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 42 U.S.C. § 3535(p) (2006).
197 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2012).
198 The D.C. Circuit has held that agencies are permitted to consider costs absent clear
congressional intent to preclude such consideration. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
199 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (outlining history of the SEC's voluntary
cost-benefit analysis); cf Initiation or Resumption of Quotations Without Specified
Information, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (proposed Apr. 10, 1985) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240
(1986)) (conducting cost-benefit analysis of proposed rulemaking).
200 A question for another day would be why agencies voluntarily undertake to conduct
cost-benefit analysis. Is it to reduce the prospect of an adverse judgment in the courts? To
inoculate themselves against the potential imposition of a cost-benefit mandate? To ingra-
tiate themselves to the executive or legislative branch? Whatever the motivation, it bears
noting that voluntary undertakings of cost-benefit analysis tend to be less comprehensive
than those mandated by executive order. See generally Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On
the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN.
L. REv. 213 (2011) (reviewing economic analyses conducted by independent regulatory
commissions, which historically have not been required to do so, and finding that their
studies tend to be less precise and complete than those conducted by agencies subject to
centralized regulatory review).
201 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing the series of executive
orders mandating cost-benefit analysis).
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cost-benefit analysis.202 The form of any such analysis might be
expected to vary depending on its source.
Minimally, our presumptions of justiciability versus non-
justiciability might vary between statutory and nonstatutory cost-
benefit analysis mandates. More substantively, cost-benefit analysis
conducted pursuant to executive order might fairly be conceived as
directed to a distinct audience. Even further, we might count it to
serve distinct purposes-with attendant implications for form.
Finally, whether the charge to engage in cost-benefit analysis
comes by statute or by executive order, one might separately consider
whether such provision is directed to a specific agency or is of more
general application. The UMRA and Executive Order 12,291, for
example, are applicable generally. 203 The Consumer Product Safety
Act and SDWA, by contrast, are directed specifically to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission and the EPA, respectively.204 Likewise for
Section 106 of NSMIA, which speaks only to the SEC.20 5
202 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2012)
(requiring all agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations); Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2012) (creating a Consumer Product Safety
Commission and authorizing it to promulgate rules to protect consumers, but only after
conducting cost-benefit analysis); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26
(2006) (authorizing the EPA to regulate drinking water safety but only after conducting
cost-benefit and risk analysis); Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996,
49 U.S.C. § 60102(b) (2006) (requiring that pipeline safety standards issued by the
Secretary of Transportation undergo cost-benefit analysis).
203 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §H 1531-1538 (2012)
(requiring all agencies to assess the budgetary impact of proposed regulations on the pri-
vate sector and other governments); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. §§ 127-128 (1981)
(specifying that its cost-benefit analysis mandate applies to all agencies, to the extent
legally permissible).
204 See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2012) (establishing an
independent regulatory agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, to implement
consumer product safety regulations); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-
26 (2006) (vesting the EPA with the authority to promulgate drinking water safety
regulations).
205 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(2012) (mandating consideration of efficiency, competition, and capital formation in SEC
rulemaking). A related question might be whether any rulemaking at issue has been explic-
itly mandated or authorized by statute. In the case of the SEC's shareholder proxy access
rule, thus, the Dodd-Frank Act specifically empowered the SEC to proceed. See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971(b),
124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)) (explicitly
authorizing the SEC to issue rules to allow shareholders to use a security issuer's proxy
solicitation materials). As such, one might plausibly expect that the conduct and review of
any cost-benefit analysis should not be directed to whether to enact a rule but to the choice
of rule. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1836 (noting that Congress had already
spoken to the policy issue of whether shareholder proxy access rules could be enacted,
presumably removing that question from consideration during judicial review). On the
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B. Responsible Agency
A second set of variables that might impact the form of cost-
benefit analysis in a given setting concerns the nature of the agency of
interest. Two features, in particular, may be relevant. The first is
whether it is an independent agency. From the SEC to the Federal
Election Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Federal
Communications Commission, and others, independent agencies exist
outside the executive branch and are commonly headed by multiple
members, serving overlapping terms, who can only be removed for
cause. 206 As a consequence, they are expected to be relatively insu-
lated from political demands. 207 In the particular realm of cost-benefit
analysis and centralized review by OIRA, for example, they face the
same reporting obligations as executive agencies, but not the require-
ment of preclearance. 208
While such independence need not point to any wholesale vari-
ance in the applicable level of scrutiny or deference, the approach to
cost-benefit analysis by an independent agency might be expected to
differ in at least some ways. In the absence of clear statutory instruc-
tion to the contrary, to begin, one might more naturally assume a pro-
cedural rather than substantive obligation as to such analysis, with the
agency required to consider (and perhaps report on) relevant costs
and benefits, but not constrained in its decisionmaking by that
analysis. 209
other hand, it may be important to distinguish the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act did not
mandate rulemaking, but simply authorized it.
That Congress may not have seen Section 106 as a barrier to SEC rulemaking on
proxy access, however, might be suggested by the precise language of its authorization.
Specifically, Congress sanctioned SEC rulemaking "under such terms and conditions as the
Commission determines are in the interests of shareholders and for the protection of inves-
tors." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971(b).
206 See Robert L. Glicksman, The Constitution, the Environment, and the Prospect of
Enhanced Executive Power, 40 ENvTL. L. REP. 11,002, 11,005-06 (2010) (discussing the
structure of independent agencies).
207 See id. at 11,006 (characterizing independent agencies as "relatively insulated from
partisan political pressures"). Justice Scalia addresses this characteristic of independent
agencies in his plurality opinion in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., writing that
independent agencies are "sheltered not from politics but from the President," and that
"their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by
increased subservience to congressional direction." 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009).
208 See Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REv. 2162,
2181 n.120 (2009) (noting that, unlike executive agencies, independent agencies do not
need to submit rules for preclearance to the Office of Management and Budget). Formal
differences notwithstanding, however, the variance in accountability of independent versus
executive agencies to the executive branch should not be exaggerated.
209 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1351-52 (contrasting substantive and procedural
mandates for cost-benefit analysis). Independent agencies are not, of course, bound by
most of the cost-benefit analysis requirements imposed on executive agencies. See
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One might also favor a somewhat less demanding standard for
cost-benefit analysis by independent agencies in light of their collegial
structure, with multiple-member commissions or boards at their
heads. That structure, in a sense, can be understood to serve at least
some of the information-forcing and bias-reducing functions of cost-
benefit analysis. 210 In its presence, then, our expectations of cost-
benefit analysis might be proportionally lower. 211
Other implications of independence for the conduct of cost-
benefit analysis are more ambiguous. For example, one might be more
inclined to judicial (rather than political) review of an independent
agency's cost-benefit analysis given the particular desire to insulate
such agencies from political pressures. 212 On the other hand, for the
very same reason, one might argue against judicial review, if it were
perceived as the more forceful constraint in actual practice. 213 Similar
ambiguity arises from the fact that independent agencies tend to be
relatively smaller, more focused institutions than executive agen-
cies.214 While specialization might favor an expectation of more
sophisticated cost-benefit analysis, independent agencies' size might
cut in the opposite direction, at least when it comes to the frequency
of analysis.
Beyond its independence, a second feature of the agency of
interest might be whether it works in the realm of risk regulation. 215
CURRENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 4 n.12 (observing that independent agencies are
merely encouraged to comply with the cost-benefit analysis mandates that are binding on
executive agencies). Of course, this might counsel an expectation of closer compliance with
any cost-benefit analysis requirements imposed by statute.
210 Cf Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 35-36 (offering multimember agencies' quasi-
legislative character as a distinct rationale for more deferential review of their cost-benefit
analyses).
211 This conclusion might depend on the aforementioned factor of whether the operative
cost-benefit analysis provision is of general applicability or is directed to a particular
agency. If Congress has charged a specific independent agency to engage in cost-benefit
analysis-notwithstanding its collegial structure-one might arguably read that decision to
demand even more stringent cost-benefit analysis. I am grateful to Jon Michaels for this
insight.
212 But see infra note 379 and accompanying text (noting nonjusticiability of cost-benefit
analysis in a number of important settings). On the contrast between political and judicial
review, see Posner, supra note 40, at 1187-89 (highlighting differences between political
versus judicial review as means to ensure agencies act in the interest of their principals).
213 Political control by way of the budget process, to be sure, should not be
underestimated.
214 See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (contrasting the SEC, an independent
agency, with executive agencies with vastly larger budgets and staffing).
215 On the scope of "risk regulation," see John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to
Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 18-20;
Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1029-37
(1983) (comparing standard-setting and screening approaches to risk regulation).
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Of course, any regulator can be cast as a risk regulator of some sort. A
more precise inquiry might thus be whether the statutory responsibili-
ties of the agency are directed to human, animal, or plant health or
safety.
As to such agencies, one might plausibly argue for a less assertive
form of cost-benefit analysis. 216 As many have suggested, the valua-
tion of life (and death) may present too many difficulties of calcula-
tion-independent of any normative concerns-to undergird effective
decisionmaking. 217 At a minimum, one might favor a procedural
versus substantive cost-benefit analysis by risk regulators. 218
On the other hand, risk regulation is the realm in which cost-
benefit analysis has been most actively used (and studied), 219 such that
its application might be most predictable and reliable in that setting.
Risk regulators thus benefit from far more robust models against
which to test alternative regulatory choices. 220 Cost-benefit analysis
may be an especially important tool for risk regulators, meanwhile,
depending on its function in the relevant case. Cognitive biases, for
example, may be at their worst when it comes to questions of life and
death.221
C. The Nature of the Problem Presented
The relative complexity of the social or economic challenge at
issue might also impact the form and rigor of any cost-benefit analysis
used to address it. At one level, cost-benefit analysis might be seen to
be increasingly justified as the complexity of the underlying problem
216 Cf Adler, supra note 64, at 273 (proposing that cost-benefit analysis may not be
appropriate for agencies regulating risks).
217 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 61, at 8-9 (arguing that cost-benefit
analysis is flawed in part because it is impossible to place a meaningful price on human
life).
218 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1351-52 (comparing statutes requiring substantive
cost-benefit analysis with those that only require procedural cost-benefit analysis).
219 See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 24-42 (chronicling the use of cost-
benefit analysis from President Ronald Reagan through President George W. Bush).
220 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 29 (noting that agencies subject to Executive
Order 12,866 have substantial experience and methodological analysis to draw upon when
conducting cost-benefit analysis). Analogous models may be relatively difficult to develop
in financial regulation, given the challenges of modeling both individuals' response to new
information-among the primary contributions of securities regulation-and individuals'
engagement in fraudulent behavior. See generally COPELAND, supra note 32, at 96-97
(identifying factors, including the lack of data and experience regarding previously unregu-
lated activity, that can make it difficult for the SEC to quantify certain regulatory costs
and/or benefits).
221 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the perceived high risks of cancer
and of flying versus driving as paradigmatic examples of cognitive biases).
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grows.222 The challenge of ozone depletion may require systemic cost-
benefit analysis more so than would an evaluation of glass recycling. It
is in such settings that an effective decision tool is most crucial. By
reducing complex decisions to tractable terms-both by eliminating
seemingly irrelevant variables and by capturing the remaining vari-
ables using a common frame of reference-cost-benefit analysis may
offer its greatest value when applied to complex problems.
On the other hand, the very exclusion and quantification of vari-
ables that makes cost-benefit analysis useful with complex problems
may sometimes undermine its utility. This may be especially true
where, as discussed below, complexity does not arise (at least prima-
rily) from policy challenges associated with the key variables-how to
coordinate private actors across multiple jurisdictions, for example-
but from the presence of a large number of relevant variables.223 In
the latter circumstance, the exclusion-or even de-emphasis-of cer-
tain variables may generate a more tractable, but also less accurate,
evaluation. 224 Cost-benefit analysis thus may solve one problem only
by creating a new one. It is telling, in this regard, that no one has more
forcefully argued for the inclusion of nonquantifiable variables in cost-
benefit analysis than its advocates. 225
A second characteristic of the underlying problem that might
impact the chosen form of cost-benefit analysis would be any distribu-
tional features of (a) the status quo, (b) any regulatory intervention
directed at it, or (c) the cost-benefit analysis itself. Such distributional
issues give rise to their own species of complexity, with resulting
implications for the form (and suitability) of cost-benefit analysis.226
222 See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 32, at 14 (noting that cost-benefit analysis
can be especially useful when engaging areas of uncertainty); cf Livermore & Revesz,
supra note 149, at 25 n.136 (considering the role of cost-benefit analysis in climate change
regulation).
223 See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of per-
forming cost-benefit analysis when there are multiple variables to be considered on each
side).
224 See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (noting that the multiplicity and/or
intractability of relevant variables may make cost-benefit analysis less useful).
225 See David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can
They Be Reconciled? 6 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (noting that purely quantitative cost-benefit analyses can be prob-
lematic, and that many cost-benefit analysis supporters argue that nonquantitative benefits
should be considered as well).
226 See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012) (proposing the "social welfare function" as the optimal
policy-analysis methodology because, unlike cost-benefit analysis, it can incorporate dis-
tributive considerations); Arnold C. Harberger, On the Use of Distributional Weights in
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, 86 J. POL. ECON. S87, S94-S102 (1978) (exploring distribu-
tional considerations in cost-benefit analysis); Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong
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At some level, such distributional implications are universal. They
vary in degree, however, with attendant variation in the implications
for cost-benefit analysis.
Rigid cost-benefit analysis may be especially problematic, thus, in
the presence of significant information asymmetries-and the distor-
tions in preference functions that may follow. 2 2 7 Where individuals
lack relevant information, their preferences may not align with the
maximization of their utility. 228 As a result, a standard-form cost-
benefit analysis, directed to utility maximization, will favor undesir-
able results.
A similar pattern may arise in the face of significant wealth differ-
entials. Legitimate methodological concerns with the interpersonal
comparison of utilities aside,229 there may be important differences in
the marginal utility benefits associated with nominally comparable
welfare gains across the wealth spectrum. 230 In certain circum-
stances-the financial markets, among them-cost-benefit analysis
will need to acknowledge and capture as much if it is to offer mean-
ingful insight.
This is even more true where questions of distribution arise not
from the ex ante equilibrium, but from the proposed regulatory inter-
vention itself.231 A Kaldor-Hicks efficient intervention counseled by
cost-benefit analysis is already problematic in its reliance on associ-
ated wealth transfers.232 The cost-benefit analysis is even more prob-
lematic where it fails to acknowledge the varying utility losses
Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1313-14 (pointing to
circumstances in which cost-benefit analysis will generate misleading results).
227 The same is true of any circumstance in which a subset of preferences is not effec-
tively captured by the analysis. See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 168 (noting that cost-
benefit analysis may need to be modified when a project would "affect people who have
highly unequal levels of wealth, or who are poorly informed about the consequences of the
project, or whose preferences fail for other reasons to register projects that would enhance
their well-being").
228 See Juanda Lowder Daniel & Kevin Scott Marshall, Avoiding Economic Waste in
Contract Damages: Myths, Misunderstanding, and Malcontent, 85 NEa. L. REV. 875, 896-97
(2007) (discussing the need for fully informed market participants to avoid distortions in
contracting); cf William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEo. L.J.
201, 275 (1997) (noting problems of asymmetric information in regulatory competition).
229 See Ahdieh, supra note 162, at 51 n.40 (discussing challenges of interpersonal com-
parisons of utility).
230 Cf Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care Act, the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes,
and the Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1639, 1692 (2012) (noting the "decreasing marginal utility" of wealth).
231 See REVEsZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 180 (discussing the ways in which regu-
latory costs and benefits may fall disproportionately on a subpopulation).
232 See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 190 (outlining limitations of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency analysis).
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associated with the proposed regulation's generation of costs at one
level of wealth versus another.233 Where the status quo or a proposed
regulatory intervention is grounded in-or gives rise to-an asym-
metric allocation of benefits, the rigid application of cost-benefit
analysis is necessarily more problematic. 234
Perhaps most directly relevant to the form of cost-benefit
analysis, however, are distributional questions attendant to the
analysis itself. As we will see with regard to Section 106, the operative
variables of a given cost-benefit analysis provision may variously favor
the interests of one interested party or another.235 As the demands of
investor protection, efficiency, and capital formation are successively
weighed, the costs and benefits of each are distributed in uneven-yet
predictable-ways. Such patterns must necessarily be integrated into
any regulatory analysis if it is to be useful.236
D. The Variables to Be Weighed
Finally, the form of cost-benefit analysis in a given setting-as
well as the wisdom of its application-are necessarily impacted by the
nature of the variables to be considered. To begin, one might ask
whether the relevant legislative or executive charge (if any) speaks
explicitly to the evaluation of "costs" and "benefits." While certain
cost-benefit provisions do so, others do not. Many, meanwhile, refer
to costs, but not benefits. The National Energy Conservation Policy
Act, for example, speaks of "cost-effectiveness." 237 The NSMIA, on
the other hand, makes no reference to costs or benefits, instead citing
233 See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of
Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243, 247 (1988) ("[A] given loss
reduces the utility of a rich person less than a poor person .... ). A separate but related
question is the treatment of loss aversion in the analysis of costs and benefits, at least in
some appropriate settings. See Adler & Posner, supra note 36, at 238-41 (describing
"endowment dependence" in cost-benefit analysis).
234 An obvious case of this would be the application of tax-and-transfer policies. As to
such policies, a distributionally insensitive cost-benefit analysis would see no gain. Tax-and-
transfer policies, however, might in fact be correlated with a significant overall increase in
well-being. See Adler, supra note 64, at 272-73 (noting welfare gains associated with such
policies yet not captured by cost-benefit analysis).
235 See infra Part IV.B.3 (suggesting orientation of Section 106's individual factors to
different groups).
236 In unpublished work, David Arkush suggests an even more fundamental distributive
flaw that may be inherent in cost-benefit analysis: a status quo bias that assumes current
conditions capture what is most valued-absent evidence of some market failure. As
Arkush notes, this constitutes an odd starting point in evaluating potential regulatory ini-
tiatives-perhaps most of all in the context of emerging financial technologies, from credit
default swaps to high-frequency trading. Arkush, supra note 33, at 2-3.
237 42 U.S.C. § 8256(b)(3)(A) (2006) (listing the requirements to be considered when
disbursing funds from the Federal Energy Efficiency Fund).
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"investor protection" as the operative benefit of SEC rulemaking,
with potential costs arising from reductions in efficiency, competition,
or capital formation.238 It requires no great commitment to textualism
to appreciate that such terminological choices should impact choice of
form. This is especially true where, as here, "cost" and "benefit" have
come to resemble statutory terms of art-however ambiguous they
might remain in actual practice.
The implications of a statute's explicit versus implicit reference to
costs and benefits for the form of any resulting cost-benefit analysis
suggests a second point: In its simplest form, cost-benefit analysis
involves the weighing of some singular cost against some singular ben-
efit-whether it has explicitly been framed as such, or because a mul-
tiplicity of enumerated variables can be reduced to a single metric of
cost and/or benefit. In other cases, by comparison, one might find a
multiplicity of irreducible variables on one or both sides of the ledger.
Such an enumeration might include costs or benefits among the rele-
vant considerations, but also might not-as in the provision of interest
herein.239
The ability to reduce multiple variables to one will often turn on
their quantifiability. 240 Questions of quantifiability, however, may
arise even with a single variable on each side of the ledger. Much of
the existing literature about cost-benefit analysis is thus concerned
with whether, and how, we can quantify the cost associated with an
increased risk of death or injury.241
As any regulatory assessment moves away from calculation of a
limited number of tractable variables, important potential benefits of
cost-benefit analysis may be undermined. If the putative function of
cost-benefit analysis in a given setting is transparency, the limitation
of interest-group influence, the control of cognitive biases, or even the
238 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012).
One interesting scheme is that of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the gov-
erning statute of which mandates the consideration of costs and benefits but offers a spe-
cific enumeration of relevant factors to be weighed. See 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2012).
239 As suggested above, it might also include "costs" as a factor but not "benefits."
240 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 171, at 1584 (arguing that cost-benefit
analysis is flawed in its attempt to quantify unquantifiable values); see also Victor B. Flatt,
Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold with a New EPA
Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1999) (describing how cost-benefit
analysis fails in the environmental context because the relevant variables cannot be
reduced to numeric values).
241 This emphasis includes questions regarding the widespread reliance on subjects' will-
ingness to pay rather than willingness to accept; the use of relatively dated, and industry-
specific, wage premium studies; and the complexity of discounting future risks. See
McGarity, supra note 63, at 2355, 2370 (discussing these three questions).
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enhancement of efficiency, 242 then the need to weigh a multiplicity of
variables or to calculate the incalculable counsels against its use.
Minimally, the intractability of the relevant variables encourages more
modest cost-benefit analysis, perhaps at least counseling a procedural,
rather than substantive, approach.243
A final-and more fundamental-aspect of the variables to be
weighed is also worth noting. Questions of quantifiability relate to,
but differ from, the question of whether the variables on each side of
the ledger fall on the same scale-what some have described as the
issue of "incommensurability." 2 4 4 In essence, can the variables on
each side be balanced against one another? When we can reduce the
operative variables to monetary costs and benefits, they obviously can.
Mere subtraction will suffice. Where one or more variables on each
side are properly measured on different scales, by contrast, any such
balancing of the ledger becomes impossible.
At least in some cases, moreover, even where we can compare
the variables on each side of the equation, this may not be the opera-
tive mandate. Thus, it is essential to identify, in any given cost-benefit
analysis, what precisely the relevant agency is charged to do with the
variables under consideration. Is it to balance them against one
another, or something entirely different? Under Section 106, I will
suggest, the charge of cost-benefit analysis is to weigh, consider, and
assess-but not by way of subtraction. Rather, it is an exercise in
addition.
IV
THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SECTION 106
Having posited a broader array of potential functions of cost-
benefit analysis than has commonly been acknowledged and having
offered a framework for evaluating the optimal form that cost-benefit
analysis might take in a given setting, we can return to Section 106's
requirement that the SEC "consider" the implications of its regulatory
actions on "efficiency, competition, and capital formation." Many of
the most familiar justifications for cost-benefit analysis have little
application to Section 106. The efficiency rationale of achieving
optimal outcomes and the nonefficiency rationale of limiting regula-
tory initiative, by contrast, each capture something of the function of
242 See supra Part II (analyzing the functions of cost-benefit analysis).
243 See supra note 209 and accompanying text (describing procedural versus substantive
cost-benefit analysis).
244 See, e.g., Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1371 (1998) (discussing whether "incommensurability" undermines monetized
cost-benefit analysis).
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Section 106. Section 106 is best understood, though, as an unusual
case of Congress seeking to mandate agency consideration of factors it
otherwise could not integrate into the SEC's substantive regulatory
analysis.
As to form, meanwhile, Section 106 emerges as a true mandate,
but one imposed on an independent agency operating outside the
traditional realm of risk regulation. Further, its multiplicity of difficult
to quantify factors generates not only significant complexity, but its
own distributional implications-even beyond those that characterize
the underlying financial markets. For that reason, among others, a
traditional balancing approach has limited utility under Section 106.
Against this backdrop, it becomes possible to articulate a more
systematic approach to the nature of the SEC's obligation under
Section 106, the nature of the analysis it should undertake, and the
nature of any ensuing review. Section 106 does, in fact, impose a duty
on the SEC, though it is a procedural rather than a substantive one.
The analysis it mandates, further, should be rigorous-particularly in
its attention to distributional concerns-but it should not be
understood as a rigidly quantitative exercise, let alone as one keyed to
balancing costs and benefits. Contrary to the views of some, finally,
judicial review of SEC analysis under Section 106 is appropriate. It
must, however, be highly deferential.
A. The Function of Section 106
1. Efficiency Functions of Section 106?
Although broadly consistent with the promotion of efficiency, it is
difficult to cast Section 106 as primarily directed to that purpose. In
particular, given both its terms and its context, Section 106 does not
seem to reduce cognitive biases or foster efficient priority setting in
any significant way.
Cognitive failure is not commonly seen as a central consideration
in the regulatory decisionmaking of the SEC. Financial regulation is
not the realm of risk regulation, where we regularly worry about
alarmist or availability biases producing significant misjudgments
about relevant harms.245 The questions at stake in securities regula-
tion do not, for the most part, provoke such concerns.
What may be the most significant exception, meanwhile, would
arguably cut against the mandate of Section 106. A crucial risk in
securities regulation-made plain in recent years-is the "black swan"
245 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive biases, including
alarmist and availability biases).
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event we blithely disregard.246 It is systemic risks, and the possibility
of catastrophic failure, that we are prone to over-discount. 247 Section
106 may actually aggravate this bias, however, rather than reduce it:
By adding efficiency, competition, and capital formation alongside the
SEC's conventional emphasis on investor protection, we may divert
attention from the systemic risks facing the market.2 4 8
The relative visibility of the factors enumerated in Section 106
also cuts against an understanding of cognitive bias as the provision's
primary motivation. Efficiency, competition, and capital formation are
unlikely to be overlooked-or even underappreciated-in regulation
of the securities markets. Tellingly, even before enactment of the
NSMIA, the SEC voluntarily weighed the costs of its regulatory pro-
posals against their benefits. 2 4 9
Criticism of the SEC, meanwhile, has not focused significantly on
the possibility of cognitive bias in its rulemaking-be it availability
bias, informational cascades, or other behavioral errors. 2 5 0 While its
regulatory initiatives are not without controversy, they are not com-
monly critiqued on these particular grounds. Rather, the SEC has
alternatively been cast as either overly solicitous of investors or inade-
quately attuned to potential market efficiencies. 251
An account of Section 106 as directed to investors' cognitive
biases is easier to imagine. The high visibility of financial scandals-
246 See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE, at xvii-xviii (2007) (defining such an event as one that is rare, has an
extreme impact, and is retrospectively explained as predictable).
247 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory
State, 95 MINN. L. REv. 578, 586 (2010) (exploring patterns of systemic risk in the financial
markets); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198-201 (2008) (defining
and providing examples of systemic risk).
248 To be clear, there is nothing inherent in cost-benefit analysis that dictates this result.
One could readily imagine a statutory provision-especially after the recent financial
crisis-that is designed to undercut operative cognitive biases by mandating "considera-
tion" of relevant low-probability, high-risk events, or of data directed to those possibilities.
249 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing the beginnings of the SEC's
voluntary cost-benefit analysis).
250 This might be traced, at least in part, to the SEC's multimember structure. See supra
note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate standard for cost-benefit
analysis with independent agencies). Its relatively open decisionmaking process might also
contribute to this sense of the agency.
251 To be sure, many critics would challenge this characterization, suggesting the SEC
has been too keen to accommodate industry wants and needs. Cf Francis J. Facciolo,
Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
615, 680-81 (2000) (noting issues of regulatory capture in securities regulation); see also
Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer Protection Approach to Mutual Fund Disclosure and the
Limits of Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 60-61 (2009) (arguing for increased
disclosure of technical information that may not be comprehensible to the average investor
but would be useful to intermediaries on a consumer-protection justification). These critics,
on the other hand, are rarely advocates of increased cost-benefit analysis.
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from Charles Ponzi's complex schemes to Bernie Madoff's very simple
one252-Could foster investor attitudes akin to the inaccurate
appraisals of cancer. Individual investors plagued by availability or
alarmist biases, or by an on-screen/off-screen mindset, may come to
see fraud as a far greater risk than it actually is.253 The persistence of
high levels of investment even after the revelation of such prominent
frauds, on the other hand, would seem to argue against this con-
cern. 2 5 4 The dominant role of sophisticated institutional investors in
the modern capital markets further undercuts these concerns.255 A
conception of Section 106 as directed to cognitive bias is difficult to
reconcile with the central role of such investors. While cognitive
biases are possible even within large and sophisticated institutions,
they seem relatively less likely to arise in those settings-and even less
likely to persist.256
Given the broad factors it enumerates, Section 106 is also a poor
tool of priority setting. To begin, it continues to fix investor protection
as the SEC's core responsibility.257 In "efficiency, competition, and
capital formation," more importantly, Section 106 does not enumerate
252 See Mark Klock, Lessons Learned from Bernard Madoff Why We Should Partially
Privatize the Barney Fifes at the SEC, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783, 785-87 (2010) (describing the
Madoff scheme as the largest Ponzi scheme in history); Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi
Scheme Exposes "The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor," 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 215, 221
n.16 (2010) (discussing Madoff and other recent Ponzi schemes).
253 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471, 1518 (1998) (describing judgment errors by individuals based on the "availa-
bility" of relevant harms).
254 See Adam Shell & Matt Krantz, Are Main Street Investors Warming Up to Stocks?,
USA TODAY (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2013/01/24/
new-stock-highs-lure-main-street-back-to-market/1861789/ (discussing retail investors'
return to the stock market).
255 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the Art of Securities Regulation, in MODERNIZING
U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVEs 3, 6-7 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) (noting the rise of institutional investors); see
also Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the
Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 1, 20 (2008) (dis-
cussing increased shareholder activism); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age
of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1987) (exploring the increased activism
of institutional investors).
256 See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323,
342 n.78 (2012) (noting that large institutions may be more capable of acquiring and
assessing information than individuals).
257 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(2012) (requiring that the SEC consider the protection of investors); see also C. Steven
Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1,
98-99 (suggesting that the SEC has usually ranked investor protection high among its pri-
orities); Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CALIF. L. REv. 279, 280 (2000) (noting that securities regulation in the United States
revolves around investor protection); Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 37 (stating that the
primary mission of the SEC is investor protection).
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specific topics that might define the SEC's agenda. As to whatever
subject matter priorities the SEC chooses, rather, Section 106 enumer-
ates considerations to be weighed in its regulatory calculus.
Issues of priority setting, furthermore, have not been a source of
significant concern with the SEC. Even among its critics, the objec-
tions are not so much with the Commission's choice of priorities as
they are with the substantive regulatory choices it makes as to any
given priority.258 Legislative attention to the SEC comes in fits and
bursts, meanwhile, commonly driven by industry lobbying regarding
particular questions, rather than any congressional intent to shape the
Commission's agenda more generally.259
By contrast with the reduction of cognitive bias and the setting of
priorities, the efficiency function of facilitating optimal outcomes
should be understood as at least part of Section 106's function. 260
Generally, one might see every statutory charge to an agency as
seeking improved outcomes at some level. Minimally, one would
expect Congress to believe as much. But the goal of encouraging
optimal outcomes seems relatively more applicable to Section 106 for
at least three reasons.
The subject matter of Section 106, to begin, makes an orientation
to efficient results especially appropriate. Although efficiency can
surely be evaluated with respect to environmental protection or work-
place safety as well, it would seem part and parcel of any analysis of
securities regulation.261 Secondly, and more importantly, one might
think of efficiency as-in some respects-a natural counterpoise to
the SEC's traditional focus on investor protection. Investor protection
is essential to the operation of efficient capital markets. 262 Mandatory
258 See, e.g., Miriam Miquelon Weismann, Corporate Transparency or Congressional
Window-Dressing? The Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley as a Means to Avoid Another
Corporate Debacle, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 98, 111-12 (2004) (criticizing the SEC for,
inter alia, its failure to foresee Enron's collapse); Alison S. Fraser, Note, The SEC's
Ineffective Move Toward Greater Regulation of Offshore Hedge Funds: The Failure of the
Hedge Fund Registration Requirement, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 795, 799 (2007) (criticizing the
SEC's failure to properly regulate offshore hedge funds).
259 See Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder's Role, Defining a Role for State
Law: Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 774 (2008) (noting that Congress only sporadi-
cally focuses on securities law, and usually only after a crisis).
260 See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the efficiency function of cost-benefit analysis in
generating improved outcomes).
261 See Schwarcz, supra note 247, at 205-06 (highlighting efficiency as a central goal of
the securities laws); see also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 88 (1975)
(arguing that efficient capital markets protect investors).
262 See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting,
37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 861, 935 (2005) (explaining that investor protection and confidence in the
market are critical to efficiency); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for
2039
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
disclosure, meanwhile, is commonly believed to enhance market effi-
ciency. 263 On the other hand, a great deal of investor protection comes
at the cost of efficiency-whether in terms of opportunities for
competition, or the ease of capital formation.264 By mandating the
consideration of efficiency, competition, and capital formation along-
side a continued emphasis on investor protection, thus, we might
understand Congress to be seeking more optimal outcomes in the
financial markets. Finally, and most simply, Section 106's explicit ref-
erence to the consideration of "efficiency" also supports an under-
standing of increased efficiency as part of the provision's function.265
All of that said, several factors counsel against a conception of
Section 106 as being primarily about facilitating optimal outcomes.
The provision requires, to begin, only that the SEC "consider" effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation. 266 If optimal ends were the
priority, one might instead expect a mandate that the SEC "deter-
mine" whether a proposed rule advanced the ends of efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation. 267 Stating it differently, a mandate of
substantive rather than procedural cost-benefit analysis would seem
more appropriate. 268
Incorporation of the new factors alongside investor protection in
Section 106 also supports this conclusion. Whatever desire for optimal
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 31, 45 (2007) (explaining the link between investor protection and efficient markets).
263 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722, 725-29, 733, 751-52 (1984) (arguing that
mandatory disclosure improves efficiency by subsidizing the public good of information,
reducing wasteful duplicative research, and reducing price dispersion); Donald C.
Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 747, 781-85, 803 (1985) (considering arguments for mandatory disclosure and con-
cluding that it can enhance efficiency); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 695 & n.281
(1995) (noting praise for federal mandatory disclosure rules for contributing to efficiency);
Paul P. Brountas, Jr., Note, Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities
Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1517, 1532-33 (1992) (explaining that mandatory disclosure
facilitates the accurate allocation of resources to their most efficient use).
264 See Facciolo, supra note 251, at 681 (noting that the goals of investor protection and
efficiency may sometimes conflict).
265 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012).
266 Id. In addition to the arguments offered above, Posner and Weyl suggest another
reason to question an account of Section 106 as primarily directed to facilitating allocative
efficiency: In financial regulation, the "efficiency" goal of interest tends to be informa-
tional, rather than allocative, efficiency. Cf Posner & Weyl, supra note 68, at 393
(explaining that asset pricing generally is concerned with "whether prices are predictable
rather than whether welfare is maximized").
267 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the relatively weak language of
Section 106).
268 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1351-52 (explaining the difference between substan-
tive and procedural cost-benefit statutes).
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ends might be manifested in Section 106, its continued emphasis on
investor protection would seem to counsel something less than the
systematic analysis of efficiency offered by conventional cost-benefit
analysis. 269 Section 106 may thus serve some purpose of fostering effi-
ciency by encouraging optimal outcomes. But it does so to a lesser
degree than in the ordinary case of cost-benefit analysis. To the extent
that Section 106 does promote efficiency, in fact, it might best be
understood to do so simply in the (debatable) sense that less (regula-
tion) is more.270
2. Nonefficiency Functions of Section 106?
Turning to potential nonefficiency functions of Section 106, con-
straining the overall volume of regulation should surely be understood
as part of its purpose.271 This is evident from the political context of its
adoption. 272 Section 106 was enacted during the mid-1990s heyday of
Republican control of both houses of Congress and fits squarely
within the deregulatory agenda of that period.273 From this vantage,
the NSMIA's preemption of state securities law should not be under-
stood as a decision in favor of federal securities regulation. Rather,
preemption was merely one side of the coin, in a strategy to reduce
overall constraints on the securities markets.274 Section 106 is the flip
side-with its constraint on federal initiative in securities regulation as
well.
269 Cf Michael A. Livermore, A Brief Comment on "Humanizing Cost-Benefit
Analysis," 2011 EUR. J. RISK REG. 13, 14 (noting the "focus on economic efficiency" in
"standard cost-benefit analysis").
270 Stating it differently, Section 106's promotion of efficiency might be seen as not
about improved regulation, but rather less of it. While this is potentially an argument about
efficiency, it is not inherently so. See supra Part II.B.1 (considering the role of cost-benefit
analysis as a means to restrain regulation).
271 See supra Part II.B.1.
272 See Spiller & Tiller, supra note 154, at 361 (noting efforts of new Republican
majority in Congress to restrain regulation); cf Johnston, supra note 15, at 1344-45 &
nn.5-6 (noting the political context of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995). A
similar account might be offered of the extension of Section 106's requirements to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in the context of the deregulatory Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, see supra note 76 and accompanying text, and of the adoption of the Paperwork
Reduction Act in 1980 and its amendment in 1995, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paperwork
Redux: The (Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 111 (1997).
273 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 167-68 (2001) (noting that deregulation was central to Republicans'
political campaigns); Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in
Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 321 (2001) (noting the deregulatory objec-
tives of Republicans in the 1990s).
274 See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 151, 181-82 (2010) (explaining that the NSMIA was intended to eliminate certain
regulations through preemption).
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The antiregulatory character of Section 106, however, should not
be overstated. As noted, the provision makes clear that investor pro-
tection remains the SEC's baseline directive. 275 The nature of Section
106 as a brief entry in a statute primarily directed to other questions
also favors a modest view of its function as a barrier to regulatory
activity generally. 276 Likewise, its interpolation as a disconnected
clause in the definitions sections of each of the statutes amended by
the NSMIA counsels against such an expansive view.2 7 7
More generally, the SEC has not been a prominent target of
antiregulatory initiatives, at least outside certain selected contexts.
This was true even amidst the push for cost-benefit analysis and der-
egulation generally, following the 1994 midterm elections.278 Even
where the SEC has been the target of such efforts, moreover, there
has not been any strong orientation to cost-benefit analysis as the
weapon of choice. The recently enacted JOBS Act, for example-not-
withstanding its goal to reduce the regulatory burdens imposed by the
SEC-included no requirement of cost-benefit analysis. 279
Whatever shortcomings one might see in a conception of Section
106 as functioning to discourage regulatory initiative, that account is
still more plausible than one in which the SEC's consideration of effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation is designed to promote
overall well-being, to increase transparency, or to facilitate agency
monitoring.280 It is not clear how Section 106 might be understood to
promote well-being-where emphasis on well-being (as distinct from
efficiency) is meant to highlight potential distortions in formal prefer-
ences.281 The latter concern is of necessarily diminished relevance to
modern capital markets, given the growing dominance of institutional
investors282-whose preferences are relatively less likely to exhibit
such distortions.283 More fundamentally, the language of Section 106
would not appear to be directed to well-being broadly defined. To the
275 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(2012); see also supra note 257 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that the NSMIA was primarily
directed toward preempting state law).
277 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
278 Cf Johnston, supra note 15, at 1345 n.7 (describing congressional drive for regula-
tory reform).
279 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1835 n.155 (summarizing the JOBS Act's
requirements).
280 See supra Part II.B (describing these potential goals of cost-benefit analysis).
281 See supra Part II.B.2 (contrasting well-being with efficiency).
282 See Grundfest, supra note 255, at 6-7 (noting the rise in institutional investors).
283 See Mark Simon et al., Cognitive Biases, Risk Perception, and Venture Formation:
How Individuals Decide to Start Companies, 15 J. Bus. VENTURING 113, 127 (1999)
(arguing that collective deliberation may help alleviate individuals' cognitive biases).
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contrary, it might best be read to point in the opposite direction,
favoring efficiency over generalized well-being. Strengthened investor
protection might thus be the optimal means to maximize well-being-
rather than a heightened emphasis on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.
As for a conception of Section 106's function as increasing trans-
parency, the latter is not commonly raised as a concern with the
SEC.2 8 4 This might potentially be traced to its status as an indepen-
dent agency, its narrow and distinct expertise, or even the extent of
industry attention to its work. In any case, transparency is not gener-
ally seen as lacking-cutting against a conception of Section 106 as
primarily functioning to increase transparency.
Beyond that, the indeterminate nature of Section 106's require-
ments of "efficiency" and "competition" (and even "capital forma-
tion") argues against a transparency-enhancing account of its function.
It is not clear that the analysis of such vague platitudes would mean-
ingfully enhance public insight into the SEC's reasoning or into the
implications of its choices. This is especially so given its mandate
merely to "consider" those factors.285
For the same reason, it is difficult to see how the charge to con-
sider efficiency, competition, and capital formation would reduce
interest-group influence.286 Given its content, Section 106 does not
focus consideration on a readily understood and externally evaluated
set of questions or reduce relevant variables to a form that might
render industry influence more visible. To the contrary, Section 106
might actually increase interest group influence. 287 Most obviously,
the provision offers a ready tool for lobbying against proposed SEC
rules. The open-ended nature of any evaluation of "efficiency, compe-
tition, and capital formation," in turn, makes it especially effective in
that regard. As we have seen, Section 106 may also facilitate post hoc
interventions in the courts.288
284 Cf Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of
the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 367, 402 (2008) (citing aspects of transparency at the SEC).
285 See Driesen, supra note 159, at 78-80 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis does not
increase transparency if the analysis is not disclosed).
286 See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text (analyzing how cost-benefit analysis
might reduce interest group influence).
287 See Driesen, supra note 159, at 83-85 (explaining the ways interest groups exert
influence through cost-benefit analysis).
288 Cf Johnston, supra note 15, at 1358 (describing analogous multistage game of
industry resistance to regulatory constraint, with resistance at the legislative phase pre-
ceding attempts to shape agency rulemaking).
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Section 106 might more plausibly be evaluated as a means of SEC
monitoring by the President and/or Congress.289 Ultimately, though,
this account of Section 106's function also falls short. Because the
SEC is an independent agency, the emphasis on such political moni-
toring is diminished.2 " One might argue, to be sure, that the limits on
political oversight increase the importance of other monitoring
devices, including cost-benefit analysis. Recall, though, that the model
of cost-benefit analysis as a tool of agency monitoring casts it not as a
mechanism of control, but as a means to generate the information
necessary for the President or Congress (as principal) to effectively
control their agent.291 The willingness to relinquish more direct means
of control when it comes to independent agencies, thus, cuts against
an account of cost-benefit analysis as serving that purpose here.
This conclusion is also supported by Congress's relative inatten-
tion to the SEC.2 9 2 It is true that Congress has sometimes been at odds
with the SEC, including in the period surrounding adoption of Section
106.293 On the other hand, the expression of those conflicts in the form
of legislative undertakings has been rare. Finally, the mandate to
merely "consider" Section 106's enumerated factors, together with
their indeterminate nature, also undercuts a conception of Section 106
as serving to facilitate political monitoring of the SEC. The SEC's
mere consideration of efficiency, competition, and capital formation
seems unlikely to generate useful information for the President or
Congress in monitoring the SEC.2 9 4
289 See supra Part II.B.4 (explaining this function).
290 See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1073, 1076 (2005) (noting relative lack of SEC accountability to the President as an
independent agency).
291 See Posner, supra note 40, at 1142-43 (outlining principal-agent model of cost-
benefit analysis).
292 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1821-23 (noting Congress's hands-off
approach to the SEC).
293 See, e.g., id. at 1822-23 (citing congressional criticism of the SEC's implementation
of the NSMIA); Paula Dwyer, Hardball at the SEC, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1997, at 50
(explaining congressional backlash against aggressive SEC action); Congress and the
Accounting Wars, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regulation/
congress/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (noting Congress's threats to the SEC's
funding). More generally, the Republican majority in control of Congress in 1996 was com-
mitted to an agenda of deregulation. See Spiller & Tiller, supra note 154, at 361 (noting
Republican efforts to limit regulation).
294 The legislative history of Section 106 also offers little support for an account of it as a
mechanism of agency monitoring. See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1819-20 (noting
rejection of language requiring a report on the costs and benefits of proposed regulations).
The failure of the JOBS Act to direct the SEC's decisionmaking more forcefully might also
be cited in this regard. See id. at 1835 n.155 (noting the limited assessment of costs required
by the act).
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What, then, of the final function of cost-benefit analysis outlined
above-of defining the scope of agency analysis, by enumerating rele-
vant factors for consideration? 295 As the foregoing discussion sug-
gests, Section 106 might plausibly be seen to serve some role in
promoting optimal outcomes.296 It may also serve to reduce the
volume of federal securities regulation generally.297 Section 106 is best
understood, however, as serving to define the nature of the SEC's
expected analysis in rulemaking.
Since its creation, the core mission of the SEC has been the pro-
tection of investors.298 The framers of the Securities Exchange Act
saw investor protection as critical to a vibrant yet stable economy. 299
From the outset, thus, the SEC highlighted it as the "paramount goal
of the securities laws."300 This emphasis remained unchanged with the
adoption of Section 106. The provision thus makes clear that the "pro-
tection of investors" remains the Commission's baseline
consideration. 301
Given as much, Section 106 is best understood to enumerate
countervailing considerations for the SEC to weigh in evaluating regu-
latory options. In fact, even that may overstate it. With the provision's
explicit reference to investor protection, the considerations of effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation are less countervailing fac-
tors, than simply additional ones for the Commission to consider.
This understanding fits best with the provision's mandate of "con-
sideration," rather than "determination," "calculation," or even
"analysis." 302 More broadly, it is supported by a comparison with
other congressional mandates to engage in cost-benefit analysis-in
the UMRA, SDWA, and elsewhere-in which relevant agencies are
explicitly charged to weigh "costs" on the one hand, and "benefits" on
the other.303 In these cases, the agency's clear mandate is to balance
295 See supra Part II.B.5 (explaining this potential function).
296 See supra Part II.A.1 (outlining the efficiency function of cost-benefit analysis in
promoting optimal outcomes).
297 See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining this potential function of cost-benefit analysis).
298 "The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect inves-
tors . . . ." The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013).
299 See Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 290 (2009) (noting the investor protection function of the
securities laws).
300 Id. at 292.
301 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012).
302 See id.
303 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1538 (2012); Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
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those factors that favor a proposed rule against those that disfavor it.
By comparison, the language of Section 106 reads much more like a
listing of relevant factors for the agency's consideration.
This, of course, is a more modest function than many of the other
possibilities enumerated above. Yet, this too is consistent with the
nature of Section 106 as a minor provision of a legislative act primarily
directed to other purposes-and with its casual interpolation at the
end of the definitions section of the relevant legislative acts.30 That it
is modest, more importantly, does not make it minor. To the contrary,
much of administrative law is built around the requirement that agen-
cies properly consider the factors enumerated by Congress in their
organic statutes and other legislation that they administer. 305
As outlined above, moreover, this function can properly be
understood-in appropriate cases-as a species of cost-benefit
analysis.306 Where, as with Section 106, the considerations to be added
into the mix will often cut against the results dictated by the currently
prevailing analysis, Congress may find such "cost-benefit analysis"
requirements to be effective in achieving its goals, yet far more politi-
cally palatable. With the adoption of Section 106, thus, Congress
might be understood to have staked out the position that the substan-
tial benefits of investor protection must be reconciled with its associ-
ated costs-in efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Unable
to muster the political will to add these criteria as substantive statu-
tory factors for the Commission to consider in its rulemaking, how-
ever, Section 106 presented itself as a second-best measure to the
same ends.
Notably, an understanding of Section 106 as simply enumerating
factors for SEC consideration is most closely aligned with the
approach taken to it by the D.C. Circuit. In its three decisions on
Section 106, the court relied most heavily on its prior decision in
Public Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.3o7
Public Citizen was not a cost-benefit analysis decision, however, but a
finding of arbitrary and capricious agency action based on the failure
to properly weigh all factors enumerated in the applicable statute.308
§ 300f-300j); see also supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (noting other cost-benefit
mandates).
30 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
305 See Beermann, supra note 183, at 740-41 (noting requirement to consider enumer-
ated factors in agency rulemaking); Smythe, supra note 183, at 1939 (describing enumer-
ated factors as exclusive variables for agency consideration).
306 See supra Part II.B.5.
307 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
308 Id. at 1211 (holding agency rulemaking to be arbitrary and capricious for "fail[ure] to
take account of a statutory limit on its authority").
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What the D.C. Circuit was less clear about in its three decisions was
whether it consequently thought of Section 106 as something besides a
cost-benefit analysis provision. Notwithstanding its generalized
analysis, the court's talk of costs and benefits suggests it may have
seen it both ways: as a cost-benefit analysis provision mandating SEC
consideration of Section 106's enumerated factors.
B. The Form of Section 106
Having identified the primary function of Section 106 as supple-
menting the SEC's pursuit of investor protection with a consideration
of selected factors that might counterbalance that goal, what can we
say about the form of any analysis under Section 106? As outlined
above, there are four clusters of questions against which Section 106
should be measured in evaluating the form it should take.309
1. Source of Law
The call for the SEC to consider "efficiency, competition, and
capital formation" in its rulemaking comes, of course, by way of
statute rather than executive order.310 Further, it arises from a statute
specifically directed to the SEC3 11 rather than one applicable more
generally-such as the UMRA. 312 Given its instruction that the SEC
"shall" consider,313 meanwhile, the provision is mandatory in nature,
rather than simply an authorization of cost-benefit analysis. The scope
of that mandate is limited, however, demanding consideration of the
enumerated factors, but not any necessary conclusion.314
309 See supra Part III.
310 National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012).
311 See id.
312 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2012).
313 National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 § 106.
314 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1839-42 (proposing SEC retreat from a con-
clusory analysis under Section 106); cf Johnston, supra note 15, at 1352 (noting that "pro-
cedural cost-benefit statutes say nothing about how the agency strikes the cost-benefit
balance; they merely require the agency to do the balancing"). An important, but separate,
question concerns the origins of the regulatory undertaking being subjected to cost-benefit
analysis. In the case of Business Roundtable, one might have expected the D.C. Circuit to
take some greater account of Congress's explicit authorization of a proxy access rule. See
supra note 22-23 and accompanying text. In a sense, Congress might be said to have done
some of the cost-benefit analysis itself. That Congress gave the SEC wide latitude as to the
content of the rule would seem to lend yet further credence to this way of thinking. See
Case Note, supra note 18, at 1089, 1094-95 (noting legislative history of the Dodd-Frank
Act).
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2. Responsible Agency
The SEC, of course, is an independent agency.315 It is comprised
of five members who serve fixed, staggered terms.3 16 Commissioners
can only be removed for "good cause" (including neglect of duty or
malfeasance) and not for political reasons, such as failure to follow
administration policy. 317 To further assure its nonpartisanship, no
more than three SEC commissioners may be appointed by one polit-
ical party.318
Like other independent agencies, the SEC's budget represents a
fraction of the annual appropriations of most executive agencies.319 Its
staffing is likewise dwarfed by the latter-from the Environmental
Protection Agency to the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and
others. 320
At least in the conventional sense, meanwhile, the SEC is not a
risk regulator. Agencies such as the EPA, OSHA, NHTSA, and the
like-with their focus on human health and safety-have traditionally
been thought to represent the universe of risk regulators. By
315 See Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach
(with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1412 (2013) (noting the
character of the SEC as an independent agency).
316 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
317 While the Securities Exchange Act lacks explicit removal language, it is "commonly
understood" to include a "for cause" removal limitation. See MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380
F.3d 611, 619-20 (2d Cir. 2004) ("inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office"
(quoting SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988))); cf Free
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010) (noting constitutional limitations on
removal power).
318 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
319 In 2012, for example, the SEC's budget was $1.321 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, APPENDIX, at 1402, available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2013-APP-1-31.pdf. This was only slightly
larger than the line items for both the U.S. Marshals Service, id. at 777 ($1.170 billion) and
the Fish & Wildlife Service, id. at 703 ($1.282 billion). It was dwarfed, meanwhile, by the
budgets of the Department of Commerce ($11.326 billion), the Department of Justice
($34.556 billion), and the EPA ($9.352 billion). See The Budget for Fiscal Year 2013,
Historical Tables, at 83, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-TAB/
pdflBUDGET-2013-TAB.pdf.
320 The SEC had 3906 permanent full-time employees in 2012. U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IN BRIEF, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 12 (2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfyl3congbudgjust.pdf. The EPA, in contrast, had
17,084 full-time employees in 2012. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FY 2013
ANNUAL PLAN 9, available at http://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/annualplan/FY13Annual
Plan.pdf. The Departments of Commerce and Defense had 35,013 and 86,315 permanent
full-time employees in 2012, respectively. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT, SIZING Up THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE 7
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extension, they have been the focal point for use of cost-benefit anal-
ysis and (even more so) academic analysis of it.321
On the other hand, the SEC's critical role in regulating-or at
least mandating the disclosure of-investment risks makes it some-
thing of a "risk regulator." 322 After the financial crisis, meanwhile,
there can be little doubt about the critical role of financial regulators
in minimizing systemic risk. 323 The shift from health risks to market
risks, however, likely limits the analogy to traditional risk regulators,
in defining the appropriate form of cost-benefit analysis under Section
106.
3. The Nature of the Problem Presented
As to the nature of the problem presented, both the level of com-
plexity and the distributional consequences at stake in the financial
markets-and under Section 106-are substantial.324 As to com-
plexity, any meaningful engagement with the efficient equilibrium of
investor protection, competition, and capital formation will necessa-
rily entail a mind-boggling array of questions.325 On their face, Section
321 See supra notes 187-89, 219-20 (describing the origins and primary application of
cost-benefit analysis in areas of risk regulation).
322 Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 909, 933 (1994) (noting
the conception of securities regulation as serving to reduce risk).
323 See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1682 (2012) (describing the increased
role of Congress in regulating risks associated with complex financial innovations and
institutions).
324 See supra Part III.C. In addition to the sources of complexity outlined above, at least
two others might also be noted. First, the terrain that financial regulation seeks to shape is
prone to rapid adjustment. By contrast with areas in which regulation is directed to phys-
ical processes, financial "institutions and activities [] exist largely on paper-and that
paper can be rewritten quickly." Arkush, supra note 33, at 2. The high degree of intercon-
nectedness across myriad spheres of financial regulation-and among the regulatory man-
dates of the Dodd-Frank Act alone-represents yet another source of complexity. See id.
325 See CURRENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 10 (discussing the difficulty in reliably
estimating a regulation's costs and benefits); Mongone, supra note 16, at 756 (noting the
"lack of definitive or readily quantifiable empirical data and the unpredictable nature of
certain costs" in financial regulation (internal citation omitted)). Consider Rule 14a-11's
provision of proxy access: Notwithstanding the forcefulness of Business Roundtable's cri-
tique of the SEC's analysis, determining the actual impact of proxy access turns out to be
an almost impossibly complex task. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 18, at 125-29;
Mongone, supra note 16, at 780 nn.182-83 (describing how reality is not as straightforward
as theory); D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 125
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 166 n.299 (2011) ("Given the stock of empirical knowledge we
have today, I submit that the only responsible answer to [what the amendments mean for
investors] is a cautious combination of 'it depends,' or 'we don't fully know."' (quoting
Eric Talley, Proxy Access Forum, THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.the
conglomerate.org/forum-proxy-access (alteration in original))). This is true even simply as
a matter of corporate governance and capital market efficiency. In addition, however,
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106's enumerated variables generate a striking degree of complexity.
That complexity grows exponentially, however, when we recognize
the dizzying array of subfactors embedded within them.3 2 6
There are also significant tensions among those factors, which
further increase the degree of complexity. Obviously, there is the
facial tension between the goal of investor protection and the goals of
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. But even as between
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, conflicting imperatives
will often arise. Competition may sometimes be inefficient and may
negatively impact capital formation. Informational efficiency, mean-
while, may be undercut by certain mechanisms of capital formation. 327
The distributional dynamics at work present comparable chal-
lenges-as to the ex ante equilibrium to be regulated, and as to the
implications of the Section 106 analysis itself and any regulatory
undertakings it might counsel or discourage. The baseline distribu-
tional issues in the capital markets, to begin, are substantial. Most
obviously, this is grounded in the unequal distribution of wealth. More
important for our purposes, though, is the significant variation in
investors' level of sophistication-and associated information asym-
metries. 328 To some degree, such discrepancies arise even within any
given category of investors. As between institutional and individual
investors, however, the divergence is all but immeasurable. 329 Any
cost-benefit analysis in the realm of financial regulation that dis-
regards distributional issues, as a result, would necessarily lead us
astray.
proxy access also engages complex questions of democratic process. See William S. Jordan
III, News From the Circuits, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws 20, 23 (2012) (drawing an analogy
between "electoral democracy" and "shareholder democracy" and arguing that the SEC
was reasonable in assuming that proxy access would improve corporate governance);
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 18, at 133-37 (detailing complex academic accounts of the
value of shareholder democracy).
326 Consider all the potential determinants of "efficiency," or even of "competition."
327 The preference of certain institutional and other large investors to shield their
trading from ready visibility-for many reasons, including the understandable desire to
minimize price movement against them-is suggestive. See Kiran Kumar et al., Hiding
Behind the Veil: Informed Traders and Pre-Trade Opacity, SEC.Gov 1-6 (March 1, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/seminar/yadav041812.pdf (studying hidden
orders).
328 See Darrell Duffie et al., Over-the-Counter Markets, 73 ECONOMETRICA 1815, 1828
(2005) (noting the heterogeneity of investors); Han N. Ozsoylev et al., Investor Networks
in the Stock Market 1 (unpublished manuscript) (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1784007 (describing information asymmetries in financial markets).
329 Cf Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1903-06 (1997) (sug-
gesting a role for institutional investors in helping individual investors overcome informa-
tion-cost barriers).
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Even if we leave aside the baseline distributional imbalances in
the financial markets, however, Section 106 holds its own distribu-
tional consequences. Though not apparent on its face, such impacts
are embedded in Section 106's enumerated factors as applied. While
"investor protection" is nominally relevant to any investor, institu-
tional and other sophisticated investors can largely protect their inter-
ests-including by securing desired disclosures-regardless of any
regulatory mandate.330 The SEC's investor protection function has
thus come to be thought of as directed primarily to retail investors,
and to other investors only secondarily.3 31
On the other side of the ledger, "capital formation" is likely to
speak primarily to the interests of institutions-be they investment
funds or capital-seeking business entities-rather than individual
investors.332 "Competition"-like investor protection-will often cut
the other way. Competition may benefit retail investors, thus, to the
extent that it lowers the cost of trading-for example, by undermining
the system of fixed commissions.333 At some level, this might be useful
for institutional investors as well. On the other hand, even limited
competition may suffice for institutional investors, given their ability
to secure beneficial pricing even in a constrained market.334 Also
notable may be circumstances in which institutional investors and
other large investors do not seek competition-as with the insulation
of trading from the public through the "dark pools" of the upstairs
market.335 Even as this choice undercuts price competition (and price
330 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of
the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1074 (2009) (noting the capacity of institu-
tional investors to force issuers to behave in their best interest); Troy A. Paredes, On the
Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 991 (suggesting that sophisticated investors can "fend for them-
selves"); see also Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, at 95 VA. L.
REV. 785, 816 (2009).
331 See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1092-93
(2009); cf Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty,
35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 78-79 (2009) ("[T]he SEC must continue its responsibility to
advance the interests of retail invpstors despite concerted industry opposition.").
332 But see Bradford, supra note 257, at 99 (noting the role of crowdfunding exemptions
from securities law in facilitating capital formation by small businesses).
333 Cf George W. Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 731 n.44 (1986) (Rules 19c-1 and 19c-3). Such commissions were
long mandated by the New York Stock Exchange under Rule 394. Id. at 731 n.45.
334 See Paredes, supra note 330 (noting the ability of institutional investors to protect
their interests); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
775, 789 (2006) (noting that opponents of strong securities regulations claim sophisticated
institutional investors can protect themselves).
335 See infra note 338 and accompanying text (noting the preference of certain institu-
tional investors for speed and anonymity over best execution).
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efficiency)-thereby harming retail investors-it may be valuable to
large investors.336
Section 106's aspiration to "efficiency," finally, does not
consistently tilt toward one category of investor versus the other.
Problematically, however, this is largely true because of its tendency
to favor one group or the other, depending on the particular regula-
tion in question. Efficiency may nominally be good for all investors.337
But in practice, certain types of efficiency will favor certain types of
investors.
Generalized efficiency, in terms of increased competition and
reduced transaction costs, likely favors retail investors more strongly,
for the reasons already suggested.338 The same is true of price effi-
ciency, with many large investors concerned more with speed than
with price. 339 The liquidity gains associated with more efficient mar-
kets, on the other hand, may cut either way-though for different rea-
sons. For institutional investors, the liquidity of the public markets
may be less vital at one level, given their access to alternative trading
platforms.340 On the other hand, it may be more crucial at certain
times, given their relatively higher degree of market exposure.341 As
to retail investors, meanwhile, they may sometimes face greater harm
than institutional investors from illiquidity-perhaps in the face of a
sudden need to shift their assets to cash. Given their relatively non-
336 To be sure, an emphasis on competition may sometimes favor institutional and
sophisticated investors more than retail investors, as where the operative limitations on
competition arise from barriers to entry imposed on more risky brokers, dealers, or other
market intermediaries.
337 One might think of larger investors as benefiting relatively more from increased effi-
ciency, given their greater investment in the market. But this does not implicate distribu-
tional concerns of the sort we are concerned with herein.
338 See supra note 330-331 and accompanying text.
339 See SEC Factsheet: Banning Marketable Flash Orders (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-201-factsheet.htm (describing institutional investors' use of
flash trading to seek advantage over other investors); see also Arthur Levitt, Best
Execution, Price Transparency, and Linkages: Protecting the Investor Interest, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 513, 514-15 (2000) (discussing balance between speed and price); cf. Donald C.
Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 191,
202 (2008) (discussing diverse needs of traders).
340 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-
Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 1069, 1125-26 (2005)
(describing advantages of alternative trading systems for institutional investors).
341 See Geoffrey T. Chalmers, The SEC: Dealing (or Not Dealing) with Trends in the
Regulatory Climate, in SEC COMPLIANCE BEST PRACTICES: LEADING LAWYERS ON
UNDERSTANDING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, DEVELOPING COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES,
AND ADVISING CLIENTS ON REPORTING PRACTICES 89-90 (Thomson Reuters 2009)
(noting the collapse of Bear Stearns following a "liquidity crisis" stemming from its expo-
sure to subprime mortgages).
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diversified portfolios, on the other hand, such investors receive rela-
tively less of the upside of liquid markets.342
4. The Variables to be Weighed
Section 106, of course, does not speak explicitly of costs and ben-
efits-though its legislative history does so.343 Further, it is not limited
to the measurement of two variables against one another, but
introduces three additional factors to be weighed alongside the base-
line consideration of investor protection.344
Its factors are fairly quantifiable, meanwhile, at least as a relative
matter. By contrast with the risks associated with arsenic in drinking
water, or the benefits associated with passive restraint systems in auto-
mobiles, the variables enumerated in Section 106 largely-though not
exclusively-involve monetizable activities and their consequences.
Whether there is competition might thus be measured by bid-ask
spreads; levels of capital formation can likewise be evaluated across
markets or across time; and even efficiency, depending on how it is
defined, can be assessed using the extent of price volatility-among
other potential measures. 345 Investor protection may be somewhat
more difficult to quantify, given the soft variables we might count as
part of it. Even there, however, market capitalization, the frequency
of fraudulent activity, and the like might readily be measured and
evaluated. 346
The identification of such metrics, however, answers the wrong
question. The issue is not whether one can find measures that are rea-
sonable proxies for the enumerated factors in Section 106. Surely one
can-and likely can do so more readily in the context of Section 106
than in other areas in which cost-benefit analysis has been more
342 Also relevant may be their more limited capacity to hedge risks. See Houman B.
Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors,
11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. PoL'Y 251, 255 (2007) (noting retail investors' more limited
tools to limit risks).
343 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
344 See National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(2012).
345 See, e.g., Nicolas P. B. Bollen et al., Modeling the Bid/Ask Spread: Measuring the
Inventory-Holding Premium, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 97, 102 (2004) (including "volatility," "ratio
of the difference between high and low prices to the average share price," "logarithm of
the variance of stock returns," and "deviation of returns"); Peter Koudjis, The Boats That
Did Not Sail: Asset Price Volatility and Market Efficiency in a Natural Experiment 3
(NBER, Working Paper No. 18831), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractjid=1343659 (discussing "noise," or other factors affecting price in an inefficient
market).
346 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998)
(measuring level of investor protection across forty-nine jurisdictions); Rafael La Porta et
al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (same).
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commonly applied. The critical question, however, is whether these
metrics effectively quantify the extent of efficiency, competition, cap-
ital formation, and investor protection in one equilibrium state versus
another. This is a far more difficult task-perhaps even compared to
other settings in which cost-benefit analysis is used.
The sweeping nature and indeterminacy of the variables to be
weighed under Section 106 may thus make them difficult to evaluate,
even compared to the risk of death, dismemberment, or reduced life
expectancy. Surely this is true of efficiency and competition, which are
more in the nature of first principles than particular and determinate
variables to be analyzed and weighed.347 Even investor protection and
capital formation, however, do not lend themselves to ready capture
by one, or even multiple, metrics.348
Finally, there is nothing in either the language of Section 106 or
the nature of the analysis it mandates that suggests a balancing of
costs and benefits as the intended statutory prescription 349-by con-
trast with conventional conceptions of what cost-benefit analysis
entails. As to language, the distinct emphasis on investor protection
cuts against the notion that it should be balanced against the demands
of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.350 That the foregoing
are merely to be considered affirms this conclusion-suggesting no
necessary equation of the factors on each side of the ledger.
Even beyond the text, Section 106's enumerated factors do not
lend themselves to a cost-benefit balancing. First, they do not consist-
ently pull in one normative direction versus the other, and thus cannot
be reduced to "costs" and "benefits."351 To related effect, they do not
readily fall on the same scale-of dollars or otherwise. 352 This is espe-
cially true of investor protection, to the extent it is understood to
encompass variables not captured in monetary terms, including per-
ceived risks, the psychic externalities associated with market losses,
and the like. Ultimately, and in line with what I would identify as
347 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 12 (discussing efficiency and competition as
broad concepts with many dimensions).
348 See id. at 38 (describing the complex and allocative nature of capital formation as a
goal of SEC regulation).
349 See supra note 244 and accompanying text (describing situations where balancing of
variables is either impossible or simply not mandated).
350 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(2012).
351 See supra notes 327-42 and accompanying text (describing the divergent impact of
Section 106's factors on different participants in the securities markets). Stating the point
differently, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which generating more of each of
Section 106's enumerated factors would not necessarily be better.
352 Cf Adler, supra note 244 (describing generally the problem of incommensurability
in cost-benefit analyses); text accompanying note 244 (same).
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Section 106's primary function, 353 the enumerated variables have
something of a complementary quality to them. Rather than a bal-
ancing of costs and benefits, thus, Section 106 is best read to prescribe
a continuing duty to advance investor protection, with a now-
heightened responsibility to consider the implications of the SEC's
resulting efforts for efficiency, competition, and capital formation in
the financial markets.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Section 106:
Obligation, Analysis, and Review
In light of the above findings, what principles might we extrapo-
late as to the conduct of SEC analysis under Section 106? As to the
nature of the SEC's obligation, to begin, Section 106 is properly
understood to impose a duty on the SEC to conduct cost-benefit
analysis-though its mandate is of a procedural, rather than substan-
tive, nature. The analysis Section 106 mandates, meanwhile, should be
rigorous in nature-particularly in attending to distributional con-
cerns-but need not be a distinctly quantitative exercise, let alone one
that seeks to rigidly balance costs against benefits. Perhaps contrary to
the conventional wisdom, finally, some scope of judicial review, albeit
of a highly deferential nature, is appropriate under Section 106.
Before turning to each of the foregoing, however, we might begin
by asking whether the ultimate lesson to be taken from the above is
not that cost-benefit analysis has no place in the work of the SEC.
One could argue that Congress never intended Section 106 to function
as any kind of cost-benefit analysis at all.354 The language of Section
106, on the other hand, has something of that spirit to it.355 That spirit
is affirmed by its legislative history.356 And as applied by the SEC and
353 See supra notes 295-309 and accompanying text (identifying Section 106's primary
function as supplementing relevant factors for the SEC to consider, in addition to investor
protection).
354 It might be analogized, in this account, to Congress's generalized charge to the
Federal Communications Commission to allocate frequencies in the service of the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006).
355 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106. The Supreme
Court has previously made clear that language short of "cost" and "benefit" may permit,
or even mandate, cost-benefit analysis. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490, 508-09, 511 n.30 (1981) (stating that "unreasonable risks" suggests congressional
intention of cost-benefit analysis, in contrast to "to the extent feasible" (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (2006))); see also Morrison, supra note 78, at 1352 (citing Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 419, 435 (1989)) (dis-
cussing indirect statutory requirements for cost-benefit analysis).
356 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (describing indications in the legisla-
tive history that Section 106 requires some cost-benefit analysis).
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evaluated by the courts, it has been treated as a cost-benefit
provision.357
More important, then, may be the question of whether-regard-
less of Congress's intent, the approach of the SEC, or the mindset of
the courts-the provision ought to be evaluated, applied, and
reviewed as a form of cost-benefit analysis. If one adopts the tradi-
tional conception of cost-benefit analysis as simply a tool of efficiency,
it should not be. This is minimally suggested by the text of Section 106
itself.3 5 8 More fundamental, however, is the disconnect between the
analysis prescribed by the provision and the kind that would be neces-
sary for a truly efficiency-enhancing evaluation of the SEC's regula-
tory choices. The indeterminate nature of the factors to be considered;
the lack of any requirement to reach a conclusion, let alone to act on
it; and the absence of any strong balancing function among Section
106's enumerated factors all counsel against an understanding of
Section 106 as primarily designed to increase efficiency, whether gen-
erally or even in the more refined sense of encouraging optimal
outcomes.
But this approach involves too narrow a conception of the nature
and role of cost-benefit analysis. As suggested above, cost-benefit
analysis may serve a variety of functions beyond the promotion of effi-
ciency. 359 In certain circumstances, cost-benefit analysis may serve
simply to force an agency to consider additional factors-and perhaps
particularly factors in some tension with the agency's primary charge.
The SEC's required consideration of efficiency, competition, and cap-
ital formation under Section 106, then, may constitute cost-benefit
analysis of a particular sort.
If that is so, what can we extrapolate from the foregoing as to the
application of Section 106 in practice, and as to the scope of any
ensuing review? In turn, we must define the nature of the SEC's obli-
gation under the provision, the nature of the analysis it should be
expected to conduct, and the nature of any subsequent review.
1. The Nature of the SEC's Obligation
There can be little doubt that Section 106 imposes some obliga-
tion on the SEC. In light of the language of Section 106, its purpose,
and the nature of the variables it enumerates, however, that obligation
357 See supra notes 90-91, 114 and accompanying text (describing the SEC's and the
D.C. Circuit's treatment of Section 106 as a form of cost-benefit analysis).
358 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106.
359 See supra Part II.B (exploring nonefficiency functions of cost-benefit analysis).
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is properly understood to be limited. More precisely, it is procedural
rather than substantive in nature. 360
Under Section 106, thus, the SEC must carefully consider the
impact of its proposed rules on market efficiency, competition, and
capital formation. It may further be required to report its findings in
that regard-though that is already less clear from the statute. In any
case, it need not go beyond these procedural duties, to reach any
substantive conclusion as to the trade-off between investor protection
and efficiency, competition, and capital formation.361 Even more
clearly, Section 106 does not require that the substance of an SEC
rulemaking comport with its findings under that provision.362
The SEC's purely procedural obligation under Section 106 is sug-
gested by the very language of the provision. All that Section 106
requires of the SEC is that it "consider" the impact of proposed rules
on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.363 That this narrow
mandate was a product of intelligent design might be divined from
Congress's reference-earlier in the same sentence-to cases in which
the SEC is required to "consider or determine" the consistency of a
proposed rule with the public interest.3 6 Similarly telling is the legis-
lative history of the NSMIA, which included an earlier iteration of
Section 106 that required the SEC to "consider or determine" the
360 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1351-52 (contrasting substantive and procedural cost-
benefit statutes); see also Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 9, 13 (arguing that the language
of Section 106 suggests a procedural rather than substantive requirement). Notably, where
cost-benefit mandates are substantive rather than procedural in nature, they have been
quite clear about their scope. See ROSE & WALKER, supra note 34, at 4 (stating that
Executive Order 12,291's mandate that "[riegulatory action shall not be undertaken unless
the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society"
was clearly not merely procedural (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127
(1981))).
361 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1839-40 (arguing that the SEC should not go
beyond the statutory mandate of Section 106 to draw conclusions). A plausible analogy
might be the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006). As interpreted by the Supreme Court, NEPA
requires agencies to study environmental impacts as they exercise their discretion, but it
does not alter their substantive mandates. See id. § 4332(2)(c); Jason J. Czarnezki,
Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative
Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 10-12
(2006) (describing the Supreme Court's treatment of NEPA as purely procedural).
362 See Johnston, supra note 15, at 1351-52 (contrasting procedural cost-benefit statutes
with substantive cost-benefit statutes that require agencies to base their actions on their
findings). It goes without saying that it would be difficult to conclude that the SEC is not
obliged to reach any conclusion as to the impact of its rulemaking on efficiency, competi-
tion, and capital formation, but that it is required to comply with some such conclusion.
363 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106.
364 Id. (emphasis added).
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implications of its rulemaking for efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.365
Other factors also favor a procedural interpretation of Section
106. To begin, the suggested function of Section 106-to enumerate
factors for SEC consideration 366-resonates more with a procedural
than a substantive reading of the statute. Section 106-a single sen-
tence buried in a statute directed to other matters-would seem a
peculiar way to alter the substantive mandate of the Commission. 367
The complexity and distributional concerns that arise under Section
106 have similar implications.368 While the SEC might reasonably be
expected to engage questions of efficiency, competition, and capital
formation, the complexity of the resulting analysis-and the signifi-
cant distributional questions attendant to weighing those factors
alongside the pursuit of investor protection-counsel against an
expectation that Section 106 will dictate the nature of SEC
rulemaking.
A further note is also in order: Whatever the obligation of the
SEC to consider Section 106's enumerated factors, it is not difficult to
imagine cases in which the effectuation of those findings would be ill-
advised. In particular, the greater the extent of any distributional con-
cerns, the more likely this is to be true. One might plausibly extrapo-
late from this to the conclusion that in some cases cost-benefit analysis
should not even be conducted. At a minimum, though, this possibility
mandates caution against overstating the scope of the obligation
imposed by Section 106.
2. The Nature of the SEC's Analysis
In defining the proper nature of SEC analysis under Section 106,
three features might be highlighted: First, any rigid quantification of
the variables to be weighed is ill-advised. Second, the SEC should
avoid any explicit or implicit attempt to balance the factors
365 Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2131, 104th
Cong. § 8(b) (1995); see Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1821 (noting removal of the
determination requirement).
366 See supra notes 295-309 and accompanying text (identifying Section 106's primary
function as enumerating factors for SEC consideration).
367 A natural analogy to such an account of Section 106 might be the "supermandates"
proposed by regulatory reformers in the 1990s. See Buzbee, supra note 123, at 306
(describing legislation that proposed to supersede all agencies' decisionmaking criteria
with a requirement of cost-benefit analysis); see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Admin.
Law & Regulatory Practice, Comments on H.R. 3010, the Regulatory Accountability Act of
2011, 64 ADMIN. L. REv. AM. U. 624, 639-43 (2012) (critiquing similar recent proposals).
368 See supra Part IV.B.3 (describing the complexity and distributional issues that sur-
round Section 106's factors).
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enumerated. Finally, analysis under Section 106 should be crafted to
give careful attention to the distributional dynamics at work.
By contrast with the practice of cost-benefit analysis in many
other settings, Section 106 should not be understood to demand a
formal quantification of relevant costs and benefits. The benefits of
quantification in appropriate settings go without saying.369 As often as
not, it may be precisely the reduction of the regulatory analysis to
hard numbers that ensures that cost-benefit framework serves its
intended function.
Several factors cut against such quantification, however, in the
context of Section 106. This begins with the provision's lack of any
explicit reference to "costs" or "benefits."3 7 0 More generally, though,
Section 106 is ill-suited to efforts at quantification. Both the indeter-
minate nature of its enumerated factors and their complexity undercut
the possibility of their reduction to meaningful numerical values. The
multiplicity of variables only adds to this difficulty.37'
In addition to presenting significant challenges, quantification is
less relevant to an analysis under Section 106. To begin, the operative
cost-benefit analysis here is not directed to the realm of risk regula-
tion. Given as much, the traditional preference for quantification-
well grounded in that sphere-may be relatively inapplicable under
Section 106. More modestly, one might claim greater room for distinct
approaches to cost-benefit analysis under Section 106 given the new
territory it encompasses.
But the lesser relevance of quantification rests most heavily on
the distinct function of cost-benefit analysis under Section 106.
Whatever the precise parameters of Section 106's purpose, the reduc-
tion of cognitive biases and the facilitation of agency monitoring are
particularly difficult to reconcile with the context and nature of the
provision.372 Yet it is as to those functions that quantification is at the
acme of its importance. Any reduction to precise quanta of the SEC's
369 See Frank B. Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance
Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 2-3 (1986); Nelson Goodell,
Making the "Intangibles" Tangible: The Need to Use Contingent Valuation Methodology in
Environmental Impact Statements, 22 TUL. ENvrL. L.J. 441, 448 (2009) (arguing for the
quantification of environmental harm in cost-benefit analyses).
370 Compare National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b (2012), with 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2012) (mandating that the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission undertake cost-benefit analysis).
371 See supra Part IV.B.4 (describing the difficulty of capturing and balancing Section
106's many variables).
372 See supra Parts II.A.2 (exploring the reduction of cognitive biases as a function of
cost-benefit analysis) & II.B.4 (exploring agency monitoring as a function of cost-benefit
analysis).
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weighing of efficiency, competition, and capital formation, by contrast,
would generate limited additional value.3 73
The poor fit of a balancing approach to Section 106 likewise starts
with the language itself. The statute does not, of course, speak of costs
and benefits. More importantly, it does not juxtapose "protection of
investors" and "efficiency, competition, and capital formation" in a
way that would suggest a balancing of one against the other. 374
Rather, the new factors are to be considered "in addition to" investor
protection.375
Regardless of the language, balancing among these variables is
not readily accomplished. As noted above, investor protection may
variously be efficient or inefficient. 376 The same might be said of com-
petition and capital formation. Competition may sometimes enhance
investor protection, meanwhile, while undercutting it at others. The
tendency of each of the factors to favor certain categories of market
participants-at least in select circumstances-offers a further caution
against any attempt at balancing.377 Such distributional impacts make
choices among the factors even more freighted.
This points to a final feature of cost-benefit analysis under
Section 106 that can be derived from the foregoing. As suggested
above, both the ex ante equilibrium against which proposed SEC rules
are directed and Section 106's analysis of those rules have strong dis-
tributional characteristics. 378 Any cost-benefit analysis under Section
106 must attend to the latter. The evaluation of relevant costs and
benefits in these circumstances may necessitate appropriate discounts,
373 Recent internal guidance from the SEC's Office of General Counsel, tracking the
position of the Office of Management and Budget, argues for just such immersion in quan-
titative analysis by the Commission's rulemaking divisions. See CURRENr GUIDANCE,
supra note 69, at 7, 9-10, 12-14 (emphasizing the importance of using quantitative analysis
to support rulemaking). As acknowledged above, such quantitative precision has
undoubted value, in appropriate cases. The institutionalization of a more quantitative
approach-with the creation of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation in
September 2009-is similarly well advised. Cf Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?
Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEx. L. REV. 1601,
1682-83 (2012) (describing the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation's focus
on interdisciplinary analysis); Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 30-32 (describing the new
division). For the reasons enumerated above, however, I would argue that the guidance
document seeks to press the Commission too far down that path.
374 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106.
375 Id.
376 See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text (describing the differential impact of
efficiency on different types of investors).
377 See supra notes 327-42 and accompanying text (detailing the different consequences
of the Section 106 factors for different types of investors).
378 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the distributional implications of SEC regulation
and Section 106's factors).
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for example, to address distortions associated with the uneven distri-
bution of assets and/or information. Improvements in investor protec-
tion or capital formation need to be carefully weighed, meanwhile, in
light of their skewed distribution to retail investors and sophisticated
investors, respectively. Beyond such caution, the distributional charac-
teristics in certain settings may counsel against any use of cost-benefit
analysis at all. At a minimum, however, their presence discourages the
rigid or unvarying use of cost-benefit analysis under Section 106.
3. The Nature of Review
Beyond the SEC's own conduct of cost-benefit analysis under
Section 106, what insights can the foregoing offer, as to the nature of
any ensuing review? In certain settings, as Eric Posner has suggested,
cost-benefit analysis is best subjected to political rather than legal con-
straint.379 Section 106 is among those settings.
Again, the statutory text counsels this result. Mere "considera-
tion" lends itself less naturally to judicial review than to political
accountability. 380 The indeterminate nature of the factors to be con-
sidered points to the same conclusion, as does the inability to simply
balance them out.3 81 A certain awkward quality to the D.C. Circuit's
decisions under Section 106 might be seen to reflect as much.3 8 2
Simply put, consistent and coherent legal standards for review of the
SEC's generalized weighing of investor protection, efficiency, compe-
tition, and capital formation may be impossible to imagine.
The distributional character of any conclusions reached under
Section 106 likewise favors a more political approach to their
review.3 83 Such distributive choices are necessarily political in nature,
and hence best policed by the political branches, rather than the
379 See Posner, supra note 40, at 1187-90 (describing cost-benefit analysis as a tool of
political accountability). Notably, one might see some indication of this in the SEC's volun-
tary conduct of more traditional cost-benefit analysis, dating back to the 1970s. Posner thus
suggests that, in light of the political functions of cost-benefit analysis in certain circum-
stances, agencies may engage in it voluntarily. Id. at 1159-60.
380 Cf supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that Section 106 only requires the
SEC to "consider" the enumerated factors (quoting the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act § 106)).
381 See supra notes 327-42 (describing the complexity and distributional consequences
of the Section 106 factors), 349-53 (explaining the difficulty of balancing Section 106's
factors) and accompanying text.
382 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing the analytical tension
within the D.C. Circuit's decisions on Section 106).
383 See supra notes 327-42 and accompanying text (describing the distributional impacts
of Section 106's factors).
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courts. 3 8 4 This approach may permit greater flexibility in attempting
to address any distributional difficulties that arise. More substantively,
the inherently political nature of distributional choices may counsel
political constraints as a matter of democratic accountability. 385
To be sure, the institutional context of Section 106 demands cau-
tion in any preference for political over judicial review. Especially as
exercised under the auspices of OIRA, political review has seemed to
entail something more than a generalized assessment by the political
branches. 386 It has involved, thus, a greater degree of political inter-
vention than would commonly be seen as appropriate in the context of
independent agency rulemaking. An orientation to political review
might not, therefore, be properly reduced to heightened OIRA
review.
Given the mandatory nature of the SEC's consideration of effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation, furthermore, some degree
of judicial review is likely justified under Section 106.387 If nothing
else, the indisputable flaws in the SEC's analysis of Rule 14a-11
counsel as much.388 This position should not be taken lightly, however,
and may not hold true in many settings of cost-benefit analysis. To the
contrary, in fact, a number of the most important cost-benefit man-
dates-those imposed under the UMRA and by President Reagan
and his successors by executive order-are nonjusticiable by their own
terms.389 By virtue of their general applicability and distinct functions,
384 See David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1259 (arguing that decisions about distributive justice should be made by the political
branches).
385 See id. The functions of cost-benefit analysis under Section 106 suggested above
might likewise favor political review. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the functions of cost-
benefit analysis under Section 106). If the provision is primarily directed to SEC considera-
tion of Congress's enumerated factors, and secondarily to limiting the extent of regulation
and to some loose promotion of efficiency-all political functions to a significant degree-
legal review may be that much less appropriate. Finally, the limited role of judicial review
in regulating the SEC generally might be seen to lend further support to a focus on polit-
ical review. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (describing the SEC's historical
insulation from judicial review).
386 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUm. L. REV. 1260, 1266 (2006) (outlining critiques of Reagan-era OIRA
review).
387 It is telling, in this regard, that important elements of the SEC's analysis of share-
holder proxy access under Section 106 were flawed. See Mongone, supra note 16, at 774
(identifying SEC conclusions that were insufficiently supported by the evidence).
388 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (detailing the inadequacies of the
SEC's analysis of Rule 14a-11).
389 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1571(b)(2) (2012) (limiting
judicial review of agency compliance or noncompliance); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R.
215, 217 (2011) (barring judicial review of Executive Order titled "Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review").
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however, those provisions should not be analogized to Section 106.
Limited as Section 106's mandate may be, it is no less of a mandate for
that.390
Judicial review under Section 106 should be circumspect, how-
ever, and highly deferential. 39' Such deference is consistent with the
traditionally limited judicial constraints on the SEC.3 9 2 It is also in line
with the Commission's significant expertise and its stature as an
independent agency. 393 That the obligation to consider efficiency,
competition, and capital formation comes by way of legislative initia-
tive rather than executive order-and in legislation directed specifi-
cally to the SEC-lends further support to such deference. 394 A
relatively high degree of deference, finally, is also favored by the com-
plexity and distributional character of SEC analysis under Section
106.395 If courts ever owe deference to administrative agencies, it is
when they grapple with the difficult choices and normative decisions
that arise in these circumstances. 396
A further point concerns the specificity of any judicial evaluation
of SEC analysis under Section 106. As written, the broadly worded
decision in Business Roundtable significantly empowered the courts
390 It is telling that the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, adopted only a year before
Section 106, included an explicit preclusion of judicial review. 2 U.S.C. § 1571(b)(2).
391 Judicial review of agency action is generally deferential, and especially so when it
comes to agencies' evaluation of relevant costs and benefits. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing judicial review of cost-
benefit analysis as highly deferential); Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 303
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (same). Given the nature of Section 106-as compared with more stan-
dard-form cost-benefit analysis requirements-the relevant standard of deference ought to
be even greater.
392 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (explaining traditional deference in
judicial review of the SEC).
393 See Rose, supra note 315, at 1412 (the SEC is designed as "a politically insulated,
independent agency").
394 But see supra notes 201-05 (noting source and institutional specificity of cost-benefit
mandate as relevant determinants of form). As, of course, does the language of Section
106, with its reference to mere "consider[ation]." National Securities Market Improvement
Act of 1996 § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012).
395 See supra Part IV.B.3 (noting the complexity and distributional consequences associ-
ated with Section 106).
396 See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 328 (3d ed.
1998) ("A reviewing court normally will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
in making factual conclusions so long as the agency's conclusions have a substantial basis in
the record... ."); cf William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1180 (2008) (noting normative decisions and complex technical issues as
areas of more limited judicial review of agency interpretations). Whatever judicial review
does occur, moreover, should be tailored to the SEC, rather than generic in nature. This
approach is suggested both by Section 106's directive to the SEC particularly, and by the
nature of the SEC as something other than the standard risk regulator commonly thought
to engage in cost-benefit analysis.
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and disempowered the SEC. As to the courts, the decision's lack of a
clear standard of analysis left future discretion not in the hands of the
agency, where it should be, but instead in the hands of the courts.397
As David Zaring has pointed out, meanwhile, the imprecise quality of
Business Roundtable also limited the ability of the SEC to respond
effectively. It could neither discern a clear path of appeal, nor readily
fix the problem, given its lack of ready identification. 398
Needless to say, the D.C. Circuit's approach to Section 106
cannot be reconciled with this approach. Across the Chamber of
Commerce, American Equity, and Business Roundtable decisions, the
court held the SEC to a standard of cost-benefit analysis that would
be high even for a provision that explicitly invoked costs and benefits
and was directed to one of the more conventional functions of such
analysis-be it the reduction of cognitive bias, agency monitoring,
increased transparency, or the promotion of optimal outcomes. 399
Perhaps as a consequence, it failed to appreciate the SEC's more than
adequate "consideration" of Congress's enumerated factors for
analysis-the function that Section 106 is more properly understood
to serve.
Already on the wrong track, the court went on to demand quanti-
fication and balancing that are difficult to reconcile with the terms of
Section 106, if not directly contrary to its mandate.400 The court chal-
lenged the SEC's conclusions-notwithstanding the absence of any
requirement that such conclusions even be offered.401 And it offered
simplistic critiques of the complex calculus that Section 106
requires. 402
The lessons of Business Roundtable may be as important for cost-
benefit analysis generally, however, as they are for Section 106 partic-
ularly. In actual application, the form of cost-benefit analysis can be
397 See Maile Gradison, Recent Case, Administrative Law-The Benefits of Prophylactic
Empirical Analysis by Administrative Agencies After Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. SEC, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 619, 656-57 (2006) ("[Tjhe court's vague standard
puts a large amount of power in the hands of future courts.").
398 See Zaring, supra note 103 ("There isn't a very clear path for affirmance for the
agency, nor is there a 'no way, no how' moment that would make clear that it needs to go
to Congress.").
399 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (highlighting surprisingly stringent stan-
dard of review imposed in Business Roundtable).
400 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (holding that the SEC "neglected
its statutory obligation to assess the economic consequences of its rule" because "it did
nothing to estimate and quantify the costs it expected companies to incur").
401 See id. at 1149 (criticizing the SEC's evidence and analysis); Cox & Baucom, supra
note 14, at 1839-40.
402 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149-52 (analyzing the SEC's consideration of
costs and benefits).
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expected to vary significantly from one setting to the next. This may
hold true even where the identical legislative or executiv& mandate is
imposed on one agency (e.g., an independent, non-risk regulator)
versus another (e.g., an executive-branch risk regulator). More impor-
tantly, across diverse statutes and regulations, cost-benefit analysis
must necessarily take different forms. These forms might be usefully
sorted and categorized, whether based on function or the underlying
characteristics that stand behind their form. Whatever the case, it is
essential to evaluate cost-benefit analyses not against some platonic
ideal, but in their particular context. Only when we do so can they be
properly judged.
V
TOWARDS A NEW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Beyond the particular setting of SEC rulemaking, what insights
might we take away from the above, as to the role of cost-benefit
analysis in financial regulation more generally? Without question,
there are reasons both to embrace cost-benefit analysis in the design
of financial regulation-and to put it aside. It is useful, then, to con-
clude with a few words about whether the practice of cost-benefit
analysis in financial regulation should be embraced or resisted-a
question Congress, agencies, and the courts will need to grapple with
in the years ahead. Beyond that, we do well to successively consider
the functions and forms of cost-benefit analysis in areas of financial
regulation beyond Section 106.403
Among the arguments for preserving the relative insulation of
financial regulation from cost-benefit analysis, two stand out. The first
is the high level of uncertainty associated with financial regulation.404
Markets are complex institutions. Financial markets are especially-
and perhaps increasingly-so. 405 Part of this complexity lies in the
403 One might wonder whether Section 23(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, with its
charge to the SEC to consider the impact of its rulemaking on competition, might not be
the next battleground. Cf CURRENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 3 (describing the D.C.
Circuit's standard of review for Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act). Other possibilities
might be identified as well. See id. at 3 n.7 (noting SEC obligations under the Paperwork
Reduction Act, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act).
404 Cf Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1489,
1499 n.37 (2002) ("In a situation of uncertainty, when existing knowledge does not permit
regulators to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is exceedingly hard to do cost-benefit
analysis.").
405 See Brett McDonnell, Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and
After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 17 (2011) (detailing the increasing com-
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heterogeneous range of actors who participate in the financial mar-
kets, from distinctly motivated individuals to widely varied institu-
tions.406 As complex as the cast of characters on the capital markets
are, however, the complex character of modern financial instruments
may add even more to the aggregate complexity of the financial mar-
kets.407 Beyond complexity, the uncertainty of financial regulation is
further enhanced by the substantial and perhaps inherent unpredict-
ability of the psychological impulses that undergird market behavior.
Especially on the financial markets, such "animal spirits" play a cen-
tral role.408
Beyond uncertainty, a further argument against the widespread
use of cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation is exemplified by
Section 106. As evident in the Business Roundtable litigation, cost-
benefit analysis in financial regulation holds great potential for abuse.
In actual practice, its primary function may be to offer another bite at
the apple for interest groups that have tried-but failed-to stymie
new regulatory initiatives at the legislative or rulemaking stage.409
Rather than a tool for improving regulation, it may amount to little
more than a weapon for deregulation.
By way of rejoinder, at least three counter-arguments might be
offered: For all the uncertainty and complexity in the financial mar-
kets, to begin, the rich body of existing-and constantly accumu-
lating-data on the markets offers the opportunity to engage in
meaningful cost-benefit analyses of financial regulation. 410 This is
plexity of financial markets); Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to
Complexity Capture, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 643, 683-89 (2012) (same).
406 See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 456 (2011) ("[T]oday's financial industry is expan-
sive, highly diverse, and heterogeneous."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in
Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 211, 235 (2009) (describing how the complexity of
the financial markets is driven by myriad connections among diverse market participants).
407 See Schwarcz, supra note 406, at 217, 220-22 (illustrating the complexity of mort-
gage-loan products and securities and how they lead to market failure); see also Zachary J.
Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L.
55, 94 (2011) (noting how financial innovation leads to increased complexity in financial
instruments); McDonnell, supra note 405, at 17 (arguing that innovation increases market
complexity).
408 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 144 (1936) (noting power of "animal spirits" in shaping market behavior); see
also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1
(2010) (emphasizing the importance of "animal spirits" in shaping market activity).
409 See McGarity, supra note 61, at 531-33 (suggesting that judicial scrutiny of agency
cost-benefit analysis can result in manipulation by regulatees).
410 But see Kraus & Raso, supra note 14, at 30 (noting significant challenges of data
collection regarding SEC and CFTC regulatory initiatives, given their mandate to regulate
a variety of new markets); see also ROSE & WALKER, supra note 34, at 17 (quoting U.S.
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especially so, given the diminished challenges of quantification and
valuation in financial rulemaking as compared with environmental
regulation, workplace safety regulation, and other regulatory fields.411
A meaningful role for cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation
is also favored by the high stakes of getting it right. As in other regula-
tory spheres in which cost-benefit analysis has taken hold, the upside
of improved decisionmaking is substantial. And-as the financial
crisis made clear-the downside could not be more grave. That down-
side, moreover, is not limited to the financial markets themselves. 412
The relatively broader range of policy alternatives presented in finan-
cial regulation-as compared with environmental regulation, for
example-might make the stakes even higher in the former than in
the latter.
Finally, given the necessary centrality of some efficiency goal in
regulating the financial markets, agencies' use of cost-benefit analysis
seems well warranted. As Revesz and Livermore have put it, cost-
benefit analysis would seem to be "a requirement of basic rationality"
in such a setting.413 Without such analysis, it becomes all but impos-
sible to define, evaluate, or measure success or failure.
Beyond these tailored arguments, cost-benefit analysis should be
understood to serve three important functions in financial regulation
generally. Most obviously, as with Section 106, cost-benefit analysis
may facilitate a more effective balancing of the competing demands of
the financial markets.414 A properly designed scheme of financial reg-
ulation must address a complex array of actors, with (sometimes
widely) varying needs. In this setting, cost-benefit analysis has the
potential to play a mediating-if not quite arbitrating-role.
Minimally, it may offer a kind of common language, or at least base of
discourse, for navigating the complex choices inherent in financial reg-
ulation. More substantively, it might be seen as offering a common
currency of sorts, with which some rough balance can be sought
between competing preferences and demands.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO REPORT GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACr
REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND
COORDINATION 19 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl2151.pdf)
(describing the difficulty in reliably estimating costs and benefits in the financial services
industry).
411 See supra Part IV.B.4 (comparing the challenges in securities regulation versus other
areas of regulation); see also ROSE & WALKER, supra note 34, at 18 (analyzing difficulty of
quantifying costs and benefits in financial regulation).
412 Cf Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887,
1937-38 (2013) (describing broad externalities associated with securities fraud).
413 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 12.
414 See supra Part IV.A.2 (exploring balance of different priorities of Section 106).
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Cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation may also be impor-
tant in helping to emphasize the non-interest-group basis for agencies'
regulatory choices. The financial markets are characterized by sharply
divergent regulatory preferences, not only between institutional and
retail investors, but-perhaps more importantly-between issuers,
investment banks, and institutional investors.415 Given the conse-
quently high stakes of regulatory decisionmaking, a particularly exten-
sive network of lobbying activity-at all levels of governance-
operates around the financial markets.416 This activity, in turn, has
prompted significant concern that interest-group influence may under-
mine the public interest.417
Cost-benefit analysis may be useful in helping to alleviate these
concerns. This begins with its enhancement of transparency.418
Greater visibility into the regulatory process may in and of itself be an
important antidote to perceived interest-group influence. But cost-
benefit analysis may also do more. It may help to communicate the
net social benefit of particular regulatory choices, in ways that reduce
perceptions of capture or other regulatory bias. Even further, cost-
benefit analysis might reduce interest-group influence in reality. But
even if the impact of cost-benefit analysis was limited to perception-
perhaps given the inevitable malleability associated with it-it would
constitute an important contribution.
Finally, cost-benefit analysis may contribute to financial regula-
tion by helping to reduce cognitive biases against systemic risk partic-
ularly, and future harms more generally. In financial regulation, as
elsewhere, there is both a psychological and a political tendency
toward the over-discounting of systemic risks.419 As the recent finan-
cial crisis made abundantly clear, however, whatever informational
efficiencies the financial markets might offer, they do not extend to an
appropriate discounting of systemic risks. The cascade effects that
originated with the collapse of the U.S. housing market, and radiated
outward from there-both geographically and across distinct financial
markets-starkly highlighted both the complexity of the capital
415 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1860-61 (addressing
differing regulatory preferences of issuers and institutional investors).
416 See Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks' Lobbyists Help in Drafting Bills on Finance,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2013, at Al (discussing the resurgence of financial lobbying
influence).
417 See id. (noting critics of banks' lobbying influence).
418 See supra Part II.B.3.
419 See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (describing cognitive bias against sys-
temic risk in financial markets).
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markets, and the failure of asset valuations to accurately reflect sys-
temic risk.420
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, of course, a great deal of
attention was showered on institutions deemed "too big to fail" 421 -
among the important sources of systemic risk in the financial markets.
Tellingly, though, reform proposals to prevent the emergence of such
institutions gained little traction, and the final provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act included only half-measures in that direction. 422 Within
little more than a year, issues of systemic risk went from the headlines
to the sidelines in the policy discourse. An effective regime of cost-
benefit analysis-in which such systemic risk is distinctly identified as
a question for evaluation-might help to address this dynamic, in
which systemic risks are downplayed for both psychological and polit-
ical reasons.
If cost-benefit analysis has an important role to play in financial
regulation, then, and the foregoing are its core functions, what key
characteristics can be understood to follow? Given its suggested pur-
poses, to begin, an effective regime of cost-benefit analysis for finan-
cial regulation should integrate a relatively broader range of factors
than traditional cost-benefit analysis-in environmental regulation
and elsewhere. Minimally, this would imply a receptivity to effects
that lie further afield-be they costs or benefits-rather than exclu-
sively those grounded in the same field of inquiry as the operative
regulation itself.423 The implicit, if not explicit, preference for quantifi-
able factors in traditional cost-benefit analysis might likewise be modi-
fied for financial regulation.424 Finally, factors that are not distinctly
costs or benefits might also be expected to play a greater role in cost-
benefit analysis in financial regulation. "Investor protection," for
420 See Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CoRP. L. 513, 533 (2011) (noting the difficulty
with asset valuations and their historic failure to reflect systemic risk).
421 See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1375-85 (2011) (dis-
cussing the problems associated with "too big to fail" institutions); Aaron C. Stine & Eric
D. Gorman, Ebbing the Tide of Local Bank Concentration: Granting Sole Authority to the
Department of Justice to Review the Competitive Effects of Bank Mergers, 62 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 405, 407 (2012) ("After the financial collapse, the policy and policymakers alike
heaped much scorn upon banks that had become 'too big to fail."').
422 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REv. 951, 1053-54 (2011) (arguing that
the Dodd-Frank Act did not completely solve the "too big to fail" problem).
423 Factors to be evaluated in the cost-benefit analysis of a proposed financial rule might
thus include potential environmental impacts of the rule.
424 Cf supra note 51 (outlining prescribed requirements for cost-benefit analysis).
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example, is not always of benefit-and may sometimes even be a cost.
Yet it is rightly placed at the heart of SEC analysis under Section 106.
Care should be taken that this broadening of cost-benefit analysis
in financial regulation does not generate a concomitant loss in rigor,
however, given both the significant capacity for quantification and
monetization in financial regulation, and the relatively high stakes.
Even if less "precise" than traditional cost-benefit analysis, the evalu-
ation of costs and benefits in financial regulation need not reduce to a
loose weighing of pros and cons. Cost-benefit analysis in financial reg-
ulation should include all the systematic evaluation associated with
conventional cost-benefit analysis, but with additional-and
broader-factors incorporated into the mix as well. Important strands
of the analysis of proposed financial rules, as such, may well be non-
quantitative. But that analysis need be no less systematic, including in
its enumeration of a precise set of factors for consideration.
Cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation should thus be fairly
clear as to the criteria for consideration and evaluation. More specifi-
cally, a cost-benefit analysis regime for financial rulemaking should
explicitly enumerate the factors of greatest concern-and perhaps
greatest difficulty-in the design of effective financial rules. Most
importantly, any such analysis should be required to engage questions
of systemic risk and the potential distributional impacts of the pro-
posed rule.
Given that systemic risk concerns are among the core arguments
for cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation,425 attention to sys-
temic risks should be mandated clearly in any applicable regime of
cost-benefit analysis. As we have seen, distributional concerns also
weigh heavily in the design of financial regulation.426 A regime of
cost-benefit analysis for financial rulemaking should thus attend to
distributional issues of two sorts: First, of course, variation in the costs
or benefits imposed on distinct categories of market actors should be
explicitly considered. While Kaldor-Hicks efficient choices may be
warranted in certain cases, it is important that such choices be trans-
parent-and that they be engaged directly. At least as important-
though perhaps less apparent-are distributional imbalances that will
play themselves out over time.4 2 7 In many cases, such imbalances will
overlap with issues of systemic risk. Regardless of their precise nature,
425 See supra notes 246-47, 322-23 and accompanying text (discussing systemic risk and
the importance of financial regulation in minimizing it).
426 See supra notes 328-42 and accompanying text (noting distributional issues in finan-
cial regulation).
427 Cf Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 344-45 (discussing the difficulty of addressing
distributional impacts across generations).
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however, a cost-benefit analysis regime for financial regulation should
explicitly require engagement with them.
What, then, should be the regulatory expectations associated with
a broader, yet still rigorous, cost-benefit analysis regime for financial
regulation, in which quantifiable variables do not exclude other
(clearly enumerated) factors? As in Section 106, any such analysis
should be procedural, rather than substantive, in nature. Especially in
the financial markets, with not only their significant complexity, but
also their capacity for-if not tendency toward-rapid change, cost-
benefit analysis should be a tool, not a straitjacket. Relevant regula-
tors-from the SEC to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
the Federal Reserve Bank, and others-should be expected to con-
duct rigorous cost-benefit analysis. But their ultimate regulatory
choices should not be limited to the outcomes dictated by that
analysis. Where alternative policies meet the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act and the organic statutes of the relevant
agencies, an agency's inability to prove their net utility-or even their
apparent inconsistency with the agency's cost-benefit analysis-should
not prevent enactment of such policies.
Finally, though, given the concerns with interest group influence
that constitute another important reason for cost-benefit analysis in
financial regulation, financial regulators' compliance with the proce-
dural obligations of cost-benefit analysis should be subject to mean-
ingful judicial review.428 The D.C. Circuit's decision in Business
Roundtable made a mockery of such review,429 but its very nature as
an outlier counsels against relying on it to dump the baby out with the
bathwater. Until Business Roundtable, courts had successfully navi-
gated the balance between meaningful review of agencies' cost-benefit
analyses and the deference dictated by the courts' lack of expertise-
as to the substantive rulemaking at stake, and even as to the proper
weighting of associated costs and benefits.430 With clear and consistent
428 See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (analyzing appropriate scope of judi-
cial review of cost-benefit analysis by independent agencies).
429 By contrast, consider the decision in Investment Co. Institute v. CFTC, 891 F. Supp.
2d 162 (D.D.C. 2012). There, the court rejected the attempt by plaintiffs-notably also
represented by Eugene Scalia-"to use the agency's obligation to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis to delve impermissibly into agency policy judgments and second-guess the CFTC's
conclusion on the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis, all under the rubric of the APA's
traditional arbitrary and capricious standard." Id. at 220.
430 See Cox & Baucom, supra note 14, at 1814 ("Until very recent years, SEC-adopted
rules enjoyed a blissful existence before the D.C. Circuit." (footnote omitted)); James D.
Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 37-39 (2000) (calling the Business Roundtable decision "[t]he most
serious reversal in the SEC's long history of rule making"); see also Kraus & Raso, supra
note 14, at 23 (discussing the Business Roundtable decision).
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guidance on the appropriate scope of judicial review of cost-benefit
analysis-be it from Congress or the Supreme Court-this balance
can be expected to remain the norm. And with such a balance, judicial
review of financial regulators' procedural obligations in cost-benefit
analysis will remain an important feature of an effective regime.
CONCLUSION
Rather than shying away from the true nature of Section 106 and
the D.C. Circuit's invocation of it to derail the SEC's long drive to
empower shareholders, the foregoing attempts to engage the provi-
sion for what it is. Without question, the Business Roundtable decision
was a striking decision as a matter of modern-day administrative law.
It is difficult (if not impossible) to reconcile it with the Supreme
Court's standard-most prominently articulated in Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Insurance-for
arbitrary and capricious review of agency action. 431 For that very
reason, though, the decision's implications for administrative law
might plausibly be seen as limited.
A different conclusion is suggested, however, when we under-
stand Section 106 and Business Roundtable as pointing to new-and
highly distinct-conceptions of the nature of cost-benefit analysis. On
this count, their potential implications are likely to be great. And as
such, they require our close attention.
Most immediately, a clearer understanding of Section 106 and the
Business Roundtable decision is crucial, given the implications they
may hold for implementation of the many requirements of the Dodd-
Frank Act-including rulemaking on the Volcker Rule, on securitiza-
tion, and on derivatives trading.432 In offering a narrowly defined con-
ception of Section 106, thus, the foregoing constitutes an important
antidote to the fear that that provision might put a stop to the regula-
tory reforms that Congress dictated in response to the global financial
crisis. 433
The lessons to be learned from Section 106's extension of cost-
benefit analysis to financial regulation, however, do not stop there. As
the reach of cost-benefit analysis continues to expand, the analysis
herein offers a framework for understanding its distinct functions and
431 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
432 See Coffee, supra note 32, at 1067 (discussing the possible impact of Business
Roundtable on future rules).
433 In a sense, the analysis herein offers a framework for the SEC to do what David
Arkush has advised in a work-in-progress: Take the lead in defining the appropriate form
of cost-benefit analysis in securities regulation, and define it-for not only themselves, but
the courts as well. See Arkush, supra note 33, at 3.
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potential forms, both in financial regulation and beyond. Cost-benefit
analysis may be a useful tool across the length and breadth of the
modern administrative state. If its utility is to be realized, however,
the rote invocation of "efficiency" as its purpose-and of a single
method of analysis as its form-must be abandoned. Rather, we must
embrace a more open conception of the diversity of approaches cost-
benefit analysis may encompass. The discourse of cost-benefit
analysis, in turn, must more consistently and systematically attend to
its function-and appropriate form-in any given case. 434
At the broadest level, finally, the foregoing helps to shed light on
the appropriate scope of courts' review of agencies' cost-benefit
analyses-and, in turn, on the nature of judicial review generally. For
the full promise of cost-benefit analysis to be realized, so too must its
limits-including the limits on its review. Cost-benefit analysis has
advanced a great distance over the century of its application in U.S.
law. As that march continues, regulators and judges alike will need to
engage more fully with its appropriate nature and proper use.
434 The benefits of recognizing a broader universe of potential functions and forms of
cost-benefit analysis may be quite far-reaching. Consider, for example, the U.S. negotia-
tions with the European Union to establish what would be the largest trading bloc in the
world. Among the key concerns of the Europeans, it turns out, has been the prospect that a
rigid species of cost-benefit analysis would be applied to European regulatory initiatives.
See Steven Erlanger, Conflicting Goals Complicate an Effort to Forge a Trans-Atlantic
Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013, at B1.
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